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Abstract 
This thesis asks a straightforward but nevertheless a complex question, that is: Why did 
modernity fail in the Arab Middle East? The notion of modernity in this thesis signifies the 
occidental modernity which reached the region in many different forms and through various 
channels. This occidental modernity had an impact on many areas and changed the societies and 
politics of the region. But these changes stopped short of reaching modernity, in other words it 
failed to change the society from traditional to modem. The failure of the emergence of a modem 
society in the region has been a puzzle for those who work on the Middle East. There are 
plethora of theories, concepts and models attempting to demystify this puzzle. This thesis regards 
the emerged form of the States and the sovereign in the region as the prime cause behind this 
failure. The thesis advances a new way of conceptualising statehood and politics in the Middle 
East: the Failed Modem State (FMS). The key features of the FMS are as follows: the sovereign 
is the state; both modem and traditional elements are utilised by the state elites; the territory of 
the state is a space where roles and functions of everything changes. The main features which 
distinguish the FMS analysis from other analyses of the Middle East are as follows: it does not 
emphases' one area or aspect; it shows how both modem and traditional tools are necessary for 
the survival of the State; the Failed Modem State is neither modem nor traditional and resists 
being either. The FMS mages to reduce both modernity and traditional aspects into tools, this 
enables the FMS sovereigns to utilise both as instruments. Modem and traditional forces used by 
the FMS to balance the power, to justify acts, divide society and being able to rule it and conquer 
it. This makes reform and change difficult if not impossible. 
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Introduction 
For Arab or Middle Eastern modernity there is more than one point of departure. The 
departure is the moment of yaqza waking up, or nahza standing up, or ba 'th rebirth, or 
essentially asr altanur alarabi, the era of Arab renaissance. All these adjectives or concepts are 
related directly to an event or a mega event. This naming, conceptualising and describing shows 
what the Arabs wanted from modernity and how they pictured it. These events have occurred 
either in the region or in the birthplace of modernity (Europe). One of the main events that 
happened in Europe which affected directly or consequently the region is the French Revolution. 
As Lewis (1961: 40) puts it: 
The French Revolution was the first great movement of ideas in Western Christendom 
that had any real effect on the world of Islam. Despite the long confrontation of 
Christendom and Islam across the Mediterranean, and their numberless contacts, in peace 
and in war, from Syria to Spain, such earlier European movements as the Renaissance 
and the Reformation woke no echo and found no response among the Muslim peoples. 
While this makes an event like the French Revolution the moment of contact and 
subsequently the commencement of modernity, others trace the beginning of modernity, in the 
region, back to the arrival of printing and the emergence of newspapers (az-Zubi: 2006: 40). 
However, it has been argued that "if any date is to be chosen as marking the end of an era of a 
long Arab sleep, it will be the day on which Napoleon set foot on Egyptian soil in 1789" (Atiyah, 
1958: 73). The notion of sleep is rather thought provoking. Most concepts used in translation for 
modernity or renaissances in Arabic are related to the act of end of sleeping (wakening). "The 
idea of modernity rests on rupture" (Dube, 2002: 729): it is the end of an era and the beginning 
of a new one. The era that has ended, or was supposed to have ended, was an era of a long sleep. 
Sleep is an action-less form of being in the world. The sleeper is present in the world with no 
communication, no participation. This signifies that the Arabs were in the world but without any 
effect. 
This long sleep has to be ended. The moment of realisation, of being asleep, happened 
only when the Arabs faced modernity. This awareness of modernity for the inhabitants of the 
Middle East manifested itself through many different channels. As a result, attempts were made 
in various ways by the people, to create the possibility of changing their society and their role in 
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it, to such a degree and in such a fashion as to make it, in the way they understood the concept, 
modern (Watenpaugh, 2006: 4). But the effort was never fully neutral; at the end becoming the 
Other was always wrapped with fear and hesitation. 
I say we have not become fully part of Western Civilization because we have only taken 
from it what is in conformity with traditions and customs of the various races which 
make up our state. This has caused both material and cultural harm .... For if we just copy 
Europeans, we will disavow our origins and acquire an antipathy toward our [past]. 
Instead, we should follow them as closely as possible in the way in which they protect 
their own race and homeland. We should strive to protect our noble language and ways 
just as they protect their languages and ways (Watenpaugh, 2006: 4). 
The above quote is a paragraph of a speech that was delivered in 1910 in the city of 
Aleppo (Syria) by Fathallah Qastun, al-Sha"b [The People] newspaper editor. The speech 
crystallises the dilemma that emerged with the arrival of modernity which is the re-emergence of 
tradition. As Watenpaugh (2006: 5) comments, the most striking feature of the lecture is 
Qastun's conclusion "his incorporation of the 'essence' of the West and not just its material 
culture was vital to the survival of his society; moreover, the preeminent threat was not only that 
West but rather, an irrational attachment to tradition and custom". 
Modernity made the West regard itself as the centre of the world. From this centre, 
armies (a modem product) with their new weapons (another modem product) departed the cold 
continent toward the rest of the world. A long era of colonialism commenced. The discourse of 
colonialism was always a mission to civilize the other. When Baghdad fell in March 19th, 1917, 
Lieut. General Sir Stanley Maude issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of the city. In it he 
stated "[B]ut our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as 
liberators" ( quoted from Harper magazine, May 2003: 31 ). The invasion was reported back as 
liberation on 16th March 1917. Edmund Candler reported in the Manchester Guardian: 
Our vanguard entered Baghdad soon after nine o'clock this morning. The city is 
approached by an unmetalled road between palm groves and orange gardens. Crowds of 
Baghdadis came out to meet us: Persians, Krahe, Jew, Armenians, Chaldeans and 
Christians of diverse sects and races. They lined the streets, balconies and roofs, 
hurrahing and clapping their hands. Groups of schoolchildren danced in front of us, 
shouting and cheering, and the women of the city turned out in their holiday dresses. The 
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people of the city have been robbed to supply the Turkish army for the last two years. 
The oppression was becoming unendurable, and during the last week it degenerated into 
brigandage. I am told that the mere mention of the British was punishable, and the 
people were afraid to talk freely about the war. 
The coloniser aimed at transformation of the region. With their arrival in Iraq the British Empire 
embarked on the transformation of Mesopotamia. 
Through the provision of technical experts, labour and material for the construction of 
ships, wharves, railways, dams, canals, harbours and so on, in what was conceived of as a 
developmental effort, an effort to stake out the land of two rivers as a material object. By 
'development' I mean a statist effort to use public investment for the avowed purpose of 
raising a colony into a modern nation state (Satia, 2007: 213). 
The coloniser had a vision that by supplying technical experts and establishing shipping wharves, 
railways, dams, canals, harbours to the people the country reaches modernity. 
The modern notion of colonial development was a highly contingent product of the 
expansion of the British Empire into the Middle East. The idea of developing Iraq 
fulfilled certain military and cultural needs generated by the Great War: in a country 
famous for its former glory as the cradle of civilization, and against the backdrop of the 
technological undoing of civilization on the Western front, it offered proof of the 
constructive powers of modern technology and the British Empire (Satia, 2007: 213). 
Elsewhere the coloniser had the same mission and played the same game. However, as a 
result of intervention, contact and exchange, the region changed, improved but never developed. 
The idea of separating the wealth of the land from the people and transporting it elsewhere to 
fulfil certain purposes, continued in a different fashion. If the colonisers separated the wealth 
from the people, the emerging states continued in a similar vein. Despite the arrival of modern 
ideas and techniques, there was a lack of force to drive it toward modernity. 
The States that emerged, after WWII, were handed over to the local elites who were 
collaborating with the colonisers. The ruling classes which took over power, in those states, at 
the end of the colonial era, to paraphrase Fanon (2001: 120), were an under-developed middle 
class. This emerging ruling class was easily convinced that it could advantageously replace the 
colonial power. Through mimicking their previous coloniser, the new leader, of the new States, 
wanted to be like the coloniser. They created the circumstances to wield and maintain their 
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power. This condition has been seen widely as unsophisticated by both outside and local 
population and thus interpreted in a rather essentialist manner. 
The elites, who came to power with help from the outside, treated the State as booty. 
Their dilemma was not how to improve it, make it more legitimate or democratic. Their main 
concern was and remained hitherto the same, how to hold onto power and survive. They utilised 
both modernity and tradition toward this end. In the newly created condition modernity became a 
counter modem force. The creators of these conditions were the new elites and their states. Thus 
the State ended up being the main impediment to completing the development of the project of 
modernity. 
In this case modernity has to be imagined as a body whose spirit has been taken out by 
the State. The Saudi writer, Mansur al-Hazimi (1988: 385-91), describes the Saudi man walking 
the streets of London with "his suit of pure English wool, his French tie made of fine genuine 
silk, his Italian shoes of the best leather, and his expensive Swiss watch," as being "a walking 
showcase of the industries of the entire world". Therefore, as Elmusa (1997: 345-46) 
commented: 
The technology that inundated Saudi Arabia is essentially of the consumer type, except 
for the capital-intensive, petrochemical industry run largely by expatriates. It lacks 
backward and forward linkages: it neither takes from nor gives to local production or 
science. It is bereft of background and foreground, as if having descended from the 
heavens on a society that was not culturally prepared to receive it. 
Technology is the material side of modernity. Especially when Middle Eastern people are 
neither making it nor creating it, this materiality remains nothing but an aesthetic object. While 
the spiritual side of modernity- rights, reason, innovation and philosophy- which prepare the 
ground for human beings to participate in the world, become more active and depart from the 
world of tradition. In a Kantian sense (in his newspaper article; 'What is Enlightenment' 1748) 
(quoted from Foucault, 2007: 29) the spiritual side of modernity is assisting people to understand 
the world and its affairs without guidance from the other. It also encourages the individual to 
have the courage to know. This aspect of modernity, a secular, human love for knowledge, was 
blocked by the political elite and replaced by a revival of tradition, especially religion. This 
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obsession with tradition resulted in diverting from the exigency of modernity in a non material 
area. 
Thus the religion and its institutions (mosques, mullah, traditional charisma, and others) 
end up becoming the Ideological Apparatus of the State. In contrast to Europe the emergence of 
the modem state project did not aim to marginalise pre-modem political cleavages and 
jurisdictions and replace them with the institutions of a centralised state. However, the emergent 
postcolonial rulers claimed supremacy of sovereignty, over the people, resources, and, 
ultimately, over all other authorities within the territory it controlled. In this way it fulfilled the 
Weberian definition of the State. This contradiction remains hitherto unresolved. Thus while the 
State was imposed from the outside, vertically, it was never able to engage in a horizontal 
dialogue with the people that it claimed to rule. If in the West, especially in the 19th century, the 
State attempted to solve this gap through the idea of nationalism, in the Middle East nationalism 
as such has never materialised. After the French Revolution the State, the secular state, after 
breaking with religion invented the idea of nation to fill the void left behind by the separation of 
the State and church. In this regard Nationalism aimed "to overcome local ethno-cultural 
diversity and to produce standardized citizens whose loyalties to the nation [and its state] would 
be unchallenged by extra-societal allegiances" (Robertson, 1990: 49). 
The Arab form of nationalism was pan-nationalism. A nationalism that claimed to unite 
all the Arab land from the Ocean (Atlantic) to the Gulf (Persian) as the slogan of the Arab Ba'th 
Party called for. This grandiosity directly threatened the local elite and their wealth; therefore it 
was opposed vehemently by all the local leaders; especially in the Persian Gulf region. However, 
this call for pan-nationalism when it was put into practice, as in Iraqi and Syrian nationalisation, 
betrayed what it was advocating and soon ended up to be nothing more than a thin veneer to 
cover the reality of tribal control, as in the case of Saddam's Iraq, and the particular sect 
dominance in Asad's Syria. 
This emerged State from the date of its inception to the present time is in a struggle with 
the population that inhabit its territory. In Europe, in the course of the struggle for democracy 
and ordinary people's rights, the subjects of the State constituted themselves as citizens on 
whose sovereignty as a collective the power and legitimacy of the State was claimed to rest. As a 
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result sovereignty was transferred from the monarchical ruler to the people, and the people were 
defined as the sum of legally equal citizens. In the States of the Arab Middle East every struggle 
toward emancipation and becoming a citizen, no matter how trivial is brutally aborted by the 
State and its apparatuses. 
One of the main groups of activists (modernisers) in the regime are the intellectuals; 
those who are aware of the West and their own society, to a certain degree. Arab intellectuals are 
divided into two main strata: those with the State and those opposing it. Pro-State intellectuals 
run the media machine of the State. They are no more than propagandist. This group surrendered 
to the State and abandoned any acts of criticism. Whereas the intellectuals who are independents 
and view the State from a critical point of view, are marginalised or exiled by the State. Despite 
these differences both groups are caught in a phantasmagorical world. For both groups the main 
concern, at a rhetorical level, is how to make the Arab a global power again, as in the glorified 
past. As alJabri shows, in his book 1aqd al .hitab a$rabi (Critique of the Arab Discourse) 
(1994), the whole understanding of the renaissance nahza among most Arab thinkers is not based 
on reality. These intellectuals resembled the protagonist of Ivan Turgenev's novel, )athers and 
Sons. The novel was published in 1862 and in it Turgenev sketched the struggle in mid-
nineteenth-century Russia between a feeble liberalism and a merciless Jacobin revolt. In 
Bazarov, the novel's central character, Turgenev created a sombre figure doomed to destruction 
because he still stands only in the gateway of the future. "The Arab Bazarovs could not win: 
they, too, were only in the gateway of the future" (Ajami, 1997: 138). 
Most of the work of Arab intellectuals is text based, since their culture is dominated by a 
text, a holy text namely the Quran. Drawing on a text and ignoring reality is a sort of fashion. 
When they adapted this method to the Western modem texts they ended up being caught within 
the text. If the text reflects the dream and aspiration of modernity or it is modernity in its utopian 
form, then the Arab intellectuals are arrested inside that utopian dream. This is a hazardous game 
as Deleuze (1998) cautioned his student during a lecture, 'Beware of the dream of the other, 
because if you are caught in the dream of the other you are fucked' (quoted from Bucher, 2005: 
138). 
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This situation of being caught in a dream of the other led most Arab intellectuals to have 
difficulty in relating to the reality. The deprivation of reality also distanced them from the reality 
of most people's lives. Hence, they could not engage with people and as a result have no link to 
them. This absence of any relation made those intellectuals who wished to stand against the 
authority to end up isolated. This being nowhere, made swinging attitudes and contradictory 
stands to be common practice. The Iraqi writer Khalid al-Maaly (2006) in a biographical 
anecdote elaborates that. In an article for the German newspaper '%erliner =eitung' alMaaly 
wrote: 
During the 1980s, a friend of mine - a left-wing, secular-minded Syrian writer living in 
Paris at that time - surprised me by his open admiration for the newly organised 
Hizbullah. At first I thought his admiration was merely a passing fancy. But when Iraq 
occupied Kuwait in 1990, he and I finally collided. He could not disguise his delight at 
the "annexation" of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's troops, which made me regard his 
secular, leftist views as a joke. <et his career led him ever deeper into the arena of the 
struggle for human rights. With European financial support, he issued a periodic 
newsletter on human rights, which for years had not a word to say about Saddam's 
crimes, nor about women's rights. Meanwhile his relations with Arab Islamist groups, 
especially the Muslim Brotherhood, deepened steadily. 
His joy over the 911 attacks, as well as his admiration for Osama bin Laden and his 
"blow at the heart of America," fit the rest of his political development only too well. He 
constantly sought justifications for Islamist acts of violence, as if he were acting under 
the ancient Arab tribal principle that, no matter what internal differences we might have, 
we must stand together as one man against an aggressor. 
alMaaly (2006) insists that this attitude is not an exception: "Unfortunately, this brief 
biographical sketch might all too easily be extended to a large proportion of Arab intellectuals. 
Many of them are characterised by a carefully masked double standard." This duplicity is not 
limited to the individual intellectuals per se. It is the common attitude among those who adapt 
the modern Western political theory and practice. A theological belief in Marxism was a 
common practice among the Arab Lefts throughout Cold War. These included belief such as 
West's demise is imminent, because of the dominance of capitalism and the latter digging grave 
for itself every day. Their inability to understand the canonical modern texts and consequently to 
relate them to reality resulted in sloganification: reducing it to a slogan. In other words the 
dominance of rhetoric over reality. This has been elegantly articulated in a detailed book entitled 
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'alArab Zahira Sawtya', "fi\R .<'!a \\-I 'Arabs a Phonetic Phenomena' (1977) (2002) by the 
Saudi thinker Abdullah al-Qasimi). 
This can be extended to almost all political belief, Marxist, nationalist, existentialist, etc. 
Surprisingly, this practice is also affecting to a large degree, especially methodologically, 
modem political Islam. The prioritising of the text and insisting that reality and humans have to 
change and adapt to the text, which is a clear justification for violence, is a trend among the 
followers and the thinkers of the fundamental Islam. It is not Islam that is wrong it is the people, 
is one of their common slogans. Roxanne Buben (1999 :81) quoting from Olivier Roy (1994) in 
his book the Failure of Political Islam "it is Marxism that is the mirror and foil of the Islamist 
effort". For Buben herself Qutb's, the theoretical father of the Muslim Brotherhood, echoing of 
the Marxist theory is "striking" (1999: 78). 
What invigorates this phenomenon of being trapped in the dream of the other- of being 
unable to realise the reality- is the role the State plays in relation to those who disagree and 
oppose the State. The State eliminates any sort of neutral or free public space. The public space 
is the sphere of public action and critique freed from the constraints of the mosque and the State, 
which is essential to democratic citizenship. IW is the realm in which citizens engage in collective 
deliberation and in joint action on behalf of the public good. But the States and its apparatuses in 
the Arab Middle East are compacted in a manner to pull the citizens away from the public space 
to a private world. The controlled public spheres within the territory of the Arab Middle Eastern 
States produce silence or permit only talks that are unrelated to the political reality. In this case 
tradition and its various components are utilised, by the States, meticulously to enhance such an 
arrangement. For instance, women and youths make up the vast majority of the population of 
these states, but the State manages through utilisation of tradition to push them into the margin. 
The trick is quite simple. In tradition of the region, especially in Islam, the family is 
essential. Every family is run like a small state. IW is common that the family has the head, and 
the head is the father. This structure makes the father to be the natural and the normal 
representative of the rest of the family. The Arabic concept used for this is rab aa 'Ila W:I < .- or 
rab alausra, y..o'i? '--'.-' rab is god. Thus, women and youth end up being unrepresented and 
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silent. This is continually pushed by the mosque and the political Islam. The State is always 
willing to compromise to traditional forces on such issues. 
Observing and analysing this reality resulted in coining the concept or the theory of the 
Failed Modem State (FMS). The phrase is composed of three concepts, namely: failure, 
modernity and state. It indicates that the State is in a perpetual process of halting, in other words, 
failing to reach modernity. The reason behind that is rather apparent. Allowing the society to 
develop into a modem stage, automatically results in the disappearance of the current form of the 
States. Therefore, in order for the current structure of the States in the region to survive it has to 
become an impediment to completion of modernity. This situation of failing modernity, 
simultaneously, maintains tradition to balance or to fill the void left as a result of the failed 
modem. In other words, traditions like modernity similarly hold the State in a permanent state of 
failure. 
The FMS, to borrow the title phrase from Richard Rorty (1994) in his description of 
religion "is the conversation stopper". But the essence of religion, as Rorty later on articulated 
"is trying to put off invoking conversation-stoppers as long as possible" (Rorty, 2003: 148). In 
order for the conversation and discussion to take place there needs to be a free space. IW is 
conditioned that this space has to be beyond the control of authority. Such a space is not 
permitted in the FMS. The FMS record is dark when it comes to such a place. IW controls media, 
harasses journalists, does not permit freedom of information, freedom of expression or freedom 
of communication. There is not any room for democracy, development, human rights or a 
prosperous society in the FMS. 
The FMS is a phrase cramped over each other and forced to carry a particular meaning. It 
qualifies to be a paradigm. Like a paradigm attempting to solve a puzzle, it raises new puzzles. 
While it combines three different notions namely, failure, modem and state, it hides within it an 
ellipse, which is tradition. Modernity in this context is seen as military, bureaucracy, technology 
and the international system. While the notion of the State itself, a state based on territory, 
sovereignty is a modem phenomenon. In this particular case the FMS is neither modem nor 
traditional. IW is the outcome of the combination of the two. This is not suggesting a hybrid state, 
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modem and tradition, within the space of the State are neither merging nor producing any new 
synthesis. Tradition contains many different components, for instance: tribe, religion, family, and 
sect. These are all invariably used, in different areas to serve the State and its elite. The coming 
together of the two components, namely tradition and modernity, in the body of the State, does 
not result in dialectical relationships. This State, despite being in the middle of a journey, is not 
in a state of transition. Despite containing opposing components, these States are rather static. 
The State neutralises the opposing forces and eliminates any existing contradictions. Any change 
which does not empower the State, regardless of how trivial, is barred. The State as a body 
becomes a buffer zone and changes both the forces into a component, instrument or tool that 
ultimately only enhances the State's survival. The dialectical relationship between tradition and 
modernity within the space of the State is proscribed because of the potentiality of change. 
Moreover, both tradition and modernity are emptied out. They are no more independent forces. 
They a re utilised by the State to guarantee the survival of the State. Thus, modernity and 
tradition are two main pillars of the State. They are the State's means of communicating and 
linking to the population. The aim of making a tool of everything is Machiavellian in essence. 
To reduce something to a tool is to utilise it. To utilise is to use without being related to. A tool 
functions without demand. Modernity and tradition are both equally reduced to just instruments 
and these instruments are monopolised by the State to create conditions and circumstances that 
assures the continuation of the State itself. By becoming a tool both tradition and modernity their 
essence changes to a level that they are becoming means to different aims than they are supposed 
to bring. 
The concept of failure crystallises this tool relationship. It is failure to reach the desired 
end. But the failure in this particular case is premeditated by the State. The State fails modernity, 
or rather more accurately, holds modernity in the state of failure. A similar process is done with 
tradition. This failure status of both modernity and tradition gives privilege to the ruling elite 
who have neither full modernity nor full traditional qualities but appear to have them both. This 
neither nor situation makes a void which, provides the rulers with an advantage to tum 
themselves and their s ystems a ccordingly as the winds and pressure, either internal or the 
external, demand, and meanwhile avoiding any actual transformation in the system of the State. 
This tool relationship changes the nature, role and function of every component of society and 
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the State. The mosque becomes an ideological state apparatus. The soldier in the army functions 
as a mercenary. The whole society metamorphoses into a Camp. 
Modem is referring to modernity, the occidental modernity. However, it is not in the 
remit of this thesis to investigate the project of the Western modernity. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to define what is meant by occidental modernity. Modernity is a complex multi-
layered movement which has its own social, intellectual, scientific, philosophical and political 
dimensions. This project has its own distinctive commencements in every different location. IW is 
associated with particular events in different regions. 
To be modem signified to be anti-medieval, in an antinomy in which the concept 
'medieval' incarnated narrow-mindedness, dogmatism, and above all the constraints of 
authority. It was 9oltaire shouting "(crasez l'infime." IW was Milton in Paradise Lost 
virtually celebrating Lucifer. IW was all the classical "Revolutions" - the English, the 
American, and the French to be sure, but also the Russian and the Chinese. In the United 
States, it was the doctrine of the separation of church and state, the first Ten Amendments 
to the Constitution, the Emancipation Proclamation, Clarence Darrow at the Scopes trial, 
Brown vs. the Board of Education, and Roe vs. Wade (Wallerstein, 1995: 473). 
Modernity, the project of becoming modem, in the Arab Middle East, is synonymous 
with catching up, becoming different, overcoming the time lag, causing the rupture with 
tradition, etc. This polysemy crystallises the complexity surrounding the notion and the 
implementation of modernity. 
To summarise, the occidental "modernity contained three elements: a concept of rational 
thought, a new system of states, and a formula for churchstate relations (Alan, 2003: 58). The 
events that mark the beginning of modernity in the region are simultaneously events that mark 
the arrival of the modem, hence modernity commenced after arrival from the West. Thus it did 
not emerge from tradition of the region. This arrival is also entangled with other events like the 
arrival of Western military, defeat of local power, wakening up, realisation, and commencement 
of modernisation. 
One of the most organised and robust institutions emerging after the arrival of modernity 
was the State. This state is a postcolonial-state. Thus the FMS is a form of a postcolonial state. 
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As a form this form of the State is one of the most stubborn impediments to development, 
democratisation and rule of law. 
)06 
7radition 
The above diagram is the structure of the FMS. As the diagram shows the State relates to the 
masses equally through tradition and modernity. The State is the sovereign. Through tradition, 
religion custom, history, $ssabiya (group linkage), values, the State manages to penetrate 
feeling, imagination, and consciousness. Utilising these has practical effect in the way the State 
functions. Similarly through modernity the State counterbalances tradition and controls it, 
moreover modernity offers the State technology and the art of power. 
In his 2f *rammatology Jacques Derrida (1997: 158) stated that "There is nothing 
outside of the text, there is no outside-text." In the same text he says "I believe that a generalized 
writing is not just the idea of a system to be invented, a hypothetical characteristic or a future 
possibility" (1997: 112). These statements paved the way for those who follow him, and employ 
his postmodern approach, to turn the text into an 'imperialistic' entity, "extending the realm of 
script and with it the rule of scribes, to all aspect of human existence, and perhaps on existence in 
general" (Weber, 2008: 228). 
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regimes versus democratic regimes. It analyses the art of governance as practised in the region. It 
shows how the state and the elite are in fusion, how the former metamorphosed into a complex 
machine that is able to survive all the challenges from inside and outside. 
The thesis layout is as follows: the literature review chapter reviews and analyses the main 
concepts. In the background chapter selected events are chosen and explored. These events shed 
light on the genealogy of the Failed Modem State. They also put the emergence of the FMS in 
perspective. The following chapter is dedicated to the FMS concept. The chapter lays out the 
components of the concept and explains what each single word in the Failed Modem State 
phrase indicates. The chapter on the camp explains how the FMS functions. The camp signifies 
centrality and the omnipresence of the state. It shows how it is impossible for one to experience 
life individually. There two case studies which make up two separate chapters: the first one is the 
mosque. In this chapter the role of the mosque as an example from tradition, its relation to the 
state and the elite is analysed. The second case study concerns the military. The military in the 
Failed Modem State functions as mercenary. The soldiers are not foreigners' nevertheless they 
are perceived by the general public as foreigners . Their loyalty is only to their master, the state 
elite. These elites regard the people as their potential enemy. The final part is the thesis 
conclusion. 
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/iterature 5eYiew 
 /iterature 5eYiew 
A lot has been written, from various different schools, about the Arab Middle Eastern States' 
experience of modernisation. Therefore, any attempt to review all the literature concerning this 
issue would be an impossible endeavour. In order to overcome this challenge in this thesis the 
key existing literature on this subject has been divided generally into two main streams namely, 
the external and internal literatures. 
The external are those scholars who are approaching the issue from the outside with an 
outsider's eyes and interests. These could be classified as Orientalists both positively and 
negatively. The internal scholars reside in the region and write with passion and missionary zeal. 
Each group highlights and prioritises different aspects and sees the situation from a different 
point of view. This chapter reviews each of these approaches separately and attempts to unveil 
their holes and shortfalls. 
 ([ternal &ommentators 
This group i.e. the external commentators, after Edward Said's landmark book 
'Orientalism,' lost their advantageous status. Said argues that "in studying the other's culture and 
politics one faces two choices, either to put intellect at the service of power or at the service of 
criticism, community, dialogue, and moral sense" (2003: 172). For him clearly most of the 
external scholars served power rather than otherwise. Said emphasises that "all knowledge is 
interpretation, and that interpretation must be self-conscious in its methods and its aims if it is to 
be vigilant and humane, if it is also to arrive at knowledge" (Said, 1997: 170). This fear is 
reiterated and expanded by another veteran Middle Eastern scholar Maxime Rodinson (1976: 84) 
for him: 
Books on the contemporary Arabian Peninsula tend to be rather impressionistic. Some 
are journalistic accounts or travelogues, others superficial narratives which use flowery 
language to conceal their author's lack of understanding; others still are the works 
orientalists who naively believe that their knowledge of medieval Islam is adeq 
preparation for understanding the Arab world of today. 
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Accordingly, there are generally two groups of Western scholars, namely (a) those who are the 
servants of power and (b) those who lack sufficient knowledge about the region. Serving power 
and making up assumptions about the region signifies that the people and their culture, their 
habit and their history are misrepresented. To misrepresent is to represent according to one's 
own interests. This is done through creating false imagery, assumptions, and false statements in 
order to serve a particular purpose, which is usually different than the interest of the real interest 
of the people who have been misrepresented. In the other words, throughout time Orientalists 
have been falsifying the reality of these people. As a reaction to this, Hasan Hanafi (1991) called 
for the establishment of a science called istighrab (occidentalism), for the purpose of 
systematically studying and scientifically understanding the West, pretty much the way the West 
had studied the East through its science of istishraq (Orientalism). 
What is rather conspicuous is the political mission of Said's project. Said was puzzled why 
America on the one hand has vital interests and oil investments in the Arab world and on the 
other hand its strategies and policies have always favoured Israel. Said's Orientalism was an 
attempt to answer that question. 
The system of ideological fictions I have been calling Orientalism has serious 
implications not only because it is intellectually discreditable. For the United States today 
is heavily invested in the Middle East, more heavily than anywhere else on earth: the 
Middle East experts who advise policymakers are imbued with Orientalism almost to a 
person. Most of this investment, appropriately enough, is built on foundations of sand, 
since the experts instruct policy on the basis of such marketable abstractions as political 
elites, modernization and stability, most of which are simply the old Orientalist 
stereotypes dressed up in policy jargon, and most of which have been completely 
inadequate to describe what took place (Said, 2003: 321). 
Said and his work has been criticised widely, both by Western Orientalists and Arab scholars. 
For Hashim Salih (2009), Said was not a specialist in the area that he worked on, his area of 
specialisation was comparative literature. Therefore he missed a large number of works that were 
different to the picture he painted. For al-Azm (2010) Said was political in his approach. 
Therefore, according to what is stated above, what Said was criticising in the other he was doing 
it himself. His writing has a political mission, like any other Orientalist and he was cherry-
picking in choosing his sources. 
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The Orientalist approach appears in two folds namely ignoring the reality on the ground and 
apologising for injustice when it is required. Said's conceptualisation signifies anti-Orientalism, 
while classical Orientalisim signifies the study of the East by the Western scholar. Post-Said the 
anti-Orientalists approach has renounced almost all sense of critical approach and they are 
apologetic for every form of violation and torture, including masses murder, under the banner of 
cultural relativism. This surreal situation is described by one Syrian political thinker as ethereal. 
[I]n an ethereal in-between so beloved of postmodem anthropologists and perplexed 
politicians and strategists in Non-Governmental Organizations, and increasingly by 
official instances of many states and international organizations, including the UN. This 
accounts to a large extent for the recent tendency towards a radical relativism regarding 
the study of matters Islamic, under the title of cultural specificity which, like other forms 
of exoticism, I take to be a grid ofmisrecognition (al-Azama, 2003: 25). 
There is no doubt that many of those who addressed the Middle East and its situation, did so to 
serve a particular interest. Therefore they ignored the reality of the situation. Equally the anti-
Orientalist approach ignores the reality on the ground and is more concerned about answering the 
Orientalists claims. 
 &ulturalists 
Failure of the non-Westerners, among them the Arabs and Muslims, to become modem, has been 
one of the subjects that numerous W estem thinker, have commented on throughout the last two 
centuries. Among these non-Westerners the Muslims and the Middle Easterners particularly 
received a lion share of comments and theorisations. One of the most influential and dominant 
explanations in this area is culture. For an influential sociological thinker like Max Weber the 
project of modernity is a unique W estem experience. 
Only the Occident knows the State in the modem sense, with a constitution, specialized 
officialdom, and the concept of citizenship. Beginnings of this institution in antiquity and 
in the Orient were never able to develop fully. Only the Occident knows rational law, 
made by jurists and rationally interpreted and applied, and in the Occident is found the 
concept of citizen ( civis Romanus, citoyen, bourgeois) because only in the Occident does 
the city exist in the specific sense of the word. Furthermore, only the Occident possesses 
science in the present-day sense of the world. Theology, philosophy and reflection on the 
ultimate problems of life were known to the Chinese and the Hindu, perhaps even of a 
depth unmatched by the European; but a rational science and in connection with it a 
rational technology remained unknown to those civilizations (Weber, 1961: 232-33). 
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Weber, during his lectures in Munich University in the Winter Semester of 1919-1920, 
did not hesitating to specify modernity to the 'occident'. Elsewhere, Weber emphasises that a 
particular Western religion, Protestantism, Calvinism, played a significant role in making 
modernity in the West, particularly Europe. He asks question such as what made capitalism. 
What moved the entrepreneur to act as he did - to live simply, to work hard, to coin sayings like 
'time is money' and to reinvest in production. For him these particular patterns of behaviour 
have a root in Luther's and Calvin's new interpretation ofreligion. For Weber many of the early 
entrepreneurs were influenced by the Calvinist strand of the Reformation. The Reformation, 
which was a Western type of reforming Christianity, among many things, accentuates the 
doctrine of 'predestination' - that those who would gain salvation were 'pre-designated'. Given 
that Luther had deemed to remove the medium between God and human, which indicates that 
man, is 'alone' before God. Combining the 'salvation status' and the exercise of 'private 
judgement', Weber argues that 'worldly success' was interpreted as a sign of salvation. 
Combining the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism shows how the Protestant work ethic 
became the capitalist work ethic. This is a clear sign claiming that the project of modernity is a 
unique European experience. Its uniqueness implies its impossibility to replicate to copy or to 
migrate. Thus, based on these grand premises, there are a herd of W eberian followers who take a 
culturalist view oflslamic societies attempts at modernisation. 
Holding culture the prime responsibility for the failure of modernity in the Arab Middle 
East, by scholars outside of the region is common. This issue is outlined vividly by Afshin 
Matin-asgari (2004: 293): 
Much intellectual effort, in academic circles as well as in the larger political and cultural 
arena, is devoted to probing many of the world's problems in terms of a clash between 
secular modernity and religious tradition. At the center of this controversy is a critique of 
Islam, treated as a more or less coherent culture, civilization, or historical tradition. 
Typically, Islamic 'fundamentalism' is seen as the prototype of religious extremism. And 
Islamic 'civilization,' according to scholars such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel P. 
Huntington, has remained 'backward' in comparison with 'the West,' because 'something 
went wrong' earlier in 'Islamic history.' 
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In his article Afshin Matin-asgari (2004) examines the works of "trend-setting scholars" 
including "Marshal G. Hodgson, Clifford Geertz, and Ernest Gellner". In summing up his article 
Matin-asgari draws a number of conclusions among them 
[T]his basic W eberian fallacy defines societies, or historical eras, primarily in terms of 
their cultural 'ethos,' often articulated in religion. This fallacy is deeply ethnocentric, 
positing a model of 'Occidental' culture endowed with superior rationality science law 
and economy; these qualities are rooted in religious transformations that' are uniaue ta 
'the West,' and either missing or impossible to develop elsewhere in the world, again due 
primarily to rigid and stagnant 'non-Western' cultural and religious norms (Afshin Matin-
asgari, 2004: 300). 
The consequence of this cultural understanding is that the Western scholars rarely hold 
the State of the ruling elite as responsible. The state is always seen as essential. This view sets a 
premise that no matter how undemocratic and abusive of human rights these states are; still they 
are more moderate and progressive than their mass. Talking about women's rights in the Arab 
countries Bernard Lewis (1996) (2002: 81) states: 
Westerners tend naturally to assume that the emancipation of women is part of 
liberalisation and that women will consequently fare better under liberal than under 
autocratic regimes. Such an assumption is dubious and often untrue. Among Arab 
countries, the legal emancipation of women went furthest in Iraq and South <emen, both 
ruled by notoriously repressive regimes. It lagged behind in Egypt, in many ways the 
most tolerant and open of Arab societies. It is in such societies that public opinion, still 
mainly male and mainly conservative, resists change. Women's rights have suffered the 
most serious reverses in countries where fundamentalists have influence or where, as in 
Iran, they rule. The emancipation of women is one of the main grievances of the 
fundamentalists and its reversal is in the forefront of their program. 
Here Lewis, because of his fixed ideological believe either fails or refuses to trace the genealogy 
and the causes of the emergence of fundamental Islam. Also through a misleading interpretation 
of now, the current, he attempts to establish a formula that modernity is only possible when it is 
forced. This view, of forcing modernity on the population, in other words modernity from above, 
is so hegemonic that it refuses to depart from the area of Middle Eastern study. Regarding the 
State as the only agent of modernisation consequently ends up making the State the legitimate 
father of modernity. In his interpretation of the failure of modernity the French philosopher 
Bernard Levy (2004: ;9I) regard the issue as "the problem oflslam". Accordingly, it is Islam as 
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a culture and a religion, which is not compatible with modernity. Islam is seen as an 
"obscurantist vision of the world that could not mix with modernity''. 
The interpretation of the phenomenon of modernity was never far from politics and 
power. The majority of these thinkers in some way or other served a particular political system. 
This approach has been documented and commented on by Edward W. Said (2003) in his book 
2rientalism. Said's thesis is built upon the premise that there is no such thing as neutral 
knowledge. For him all knowledge, especially those with regard to the other, is contaminated 
with power. It follows that all Western knowledge of, say, the Middle East or south Asia must 
wittingly or unwittingly serve the purposes of imperialism. 
Under the general heading of the knowledge of the Orient and within the umbrella of 
Western hegemony over the Orient during the period from the end of the eighteenth 
century, there emerged a complex Orient suitable for study in the Academy, for the 
display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration 
in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about mankind and 
the universe, for instances of economic and sociological theories of development, 
revolution, cultural personality or religious character (Said, 2003). 
The political interest demanded an essentialist approach toward the occident: essentialism 
means simplifying and solidifying. Thus this view is the dominant viewpoint among the external 
thinkers. For this purpose areas like religion, nature, culture and mind are regarded as 
responsible for this cataclysmic failure. These comments come from every political orientation. 
The absence of private property is indeed the key to the whole of the East ... But how 
does it come about the Orientals did not arrive at landed property, even in its landed 
form? I think it is mainly due to the climate, taken in connection with the nature of the 
soil, especially with the great stretches of desert, which extend from the Sahara straight 
across Arabia, Persia, India, Tartary up to the highest Asiatic plateau. Artificial irrigation 
is here the first condition of agriculture and this is a matter either for the communes, the 
provinces or the central government (Marx and Engels, 1959: 312). 
For Marx and Engels the absence of private property indicates the absence of capitalism, 
which also means the absence of wealth, surplus, and dialectical movement of history: in a 
nutshell, the absence of modernity. In the same token Wittfogel (1957) argues, Asiatic and 
among them Egypt, Mesopotamia are "hydraulic civilizations". These civilisations were quite 
different from those of the West. He believed that wherever irrigation required substantial and 
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centralized control, government representatives monopolised political power and dominated the 
economy, resulting in an absolutist managerial state. In addition, there was a close identification 
of these officials with the dominant religion and an atrophy of other centres of power. The 
bureaucratic network directed the forced labour for irrigation projects. The power of the 
hydraulic state is greater than the power of government in free enterprise systems. It extends over 
society as a whole by limiting property rights, by taxation and confiscation a variety of 
managerial measures that "prevent the nongovernmental forces of society from crystallizing into 
independent bodies strong enough to counterbalance and control the political machine." Often 
benevolent in form, hydraulic despotism is oppressive in content, and its "total power spells total 
corruption, total terror, total submission and total loneliness" (Mattick, 1958:23) 
Both Marx-Engels and Wittfogel, share the viewpoint that the centrality of the State is the 
prime cause of creating despotism. Both theses are at best outdated. Neither land nor irrigation 
plays a big role in the revenue of these states today. Both disregarded the human agent as an 
independent history maker. They also regard the Middle Eastern people as natural as opposed to 
cultural people. Wittfogel's approach is driven from Marx's thesis. "In the last few decades, 
Wittfogel's theories have been summarily dismissed by critics who claim that small-scale 
irrigation societies have evolved around the world without developing in to the hydraulic states 
purportedly predicted by Wittfogel" (Price, 1994: 187). Marx's view is a pre-technological view. 
Today with the help of technology a capitalist form of state can emerge and function in the 
desert. What can be appreciated from Marx's view is the absence of communication and 
ultimately, in contrast to the occidental capitalist society, the non-dialectical structure of power 
in the region. But in the contemporary world the structure of capitalism is far more complex. 
Capitalism in contrast to what Marx believed does not advocate infinite and out of control 
progress. 
There is a striking similarity among the most dominant viewpoints from outsiders on the 
failure of modernity in the Middle East. Whether it is culture, religion or nature, it i s an 
essentialist, simplistic approach. Moreover, they are one dimensional. They all indicate that 
human beings as an agent have no role to play they are passive, irrational and surrendered. All 
these approaches insist that the possibility of change in the region is nill. 
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Modernity necessitates an end to man's self or the externally imposed immaturity. These 
theories argue that a rupture with the imposed immaturity is an impossible endeavour in the 
region. If there is verification that the region went into a long sleep until the arrival of the 
W estem power, this does not necessarily indicate that the region is doomed to remain the same 
eternally. If culture, nature and mind are capable of creating an un-modem condition, then these 
qualities to resist the wave of modernity require maintenance by an organised force or power. 
There is no doubt that culture and nature contributes both negatively and positively into the 
making of the current situation but ultimately it is the human being that activates those particular 
sources into a designed end. In the West the emergence of modernity prepared the space for 
people to rupture with the conditions that imposed immaturity. Modernity that arrived in the 
Arab Middle East, the State led modernity, failed or had no intention of creating such a space 
that supports the individuals to leave their immature condition. 
Despite their focus on the State and the prime roll of the State these theories at best fail 
to interpret the current complex structure of the State in the region. These interpretations believe 
that society and politics is the natural product of cultural and natural factors. These invariables 
remain to produce similar politics and state structure infinitely. In a speech delivered at the 
Stanford University on February 25, 1992 and later on published in the Public Culture journal 
1999, Charles Taylor distinguished between two kinds of theories of modernity, which he called 
"cultural" and "acultural". For him the "culture" theory of modernity is one that characterizes 
the transformations which have happened in the modem West mainly in terms of the rise of a 
new culture. By contrast, an "acultural" theory is one that describes these transformations in 
terms of some culture-neutral operation. 
By this I meant an operation which is not defined in terms of the specific cultures it 
carries us from and to, but is rather seen as of a type which any traditional culture could 
undergo. An example of an acultural type of theory indeed a paradigm case, would be 
one which conceives of modernity as the growth ofreason, defined in various ways (e.g., 
as the growth of scientific consciousness, or the development of a secular outlook, or the 
rise of instrumental rationality, or an ever-clearer distinction between fact-finding and 
evaluation). The emergence of modernity is not bound by a particular culture. It is rather 
a cultural neutral phenomenon (Taylor, 1999: 154). 
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 0odernisation 7Keor\ 
Theoretically, modernisation is a path set by the West, the colonial power, and their local agents, 
to reach modernity. This path supposedly begins with a rupture with the past, tradition, locality, 
and superstition. Therefore, it is an evolutionary process: with both a clear departure and obvious 
arrival points. As Karl Marx in his 3reface to the )irst *erman (dition of &aSital 9olume One 
in 1867 puts it "The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less 
developed, the image of its own future". Accordingly there is only one way toward the future and 
this unique way is universal. For Pappe (2007:8) modernisation "is more an ideology than a 
reality". 
During the 1950s modernisation theories were prominent in the academic agenda and 
modernisation theorists optimistically and confidently wrote about the future of democracy in 
"belated modernities". The overall expectation was that the process of economic development 
and the pace of modernisation would ultimately create and consolidate democratic regimes. 
Modernisation theory claimed that establishing the structure automatically and imminently 
results in the desired object. In the other word the future can be engineered. It is a rather 
Marxian view which regards the human being as a product of its milieu. This view was 
influential among the colonial agents who made the Middle East. 
If we supply an aggregate of human beings, more or less homogeneous in language and 
religion, with a little assistance and a good deal of advice, if we protect them from the 
external aggression and discourage internal violence, they will speedily and 
spontaneously organize themselves into a democratic state on modem lines (Naiden, 
2007: 59). 
That was how the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 planned the region. The nation states or the 
mimicry of the nation state that were established in the region have neither DiP nor capacity to 
develop toward realising modernity. Instead of producing proletariat, labour, capitalism or 
market the arrival of modernity in a country like Iraq, Iraqi economist Muhammad Salman 
Hassan argues, that it generated pre-capitalist iqta system (Haj, 1997:9). The iqta is a modem 
agrarian system characterised by a patriarchal mechanism of labour control. 
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In the heart of the project of modernity there is a "Faustian drive to submit the entire world to 
the absolute control of man under the steady guide of knowledge" (Castro-Gomez, 2002: 270). 
This indicates the supremacy of reason, necessity of a free public space, use of language, and 
ultimately respect for human beings. The importance of the State in making and realising this 
process cannot be disputed. The State is a "central instance: from which the mechanisms of 
control over the natural and social world are distributed and coordinated" (Gomez, 2002: 270). 
The State is the "rational organization". Therefore 
The State is understood as the sphere in which all societal interests reach a point of 
"synthesis," that is, the locus which formulates collective goals valid for everyone. This 
requires the application of "rational criteria" that permit the State to channel the desires, 
interests, and emotions of citizens toward its own goals. The modern state thus not only 
acquires a monopoly on violence, but also uses it to rationally "direct" the activities of its 
citizens in accordance with previously established scientific criteria (Castro-Gomez, 
2002: 270). 
But obviously, the States that were established by the colonisers lacked these ingredients. 
Therefore instead of becoming a rational organisation for realising a rational project like 
modernity, the States in the region, became more as an obstacle. This state is neither exceptional 
nor transitional. It is there to stay. The parents of these States, "were unquestionably Western", 
the "midwife the local elites" (Pappe, 2007: 1). The forms of State that emerged resided on the 
surface, or rather were planted on the surface. In their structure resembled grass; they locate on 
the surface and grow very little roots. They never developed into a tree. These states were a 
rhizome (Deleuze 	 Guattari, 1987) and remained as a rhizome. In all of their functions of 
communication, supply, movement, war, renewal, building, and destruction they are rhizomatic, 
in the other word they remain on the surface, avoid having any root, like a nomad, like grass. 
Modernization as a method was disdainful of anything that stood in the way of progress 
as they defined it. The modernisation theorists hoped to short-circuit the give-and-take of 
politics and instead substitute fact, knowledge, and the indisputsable authority of science. 
Unruly traditional societies had to be reorganized to make individuals subject to the 
epistemological control of social science ... The modernization theorist's attitude of 
scientific authority marginalized competing sources of knowledge and identity that 
provided grounds for political resistance .. . At its core lay the eidolon of rationalist 
modernism: total knowledge about [the means of creating] a society free from both want 
and dissent, with boredom as its most threatening feature . [Modernization theory] left 
little room for the emancipator democratic egalitarianism that Habermas bas promoted as 
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a necessary ethical foil to the Enlightenment exaltation of instrumental reason (Engerman 
et al, 2003: 8-9). 
 5entier 6tate 7Keor\ 
If the cultural variable falls short of explaining the political structure and most 
importantly the failure of modernity, another dominant theory, which attempts to answer the 
question, is the Rentier theory. The Rentier theory is a complex theory. However, it appears 
above all to be an economics based explanation, the Rentier theory has its deep roots in the 
nature, modernity and the culture of the region. The Rentier approach emphasises the role of the 
rent money, then the source of the rent is a natural resource and this natural resource is only 
valuable because of the advancement and arrival of modernity in the region and elsewhere in the 
world. Modem technologies ( excavation and shipping) and the world market play a big role in 
making the rent. The Rentier theory was postulated by Hossein Mahdavy (Iranian economist) 
with respect to pre-revolutionary Pahlavi Iran in 1970; the idea has since been appropriated by a 
community of Middle East specialists (<ates, 1996: 11), mostly outsiders, in their discussion of 
the Arab world. Furthermore the origin of the theory is European based; the Rentier theory is 
also called the 'utch 'isease (<ates, 1996: 28). 
The Rentier is a concept based on the rent. Rent is defined as "the income derived from 
the gift of nature" (Beblawi, 1990:85). When the State is relying on rent, as the only source of 
income then it is a non-productive state. Giacomo Luciani (1990) introduced the formula 
"Allocation vs. Production States" categorises the Arab Middle Eastern states, especially those 
with substantial oil revenue, as the States that are non-productive and their main activity is the 
allocation of rent that they derive from their natural wealth. Expanding from the same 
perspective Hazem Beblawi (1990) in '7he 5entier State in the $rab :orld' argued that those 
states that derived most or a substantial part of their revenues from the outside world and whose 
functioning of the political system depends to a large degree on accruing the external revenues 
that can be classified as rents, showed a remarkably different political dynamic than other (i.e. 
productive) states. However, Beblawi and Luciani argued that the Rentier effects are not 
confined to the oil-exporting states alone. 
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The question here is; does the concept of Rentier demystify the nature and the structure 
of the State in the Arab Middle East? If the main activity of the Rentier state is allocation, it 
indicates that there is no system of taxation. Taxation as a form of exchanges establishes a 
relationship between the taxpayer and the State, the relationship of duties and rights. Thus 
taxation has been regarded as a matter for development. When the State is not taxing it indicates 
that it has "autonomy from the citizens" as Moore (2004) puts it: "the State apparatus, and the 
people who control it, have a guaranteed source of income that makes them independent of their 
citizens" (Moore, 2004: 306). Moore continues to outline the main features of the Rentier State 
structure: 
 The external intervention, oil being a strategic commodity, concern about the security of 
supply has motivated political and military intervention. This as result has increased the 
autonomy of these states in relation to their citizens. 
 Coupism and countercoupism. It is very tempting for those not at the very centre of 
power to try to take over by force. 
 Absence of incentive for civic politics. Dependency on oil revenues affects the general 
tenor of civilian politics, and reduces that through two very mechanisms, that citizen 
will not engage in politics in a civic fashion. 
 Ineffective public bureaucracy, there is little incentive to establish inefficient public 
bureaucracy (Moore, 2004: 306). 
The Rentier as economic model has an impact on other political and social areas. It eventually 
results in what Beblawi (1987: 52) called the "Rentier mentality'' and "Rentier ethics". For 
individual in these states non-economic criteria such as closeness to the ruling elites, showing 
loyalty, remaining silent and being apolitical are the main ways of earning income. Rentierism, 
as a mode of behaviour, is an apolitical form of politics, results in reinforcement of traditional 
aspects of the State. Since the member of a particular tribe, sect or religion is more trusted and as 
a result the income of rent is distributed on them to the basis of their memberships of the group 
right and loyalty, the Rentier economy and politics enhance the State's traditional origins, as it 
regenerates the tribal hierarchy consisting of varying layers of beneficiaries with the ruling elite 
on top, in the effective position of buying loyalty through their distributive power. The theory 
assumes that as the State is not dependent on taxation, there is far less demand for political 
participation. 
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Brynen (1992) and Luciani (1988) focused on the authoritarian consequences of 
Rentierism. In their view, since the State revenues are dependent on the international market, 
rather than domestic production, the ruling elites are much less constrained by the interests of 
domestic groups and social classes. Rentier politics, as a result, is different from the situation 
where the State's appropriation of societal resources through taxation spurs the population to 
seek a greater voice in the allocation of state expenditures. The State-society relationship is of a 
different sort in a Rentier economy. It is premised on the State's providing welfare for its people 
and the people keeping aloof from political participation. "Indeed, if anything the slogan of the 
American Revolution--"no taxation without representation"- is reversed: in a Rentier state, state-
society relations seem predicated on the principle of "no taxation, no representation", quoted 
from Moadde, M. (2002: 377). 
Rentier theory indicates that both modernity and tradition are used and utilised by the 
State in areas of economy, politics and society. In the heart of the Rentier theory there is a clear 
indication for utilisation: in other words, it means manipulating both tradition and modernity for 
the survival of the State elite. Moreover the theory is unable to analyse in detail the structure of 
the system and it fails to address and answer many vital questions. The Rentier presumes "that 
the financial autonomy of oil states grants them immunity from social pressures" (Okruhlik, 
1999: 295). This interpretation is not as uncomplicated as it seems. IW argues that the State 
provides welfare for its people on a condition that the people keep aloof from political 
participation. This indicates that there is a contract. IW is an unwritten and unspoken contract. A 
contract built on the basis that individuals trade their own political rights for economic gains. But 
this contract is only assumed, imagined by the authorities. This makes the act of allocation by the 
State a political act. The trade is goods for rights. Thus the act of distribution of goods is a 
political act par excellence. Therefore, the Rentier system, instead of providing stability to the 
regimes, often fosters its own civil opposition because of the way revenues are deployed 
(Okruhlik, 1999: 295). 
Moreover, the theory suffers from many other serious shortfalls which make in at the end 
an interpretation far from reality on the ground. Historically, the rent is not a new phenomenon in 
the Arab Middle East. Ibn Khaldun in his famous book al-muqaddimah has pointed out that Arab 
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tradition does not look upon effort favourably. There are numerous concepts and events such as 
ghazo (booty), karam (generosity) which Arabs are known for. IW is muruoha, manhood, to 
distribute. Based on that the ruling elite, by taking all the wealth and engaging in the act of 
allocation, are not only securing their own survival but also practicing an ultimate act of 
manhood. Culturally, historically and socially, when one gives, when one distributes, one is in a 
better and higher position. This also indicates that the effort taking, the hard working is not a 
guarantee of respect from the community. Therefore, as Hafez (2009) puts it, the Arab culture 
despises effort. This makes it closely if not directly associated with rent. 
This historical and cultural evidence disputes the essence of Rentier theory. When people 
receive goods and economic supplements from the government they do not interpret it as having 
to renounce their political rights for it. IW is rather a norm. This is more so in the case of oil. For 
what is received from the government by the people in the region, is demanded and expected 
since everyone regards what they receive as just a small part of their fair share of the oil income. 
The natural resources are seen and regarded by the public as a public property. 
The New <ork Times journalist Michael Slackman travelled to the Khasaba region in 
Oman. His travelogue was published in the newspaper on May 14, 2009. "After the change in the 
regime, the life that was going for generations has changed". The report states: 
Sultan Qaboos provided water and electricity, and over the next 39 years transformed a 
country that had been hermetically sealed into a modem state. For the older generations, 
that is more than enough. But like the rest of the Middle East, Oman has a very young 
population, a generation that did not experience the deprivations of the not-too-distant 
past. They are generally educated and aware. They want political change, rule of law, 
freedom of speech, institutions, and a voice. 
This crystallises that the policy ofRentierism is not fulfilling its aim. The new generation 
has new demands. This also indicates that updating gadgets, technological tools are not enough. 
The "authoritarian systems, no matter how benevolent and right minded, eventually rub up 
against the human desire for justice and self-determination" as the article prophesies. Quoting 
from the 32 old Said al-Hashmi the New <ork Times reporter quotes "for me, for my generation, 
there are a lot of ambitions, my father, my grandfather, grandmother, they really appreciate this 
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life. For me, I don't appreciate it like that. We need civil life; we need more democracy or real 
democracy." 
Expressing the 'need for more democracy or real democracy' is a clear sign that the 
contract which the Rentier theory assumes between the State and the people is not functioning, or 
at least not any more. More or real democracy is only possible in a real modernity. But Oman is 
neither real modern nor truly tradition. The system is aware that it is difficult to open the doors 
to modernity. The Rentier theory assumes success. Moreover, it also assumes that the population 
is in agreement which trading the politic for economic gains. What Hashmi, the information and 
research manager of the State Council, says, puts the whole theory into jeopardy, he states, as the 
journalist quotes, "this is our life, we have to talk about freedom of speech and about public 
freedoms, and these are not accessories. These are necessities for Omanis in the 21st century." 
The Oman situation clearly resembles the rest of the region. For instance in her writing 
on the Shi'a problem in Saudi Arabia Madawi al-Rasheed (1998: 123) states that "after the 
confrontations of 1979-1980, the Saudi state realized that a pragmatic approach to the Shi'a 
problem would be more beneficial. Officials visiting the region immediately after these events 
openly recognized the social and economic privation of the community and promised to improve 
the educational, health and economic infrastructure of Shi'a towns". 
This shows the typical Rentier mentality approach to social and political unrest. But as 
she crystallises that "an assessment of the Shi'a opposition in the 1990s shows that economic 
development in the region did not immediately succeed in pacifying the Shi'a and winning their 
allegiance" (al-Rasheed, 1998: 123). Another similar point with Oman is the change in demand 
of the new generation. "Economic development did appeal to traditional Shi'a leaderships, who 
were satisfied with the promises of the State. However, they did not succeed in pacifying the 
young Shi'a activists, who were influenced by the rising tide of political Islam in the Middle 
East, and looked to Iran for inspiration". 
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 +\brid 6oYereignt\ InterSretations 
In 2008 the Turkish academic Gokhan Bacik published his PhD thesis under the title 
'+ybrid Sovereignty in the $rab 0iddle (ast 7he &ases of .uwait, -ordan, and Iraq'. As the 
title indicates the thesis suggests that the Arab states in the Middle East are hybrid sovereigns. In 
this circumstances hybrid is the "co-existence of modem and traditional practice" (2008:6), 
within the formula or the structure of the State. Thus "the intercourse between two completely 
different models has produced a hybrid strain of sovereignty that is neither completely W estem 
nor traditional". This process of "hybridisation is the inevitable product of the colonial presence 
in the different culture" (2008: 6-7). 
For Bacik the hybrid sovereign "is the result of clash between de Mure and de facto 
practices." If de jure is colonial then de facto is tradition. This clash between the two is the result 
of "colonially imposed state structure" (2008: 7). According to Bacik European colonial powers 
engaged in an "extensive Westernisation" within the region. This process of making the other 
like the self created a bifurcated legacy in the Arab world. It inevitably led to various clashes. 
The word or the concept of clash is not a neutral concept after the publication of Samuel 
Huntington's book the &lash of &ivilisations and the 5emaking of the :orld 2rder (1993) 
(1997). Bacik argues that the clash of two cultural models has three possible consequences: 
(i) The total dominance of one side by the other, and thus the reconstruction of the other 
by the conquering model 
(ii) The models completely reject each other 
(iii) The two models gave a way to a hybrid model that is significantly different from 
both of them (2008: 30). 
For Bacik the third model is the model on the ground in the Middle East. The first model 
is the model of the ideal modernity, the idea of the replacement, the rupture, a totally new 
beginning, different from traditional past. The second model is the model of total rejection and 
the impossibility of communication. The third model suggests that the partial agreement between 
two different cultures which hybridises and thus produce the third culture which is significantly 
different from both of them. This is suggesting that distinguishing tradition from modernity in 
the Arab Middle East is no longer possible. 
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For Bacik the struggle between modernity and tradition cannot be explained by the 
"simplistic" notion of failure. In a very apologetic form for all Arab dictators and the inhuman 
condition in the Arab lands Bacik states "actors cannot be blamed, since they are under the 
influence of their traditional and social structure" (2008:35). According to Bacik the Arab 
tradition is resisting modernity, thus modernity cannot become the dominant narrative. There is a 
part of tradition, despite the influence of modernity, which is resisting and therefore 
amalgamating with modernity and producing hybridity. 
The emergence of the hybrid sovereignty requires both tradition and modernity to coexist 
together within the same space. There are several questions begging for answers here for 
instance: who is the agent behind this arrangement. Can both, tradition and modernity, coexist in 
one terrain? Is their coexistence a perpetual conflict or a true hybrid? Through answering these 
questions I argue against the belief that the Arab Middle Eastern States are hybrid states. It is 
true that both tradition and modernity have presence in the socio-political and the State structure 
in the Arab Middle East. Both lines (tradition and modernity) are struggling for emancipation 
and domination over the society. But if both tradition and modernity are two horizontal lines 
there is a vertical line that cuts both of them, that is the line of the State or the State elite. 
The concept of hybridity suggests that there is a real mixture, to a degree that neither the 
modem elements nor traditional ones can be easily recognised. What if it is still possible, is the 
end, to identify the individual elements that comprise the hybrid? This suggests that in reality 
there is no hybrid. The situation that exists was born after the marriage of modernity and 
tradition. After a simple observation, one has no difficulty, to locate the elements of both 
modernity and tradition within the society and the State. When a hybrid can be disarticulated into 
its elements, it is a compound without mixture, in other words, it is not a hybrid. 
The hybrid form is only occurring in a circumstance where there are perfect conditions 
for communication. This occurred in an atmosphere where the medium that contains both is 
neutral. This medium theoretically could be a State. Within this neutral medium there is a 
possibility of synthesis. But the States in the Middle East are not a neutral medium. When the 
State reshapes, changes and utilises both tradition and modernity, for its own survival, then both 
tradition and modernity are no longer an independent forces . Their relationship to each other 
decided upon by the State. As a result neither traditional groups nor modem groups have the 
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opportunity to establish a dialectical relationship, to commence a dialogue and to produce a 
synthesis. Within the sphere of these states the possibility of hybridity is nil. 
 Internal InterSretations 
In the Middle East modernity-related issues are a daily concern, not only for the intellectual 
elites or avant-gardes, but for the vast majority of the ordinary people. The demand for 
democracy, better government, social justice, freedom of information and transparency is 
rampant among all levels of the society in the region, to a degree that, it is hard to find a daily 
newspaper without having a piece related to the topic, whether it is news, feature article or an 
opinion, directly or indirectly focusing on modernity and its related issues. This has been so 
since the arrival of Napoleon. For instance on the 19th ofJune 2009, as part of my daily routine I 
start with reading Kurdish, Arabic and English newspapers. Firstly I opened a+ayat newspaper, 
(Arabic daily newspaper published in London and sponsored by the royal Saudi family) in its 
opinion page there is an article by a Lebanese writer .aram allflo titled '2n the 0eaning of 
%eing $uroubi' (Arab nationalist) in our time'. He wonders if there is any value in presenting 
Arab nationalism and Arab unity as a path to a promised renaissance and new Arab future, when 
the Arabs are more loyal to their territorial states, feuding sects and waking tribes. Isn't such a 
thesis, Arab nationalism, an act of romanticism, he wonders. The article is a review of a book by 
the Arab Jewish member of the Israeli Knesset, Azmi Bishara under the title '7o %e an $rab 
1owadays' (2009), which was published by 0arkaz aldrasat alwahda alarabia (Centre for the 
Arab Unity Studies). The article clearly addresses sombre issues like, nationalism, identity, 
unity, relationship with the other. All these matter and these issues are seen as different 
ingredients of the project of modernity. 
In alQudis Alarabi, a newspaper, which represents the voice of the pan-Arab nationalist 
point of view, (published in London) Dr. Faisal alHusefi writes under the title, 'the Sovereign 
and 3ower authority in the $rab 3olitical System'. Accordingly in the Arab political systems 
the relationships between the sovereigns and power represent itself in two manifestations. Either 
everlasting unity between the two or forced rupture. The first one is the norm; even republican 
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systems are drawn toward the system of inheritance. The second, which include, coup and 
regime change by the external power, have so far been the only way of changing the systems. 
The article addresses issues like dictatorships, the impossibility of change, the marginalisation of 
the whole population, the absence and the impossibility of democracy. Aside from the 
broadsheet and daily newspapers there are a large number of biogs, personal websites, journals, 
pamphlets and books addressing the similar issues. There is no doubt about the high level of 
obsession with the quest. 
Questioning the Arab situation and searching for the cause or the causes of the failure 
dates back to the late 19WK century. IW was in 1870 that %utrus al-%ustani, wrote an editorial titled 
":hy $re :e %ackward"" He answers that the "Easterners," particularly those of the Syrian 
provinces, "lack unity and fraternal love" (Sheehi, 2005: 438). Consequently, his compatriots 
surrendered themselves to ignorance, sectarianism, materialism, tribal prejudice, and fanaticism, 
resulting in national division, internal strife, and vulnerability to foreign economic and political 
expansion. The realisation of ignorance in this case is more condemnation of the ignorant (the 
person) rather than the ignorance. Despite that early beginning, a more powerful phrasing of the 
issue dates back to the early decades of the twentieth century. This was expressed i n the 
formulation of a question, a single dominant question. 'The question was: why the other [West] 
succeeded and we [Arab Muslims] failed'. For its significance the question requires a rather 
more rigorous analysis. 
A reader of the $l-manar journal, (a journal that was published by Rashid Rada, who was 
not an Arab himself), provoked the question for the first time. This indicates that the realisation 
of the gap between others and the Arabs or Muslims was not realised and not articulated, by the 
Arabs themselves. The answer was given by Shikib Arsalan (1931) in a book or rather a 
pamphlet under the title 'limaza taa 'khra almuslmoun wa taqadama alakhron ', Why the Other 
[West] Succeeded and We [Arabs or Muslims] Failed' . IW is not surprising that the answer for the 
question for Arsalan was in Islam. He holds Muslims responsible for abandoning their religion. 
He states, as long as the Quran is not regarded, as a manifesto, the renaissance of Muslims is 
impossible. He also agreed and called that Islam, as a religion, has to be supported by a worldly 
organisations for instance state. For him the abandonment of the Muslim ulama (clerics) of math 
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and natural science, sciences that established the basis for European progress, is the ignorance by 
the Ulama rather than by Islam. 
What can be concluded from his pamphlet: (a) a separation between Islam as a reljgion 
and Muslims as believers, (b) Islam as a religion is pure, complete, a panacea and infinite, ( c) 
therefore, the sources of the failure of the Muslims is their abandonment of Islam, ( d) the answer 
to the question of why Muslims failed and other succeeded is to go back to Islam and its book. 
Despite that Arsalan is not rejecting the use or utilisation of Western science and technology. 
Does he suggest a hybrid society where Islam and modernity can coexist together? Is he ignorant 
of the impact of religion in shaping scientific and political minds? Is he suggesting a permanent 
dependency on Western technology? What is clear in the answer he offers, if it could be regarded 
as an answer, is the failed modem formula: to utilise Western modernity in order to succeed with 
Islam. Hashim Salih in a newspaper article a$lsharq alawsat August 9th 2002) argues 'that his 
question hitherto remains unanswered'. 
Among many other things the question also indicates that the West was the stimulator, 
the force that awakened Arabs, from their "long sleep". Through this contact the Arabs realised 
that their present condition is an undesirable situation. This realisation only became apparent 
after the comparison to the West. But the question is multilayered. On one hand, it asks about the 
secret of the success of the 'others' i.e. Europeans, which emphasises the importance of 
understanding the nature of the success of the other. But the question is not based on a scientific 
comparative a nalysis. It originates from anger and a frustration a fter the realisation of the 
backwardness. What is noticeable, in term of the chasm between the West and Islam, is a sad 
unwanted realisation. When the wording of the question indicates, why the other succeeds, there 
is a clear sense of envy and disbelief. Why the other, who were not in the first place, who were 
never, successful in the past, in comparison to us the Muslim, now, at this moment, are 
successful. On the other hand, we [the Arabs or Muslims], who were successful in the past and 
should have been successful now, have failed. Therefore, it was rather expected within this mind 
frame that the answer of the question draws from the past, from the heritage, from the glory days. 
Despite its rational phrasing, the question is based on feeling and desire, thus ultimately it fails to 
engage in a rigorous analysis and derive toward a rational conclusion. 
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In addition to all that, the formula of the question sets a premise for the coming scholars in the 
area. The dichotomy became a mindset of us versus them, failure versus success. The answer 
always fluctuated between idealisation and demonization, a panacea or the pure evil of 
Westerners. 
The question, or rather the wonderment, established an understanding that the West is or 
could be a ready-made model which is possible to emulate. This logic was applied similarly to 
the past. The return to the dystopia of the golden era is also possible for consideration as a model 
to emulate. This viewpoint highlights that there is no need for an effort to create the whole effort 
should be on copying. Copying the West or copying the past was seen as the path to salvation. 
Focusing on the West diverted the Arab moderniser's efforts from the reality of their own 
society. They focused mostly on the West and how to catch up, for them the West became a 
threshold, which consequently hampered the understanding of their own society and themselves. 
They believed in order to catch up with the West they were required to obtain tools and elements, 
and moreover they thought there could be borrowed readymade. Thus the prime area of interest 
was always limited to military technique and equipment, economic programmes, and political 
ideologies. The Arabs compared themselves to the West, so the modernisation for them ended up 
to be a process of how to be like the West. In this sense modernity was reduced to a mere act of 
aping, a process of the extemality in technology, fashion, appearance and architecture. 
In his book 'uss alatqadm a 'nda mofakry alislam ', the Basis of Progress among the 
Muslim Thinkers, Fahmy Djad'an (1988: 16) attempts to tackle the problem of progress and how 
it is being addressed by Muslim thinkers in the modem Arab world. For Djad'an the concept of 
Arab Muslim thinkers refers to those thinkers who, despite their different opinion and 
geographical background, regard Islam as a religion, culture and civilisation that should play an 
effective role in making the social life, culture and politics of the individual. Whereas non-
Muslim Arab thinkers are those scholars for whom Islam as a religion, culture and civilisation, 
does not play any role in their intellectual works. These are also categorised as the Arab or the 
Muslim secular thinkers for instance: Mansur Fahmy (1886-1959), Taha Hussein (1889-1973), 
and Ismail Mazhar. 
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This crude categorisation relates to other dichotomies such as reformrevolution , 
continuationrupture, traditionalmodem, religioussecular and EastWest. But besides this, the 
Djad'an, book is an example of a trend that sees the study of modernity as a phenomenon in its 
implication and its fate, among the Arab scholars. For Djad'an and others modernity and 
modernising society is an issue concerning only the intellectuals. This is the remnant of the 
heavy influence of modernisation theory. The definition of modernisation as Pappe states ''takes 
for granted not only those local pre-modem pasts are irrelevant but also that, as long as they are 
not westernised, the locals themselves are not part of a modem history" (2007: 3). In general the 
intellectuals are divided in three groups: (a) those who are marginalised, (b) those who are exiled 
and (c) the majority; those who are part of the ideological state apparatus. 
It is challenging to address the ineffective role of the intellectuals in the Arab Middle 
Eastern states. According to Abu-Rabi' (2004, xiii) these intellectuals "failed to produce a 
critical and constructive Islamic theory of knowledge" they also "failed to inform us as to how to 
become both 'Muslim' and 'modem"'. For him these intellectuals are in state of ineffectiveness. 
For the intellectuals to be effective, first the State should realise the necessity of knowledge and 
create a space for freedom and expression. But these States have no public sphere. Thus, there is 
no neutral sphere where pure communication could be conducted. 
In these States the intellectuals are products of the State; "if the present intellectuals are 
not ready or willing to walk with us, we will create a new generation of the intellectuals, a rather 
more sympathetic generation, one who has a better understanding to us" (Alkhateb, 2001). This 
is how the former Syrian minister of information Ahmmad Askander puts it. This leaves no 
doubt about (a) the identity of the intellectuals (b) the State attitude toward them and (c) the role 
of the intellectual in the society. 
The elite in the Arab Middle East believe, "education is a weapon whose effect depends 
on who holds it in his hands and at whom it is aimed", as Stalin puts it (1949:281). Therefore, the 
reliance on the intellectuals to provide the miracle of modernity in a state and a society where the 
intellectuals have no effective role is a mistake. This originates from the view that every project 
of modernisation, regardless of the location, time, and culture, has a similar trajectory to the 
Western modernity process. 
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In his book, naqd al khtab al arabi, (1985) (Critique of the Arab Discourse) al-Jabri concentrates 
on the discourse of these intellectuals and their illusionary plan to modernise the society. For al-
Jabri Arab thinkers despite their different background collectively failed to understand both their 
own society and the West. For him all the discourses are ideological and have no merit to 
changing the reality. What is rather intriguing, in the works of these intellectuals, is the almost 
total absence of the role of the emerged state in the process of modernity in the region. 
Many prominent Arab thinkers have attempted to find the reason behind the failure of 
modernity in the region. Each thinker prioritises an aspect and argues that the improvement of 
that particular aspect is the key to the renaissance. This view is idealistic and abstract, as Hisham 
Sharabi (1984) states. Inability to separate the Western discourses from their reality on one hand 
and similarly being incapable of understanding the self, is the source of this abstract view. 
There is more than one adjective, in Arabic language, to describe and consequently name 
the commencement of the project of modernity. These variations depend on the regional dialect 
and the influence of the certain foreign language over the local language. I highlight two from 
Egypt, which are also used in other places, namely nahdha, and tanwer. The former literally 
means 'rising up' and the latter indicates 'Enlightenment'. Rising up emphasises that there was 
once a civilisation, which throughout time faded or failed. Therefore the duty now is to rise up 
again. The concept invites certain nostalgia toward the past golden age. Based on this premise 
the scholars in the Arab world are divided between rupture and return. For Hsan Hanfi (1980) the 
rupture is not accurate, there should be a continuation of the past and its civilisation root, but 
with change in the form. This thinking has a root in the Arab past. For the Muslim and the Arab 
thinkers the Greek philosophy was merely a tool that could be utilised to renew the Muslim 
civilisation, and keep the content untouched. For Abulla Aurawi (1996:10) the return to the past 
is not an option, thus, there must be a total rupture with this past. This emphasis on the rupture is 
an attitude which regards the past, the heritage and tradition as obsolete. It is also calling for the 
total adaptation of the Western modernity project. 
Whereas, there are other scholars who consider that the complete continuation of the root, 
Islam, is the path toward modernity. The supporters of this view primarily come from the 
Muslim Brotherhoods group. One of the main contemporary thinkers who theorise this view was 
the Egyptian Said Qutib (1906-1966). In his book 0a'almfi altariq, 'SignSosts on the 5oad' or 
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'0ilestone' (1980), which later on became the manifesto for every Islamic Political movement. 
Qutb (1980: 1) states: 
Mankind today is on the brink of a precipice, not because of the danger of complete 
annihilation which is hanging over its head--this being just a symptom and not the real 
disease--but because humanity is devoid of those vital values which are necessary not 
only for its healthy development but also for its real progress. Even the Western world 
realizes that Western civilization is unable to present any healthy values for the guidance 
of mankind. It knows that it does not possess anything, which will satisfy its own 
conscience and justify its existence. 
Qutb, on the one hand, totally rejects Western value and on the other hand, he regards 
this as danger to the Islamic faith. He establishes a dialectical relation between the pure and the 
decadent: pure being the salaf fimdament, the early Islam) and decadent is represented by the 
Western secular value. The main purpose of this critique is to induce a return to the past. The 
essential point here is regarding the sovereign; for Qutb and his followers sovereignty is not for 
man but for Allah. Hence, every form of human sovereignty is Mahillya (ignorance i.e. the pre-
Islamic form of authority). Therefore, it is permitted to be destroyed violently. This is a clear 
recipe for calamity. 
The machine of state plays a pivotal role in Qutb's theory. For him the era of convincing 
through preaching is over. Islam has to seek power by running the State and consequently 
implementing Islamic shari'a law. This project is also based on a vision that through unification 
oflslarn under an Islamic state the nahza is possible. 
There is a secular version of this vision, which is exemplified by pan-Arab nationalism. 
The Ba'th party, as the only pan-Arab political party, believe in, umma $rabia wahada that resal 
khalida o..i.la ?OW- ..:...1:i o.l:!.I.J '½-!.JC .i....lOne Arab Nation Bearing an Eternal Message. 8mma hitherto 
referred to the Islamic community, not the Arabs, and 5isaa is the word used for God's message 
transmitted by Muhammad, the Rasool. For pan-Arab nationalist modernity and modernisation is 
only possible when all Arabs are united in one state. Both Islamism and pan-Arab nationalism 
invoke an essentialist form of identity. For the political Islam, being Muslim is the identity; 
while for the pan Arab nationalist an Arab is the one who speaks Arabic. However, in the case of 
the Baathists being Arab was not as clear as it appears; this was only an empty slogan. 
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To Bathists, being an Arab is connected with the degree of loyalty that one has, not only 
to the idea of "Arabness," but also to the party that carries that idea, that party's central 
committee, and ultimately, to the party leader. In that sense, it is fascist. Baathist 
ideology in the pure original sense means you could have ancestors going back hundreds 
of years in an Arab country and your first language might be Arabic, but still you are not 
an Arab in the Baathist view. The quality of being an Arab is therefore a subjective and 
not an objective attribute of an individual (Makiya, 2005: 82). 
Both ideologies, the Islamists and the Baathists, authorise the use of violence to achieve 
their goal. Islamists resemble in many ways the totalitarian system. Like totalitarians they desire 
to capture the whole, and establish a uniform way of living based on their codes and principles. 
They also resemble the totalitarian for having an idea or ideology and an aspiration to have a 
new beginning, whether going back to the past, or purifying the society. But this is hard to 
confirm for a number of reasons. One, none of the Islamic parties have ever been in power, the 
implementation of totalitarianism is impossible outside power. Two, the Islamic political parties 
have no clear view on economy, technology, science, and even the structure of the State, 
therefore they have no option but to borrow from the W estren modernity, which in the end is 
similar to the common style of the existing nowadays States they also establish the Islamic 
version of it i.e. the Islamic version of the FMS. 
Contrary to these views there are thinkers who call for adopting the final product of the 
Western civilisation in both areas of technologies and ideas, since Western civilisation is the 
dominant and most advanced civilisation. For theses thinkers, mainly the Arab liberals, people 
like Fawad Zakaria, Ismaile Mazhar, and others, the Arab modernity is a project of catching up. 
They also confirm that the Western project of modernity is a global or human project. This 
implies that modernity is singular. Therefore, emulation and adopting is also the only way 
forward. 
These views were condemned by Hisham Sharabi (1984) who contends that the lack of 
progress, particularly regarding democracy, national unity and human rights, is rooted in the 
Arabs' failure to break from their patriarchal tradition and internalise modernity. In this regard 
the main concept he uses to analyse the failure of modernisation, or becoming modem, is what 
he calls "neopatriarchy" (1988). 
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While criticising others for idealising the West, Sharabi himself repeats the same 
practice. In his book prefaces for studying Arab society, he takes an example of a boy in 
Damascus and compares him with a boy of similar age in Chicago, in his attempt to diagnose the 
patriarchal system in the society. Hisham Sharabi argues that the boom of oil exports created a 
new postcolonial political system of neopatriarchy. By this term, Sharabi means a system of 
political control through tribal-based patronage networks that preserve hierarchal relations of 
loyalty within an expanding market economy. Key to this hierarchy is a system of male 
domination that "assign[ s] privilege and power to the male at the expense of the female, keeping 
the latter under crippling legal and social constraints" (1988: 33). Sharabi's concept can be 
criticised from many different aspects. For instance what were the main forces behind the 
maintenance of traditional patriarchal system? It is the state that maintains and distorts this 
process. Through the patriarchal system the State elite managed to marginalise and silence the 
majority of the population among them young, women, and children; this worked through 
sustaining traditional family system, which recognise the father as the only speaker and the only 
representer of the whole family. Beside that Western modem societies are still to a large degree a 
patriarchal system or modernity as some feminist theories claim is a masculine project. 
However, as John Willoughby (2008: 184) argues "that the increased educational attainment of 
women will instead lead to noticeable increases in female labour force participation" without 
much change in politics or the state structure. 
In relation to tanwer y.._,l:i the Arabic for enlightenment, the concept "has been used, 
appropriated, and recycled in multiple milieus ranging from state discourse and the secular 
intellectuals in the process of co-option by the state to the Islamists and the nationalists" as the 
Egyptian academic Mona Abaza (2010: 32) explains. Enlightenment is an essential stage in the 
trajectory of the Western modernity. The fact that the stages of the Arab developments are 
named by translating the western names into Arabic connotes that the Arabs are imagining 
themselves to walk in the similar path as Europeans. Today when one unearths contemporary 
Arab history one comes across every stage of W estem modernity by name. But in reality the 
concept has a different function. Through sloganification of the concept like tanwer, 
enlightenment, 
the government has been trying to sell for the W estem "democratic" and free world an 
image of a civilized, "enlightened" government, combating its "dark" opponents, it has 
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itself reinvented practices from the Middle Ages, such as publicly stripping and raping 
feaale demonstratars, acts that were committed in May 2005 by thugs paid by the 
regune. The launchmg of the Campaigns of enlightenment in official and literati circles 
for aore Btha a decade has run parallel with the regime' s mounting of highly barbaric 
practices m its attempt at harshly disciplining the unruly (Abaza, 2010: 32). 
For the state the tanwer is nothing but a camouflage to disguise the practice which is in contrast 
of the essence to every form of enlightenment. 
The arrival of modernity instigated tradition. Tradition was the main source of the world 
view and the discourse of power in pre-modern times. However although it was the dominant 
and single discourse, it was not a uniform. Nevertheless despite its multiplicity, its main feature 
was dogma. Tradition, prior to the arrival of modernity was a mere practice which avoided any 
form of reflection. With the arrival of modernity and the attempt of internalise it led to the 
emergence of a group called turathi those who focused on inheritance. This school tries "to seek 
our modernity by rethinking our tradition turath" (al-Jabri, 1999:1).alJabri acknowledges that: 
9oices are clamouring here and there to question, in one way or another, the Arab 
researchers' concern over tradition: why all the interest in tradition? Is this not an 
intellectual regression? Some even go as far as referring to a pathological phenomenon, a 
"collective neurosis" that suddenly hit Arab intellectuals following the 1967 debacle, and 
caused them to turn backwards in the direction of "tradition." Those who hold such an 
opinion raise the objection that the interest in the topic of "tradition" diverts minds from 
the exigencies of modernity (al-Jabri, 1999: 1). 
He regards these voices as "delusion" . What al-Jabri misses is that the excavation of the heritage 
by turath in the age of Modern did not result in "modern understanding and a contemporary view 
of tradition" as he puts it, but rather resulted in glorifying the past and regarding it as an 
alternative to modernity. For al-Jabri modernity is not a process to "refute tradition or break with 
the past, but rather to upgrade the manner in which we assume our relationship to tradition at the 
level of what we call 'contemporaneity,' which, for us, means catching up with the great strides 
that are being made worldwide" (1999: 2). A close reading of the text indicates that modernity, 
in WKiV regard, is nothing more than a tool to upgrade the past. This also shows that concepts or 
process such as; change, renewal, or rupture, are totally dismissed. Here tradition has the upper 
hand and modernity has to serve it in order to continue. If tradition iV an inheritance then to 
inKHUiW iV not essentially to receive something it iV an active affirmation. In order to EH traditional 
one must decide how and what to inherit, thus one has to be selective, 'filter' as Derrida (2002: 
110) puts it. 
Genuine fidelity to a tradition is not literalist traditionalism. Genuine fidelity consists in 
preserving not simply tradition but the continuity of tradition. A.s fidelity to a living and hence 
changing tradition, it requires that one distinguishes between the living and the dead, the flame 
and the ashes, the gold and the dross" as Strauss, (1965) puts it: 
Within a living tradition, the new is not the opposite of the old but its deepening: one 
does not understand the old in its depth unless one understands it in the light of such 
deepening; the new does not emerge through the rejection or annihilation of the old but 
through its metamorphosis or reshaping. "And it is a question whether such reshaping is 
not the best form of annihilation." This is indeed the question: whether the loyal and 
loving reshaping or reinterpretation of the inherited, or the pitiless burning of the hitherto 
worshipped, is the best form of annihilation (Strauss, 1965: 24 .25). 
The Arab traditionalists vary in their relationship to traditional. Some view it as a complete 
system: "Islam as a total system, complete unto itself, and the final arbiter of life in all its 
categories" (Mitchell, 1993 : 14) as the slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood affirms. This also 
purports perfection and infinity, (Islam is applicable to all times and all places, another Muslim 
Brotherhood slogan). On the other hand, the vernacular traditionalists are, at best, unrelated to 
reality and politics. Their utterances are merely a voice. If for Aristotle, the transition from voice 
to language was the founding condition of political community, then these people are not 
political and not establishing a political community either. This makes very few of traditionalists 
able to be considered compatible with the Straussian interpretation of tradition. 
 0odernit\ and tKe 6tate 
If the emergence of the State as an organisation and idea was the most powerful aspect of the 
project of Western modernity, then any understanding of a copy or replication of it should be 
based on an understanding of the origin. How this was original pictured, understood or imagined. 
A review of cultural and political history reveals that modernity was seen first as a single, 
compact, and undivided, project and in addition to that, it was also pictured as being a panacea. 
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The combination of simplification and universal-remedy has a root in the cultural background of 
the Arabs. Emerging from a strong monolithic religious background, Judaism, Christianity or 
Islam, it is understandable, that the Arabs, imagining and picturing, even a secular movement 
like modernity as a unified and uniform project. 
9iewing it from philosophical point of view modernity and its arrival was never dealt 
with as an event. According to Deleuze (2004: 172), ''with every event, there is indeed the present 
moment of its actualization, the moment in which the event is embodied in a state of affairs, an 
individual, or a person, the moment we designate by saying 'here, the moment has come'." The 
arrival of modernity did not become a moment of realisation, a moment to create a gap or a break 
in the continuation of the past. The arrival caused a shock but did not produce a new mode of 
thinking, living or being. What emerged was a reaction: either for or against. This resulted in 
multiple failures (a) a failure of understanding the Western modernity, (b) ofunderstanding one's 
self and ( c) of delivering any tangible outcome. 
For Hardt and Negri this, at best, is misunderstanding, for them (2000:74) "modernity is 
not a unitary concept but rather appears in at least two modes". The first mode is a radical 
revolutionary process. This modernity destroys its relations with the past and declares the 
imminence of the new paradigm of the world and life. This new emergence, however, created a 
reaction, a counter-revolution which eventually ended up in Thermidor: swinging back toward a 
pre-revolutionary state. 
From that point of view both Hardt and Negri (2000: 76) criticise Samir Amin's genealogy of 
Euro-centralism theory, Amin outlines: 
If the period of the Renaissance marks a qualitative break in the history of humanity, it is 
precisely because, from that time on, Europeans become conscious of the idea that the 
conquest of the world by their civilization is henceforth a possible objective . .. From this 
moment on, and not before, Eurocentrism crystallizes(1989: 72-73). 
For Hardt and Negri (2000: 77) it is the counterrevolutionary power, rather than the 
revolutionary power, which began to realize the possibility and necessity of subordinating other 
populations to the European domination. Here too, the second mode of modernity gained the 
upper hand. 
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Concluding from that European modernity as a project was far from being a panacea. 
From its very beginning it marks a "tragic conflict" between a horizontal force aiming at 
freedom for humanity and a vertical force utilising knowledge to impose the power over the 
other. The latter became the essence of modernity, which established a mechanism to guarantee 
the domination through this vertical structure, between colonised and coloniser. This also 
resulted in a counteraction in a Nietzschen (1989, 1886: 89) sense that fighting monsters raises 
the possibility of making one a monster. Accordingly the institutions established by the 
coloniser, resemble the essence of the coloniser themselves; therefore, they were not aiming to 
destroy the relations with the past and declare the immanence of the new paradigm of the world 
and life. From this perspective the process of modernisation could be criticised as a process that 
intended to change the non-West society in order to serve the Western society. 
Holding the State, and its structure, as the responsible for the failure of modernisation and 
never reaching modernity in the Arab Middle East, is relatively new. The State itself was always 
regarded as one of the main products of the modernisation project. The State is the modem 
element; therefore the State per se was always seen as the sine qua non for modernity. But the 
State, in the West, is the product of a capitalist modernity. In the Middle East the State became 
the main driver for implementing modernity. This state led modernity is a limited modernity. In 
the Middle East it is used to enhance and empower the State vis a vis society. Thus modernity 
never aimed to change or revolutionise tradition. Understanding the relationship between the 
States, or rather the particular form of the State that emerged in the region and modernity 
requires first of all understanding of the nature of that state and its identity. To whom that state 
belonged, and to whom it intended to serve. 
The State has the ambition to borrow from modernity and implement it, that drive is 
paralleled by an equally strong conservative drive, however as much as the States and its 
apparatuses are driven by necessity to introduce modernity, they are equally driven to limit, and 
frequently inhibit it in ways which are necessary for them to maintain their control over the 
power. 
But in the last few decades the State as a structure became the focus of scholars, 
commentators, political scientists and others in the region as the main obstacle confronting the 
project of modernity. There are different approaches in holding the State responsible. Those like 
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Burhan Ghalioun (1994) regard the State as a remote entity from the society and the 8mma the 
nation. According to him the Arab states are elite states. Others like George Tarabishi (1982) 
hold the territorial structure of the state as the main factor. Thus the possibility of modernity 
according to him can only be realised in the unity of Arabs from the Ocean to the Gulf. While 
other scholars like Khaldun Hassan aNaqib (1991) blame the authoritarian nature of the State. 
While for Nazih Ayubi as it is clear from the title of his approach, it is the particular structure of 
the state. He argues that the Arab states are as the title indicates 'Over-stating the Arab State: 
Politics and Society in the Middle East'. 
The notion of 'blackhole State' is the manifestation of the astronomical "black hole" 
phenomenon. This notion coined in the Arab Human Development Report (2004: 126) 
We can call this the model of the "blackhole State", likening it to the astronomical 
phenomenon of extinguished stars which gather into a ball and are converted into giant 
magnetic fields from which even light cannot escape. The modem Arab state, in the 
political sense, runs close to this model, the executive apparatus resembling a "black 
hole" which converts its surrounding social environment into a setting in which nothing 
moves and from which nothing escapes. Like the astronomical black hole, this apparatus 
in tum forms into a tight ball around which the space is so constricted as to paralyze all 
movement. 
Being a black-hole is a totalitarian desire, totalitarian without being a totalitarian. It is 
like being God, divine. The report shows how the different elements of modernity are utilised for 
this aim. If the body of the central executive and the leaders hunger for unlimited power is 
something from tradition, it is guaranteed in the constitutional texts, which enshrine the right of 
the king, the president or the emir ( or the Revolutionary Command Council) to legislate and vest 
wide powers in the head of state. According to the report the central executive 
becomes the supreme leader of the executive, the council of ministers, the armed forces, 
the judiciary and public services, for it is he who appoints and has the power to dismiss 
ministers, members of the judiciary, senior officials and officers, and it is he who 
convenes and has the authority to dissolve parliament (where one exists). The laws also 
prescribe the central control of local authorities, sinea ae ruler appoints aovamors and 
prefects, who are responsible to him and not to citizens.B The centraaization of the 
executive also shows in bureaucratic expansion, greater state mterference m the economy 
and higher government spending of national rasources, paicularly on securia and 
military organs. This trend is evident, both in radical states with planned economies and 
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in conservative states which, from the outset, declared their adherence to the market 
economy (2004: 127). 
The black hole is a powerful metaphor. But it is rather more descriptive than analytical. IW 
describes only what is on the surface. It is a metaphor which shows how brutal and totalitarian 
the State is. Despite its high level of accuracy the metaphor might be misleading. The State has a 
one way relation with the masseses. IW shapes them, assemblages them, toys with traditional and 
modem values and creates actual and virtual civil wars. It is not only, as the blackhole metaphor 
indicates a mega machine of control. 
 &onclusion 
The occidental modernity and its fate in the Arab Middle East has been discussed and analysed, 
by many scholars, from outside and inside the region and from many different angles. In this 
thesis these scholars are divided into two categories, the external and internal. This division is 
not simply geographical. It is also political, economical and cultural. There is no doubt that the 
strategic place of the area for global politics and its role in world economics influenced the 
academic and non academic analysis elsewhere in the world. These geostrategic interests are 
clearly marked on the aim and structure of the external literature. Whereas, the internal literature, 
which is mainly written by the local Arab intellectuals and thinkers, despite their locality in 
terms of language and information, as far as methodological and conceptual concerns they are a 
distortion of the main Western methodological schools, typically characterised either by 
mimicking or counter-reaction. Moreover every country in the region has a horde of state-owned 
intellectuals and academics who tend to write more ideological and pro-government works which 
are of little utility. 
The independent Arab writers, scholars and intellectuals have an ambivalent relationship 
to the West. While they dream of being Western, to live like Westerners and to catch-up with the 
West, at the same time they celebrate the West's calamities. This attitude influences their view, 
thus one can claim that their analysis is at best, unconnected to the reality on the ground. The 
highly secrecy oriented nature of these governments is palpable and constraints abound when 
any study conducted in this area. This is largely attributed to the nature of power. In general 
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power is conducted better and more smoothly in a closed secret environment. In addition to that 
any information leaked or told about these systems is usually done for a different reason than 
they proclaim. However the nature of these systems, their impact on daily livelihood of the 
people and their performance of power reveal a great deal of know ledge about the nature of these 
states. 
Moreover, most of the studies on the region, both internal and the external tend to stress 
on one aspect at the expense of the others. Thus most literature could be described as one 
dimensional and to some extent superficial. The State in the region has been neglected to some 
extent or treated as a positive force in implementing the project of modernity. The trajectory of 
this State, from the moment of its creation, has been marked by a particular and unique 
architecture. This State, however itself a product of modernity, from the very moment of its 
inception hijacked over modernity and utilised it for its sovereign elite. 
In analysing the reason behind the failure of occidental modernity in the region culture 
has ascendancy. The culturalists are those who regard culture at an impasse. They either argue 
that there is no possibility of modernity in other non-Western culture, therefore other are 
destined to remain in pre modem condition indefinitely. Or the culture has to be reformed to 
make room for the modem, which is seen as an impossible endeavour. The FMS approach 
recognises that culture plays a big role in resisting modernity. This is not attributed to the 
essence of the culture. If the Middle Eastern culture dominated by a religion, Islam it is not 
unique in its hostility toward modernity, this position is equally shared by every other religions, 
Abrahamic and non-Abarhamic. The culture hostility toward modernity is more in its mode of 
utilisation. The incompatibility of Islam and democracy is more in its practice than in theory. 
Since the State mainly utilises culture, and the State has no interest in the emergence of a 
modem society, it is therefore expected that the State would highlight the anti-modem aspect of 
culture and employs it for that particular purpose. The implementation of occidental Modernity 
within the sphere of other non-Western culture is evidence against the culturalist claim. 
Another dominant concept in the literature concerning the FMS is the Rentier theory. 
This approach in many ways confirms the FMS theory. This signifies that the authorities in the 
FMSs are fully aware that curtailing the political rights has to be compensated for. The 
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compensation here is economic. The Rentier is both modem and tradition. The Rentierism is not 
possible without modernity. While Reintierism indicates that both modem and tradition has been 
utilised by the State for the sustenance of the elite power but the approach at the end fails to 
explain the complex structure of these States in the region. The Rentier theory regards the 
population of these states as having little interest and awareness of their political rights. Whereas, 
the empirical evidences on the ground for instance the presence of opposition groups, 
demonstrates otherwise. Unlike Rentier theory the FMS gives broader focus - in particular on 
combination of state repression (use of modernity) combined with state cooption (use of 
tradition). The Rentier is totalizing a part and exaggerating its effect. Moreover, the Rentier 
interpretation collides with traditional understanding for state subsidy and the role of dolling out 
as a form of practicing power in the region. 
As far as modernisation theory is concerned the socio-economic indicators are inadequate 
representations of a country's political development or its capacity to democratise. Therefore 
where analyses of socio-economic indicators fail to unlock development's complex formula, 
modernisation scholars tend to blame culture as the source of the failure of modernity. 
Modernisation theory fails to provide an adequate explanation for the persistence and durability 
of these systems. This theory rather naively, presumes an almost mechanical relationship 
between levels of economic development and democracy. The Failed Modem State theory 
adequately explains the possibility of utilising modernity elements; whether it is through 
economy, technology or institution against modernity itself. Thus the elements which are 
regarded as basis signs of marching toward the realisation of modernity, within the zone of FMS, 
metamorphosed to anti-modem elements. 
The FMS approach unveils how both modernity and tradition have been equally utilised 
by the State to serve the State interests. It suggests that the State is hindering every form of 
communications and acts as a barrier. Thus modem and tradition never have the opportunity to 
engage in a dialectical relation in a neutral sphere. Modernity is not borrowed by the state to 
reform or depart from tradition. The main role of modernity within the territory of the state is to 
counter-balance tradition and update the structure of the state and its power. Furthermore 
occidental modernity provides valuable services to these states in areas of economics and 
international relations. 
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As part of the process of modernisation there has been talk of transition and consequently 
democratisation. In the past decade academic interest focused almost exclusively on 
democratisation. Despite borrowing many aspects and elements of modernity the states in the 
Middle East are not in transition toward the realisation of a modem society. The FMS through its 
static status confirms this fact. Its only aim is to maintain power in the hand of a small group. 
Therefore, transition is against the principle of this state. Thus the state itself has no interest in 
transition and through establishing a cunning formula balances out any transitional demand from 
outside the realm of the state. As far as the concept of hybrid is concemd; there is no doubt that 
modernity and Islam are both present within the sphere of the State. However, the relationship is 
not a dialectical; is not producing a synthesis. The FMS, approach deciphers this unique 
exceptional status. The FMS requires both modernity and tradition to function and to survive. 
This State through its apparatuses terminates any engagement between the two parts; therefore it 
is rather unrealistic to speculate about any sort of exchange. The State throughout its history 
engaged in this utilisation practice. By reducing, tradition and modernity to a tool it enhances 
the State's power. Tradition and modernity provide two different domains for communication 
and meaning. 
The literature that tried to address this form of State in most cases avoided the complexity 
of the structure. It has always assumed that both these two forces are competing and conflicting. 
The two forces have always been regarded as the makers of the State. Rarely has literature 
addressed how the State utilises both tradition and modernity. How it reduces them to mere tools. 
How the State as a medium metamorphoses all the forces within that medium to serve the very 
interest of the state. 
In contrast to the reviewed concepts and theories, the FMS concept does not engage in 
picking up one aspect and totalising it. It is clear that culture plays a vital role, the economy also 
has an impact, but more important is the frame within which these factors are functioning. In 
other words the decisive point is the mode of functioning: how culture functions, how economy 
is utilised. This indicates that the culture is not responsible per se. Those coming from a 
culturalist perspective argue that culture is the determining factor in shaping politics in the 
region. In contrast to that the FMS concept is neither homogenising nor essentialising. If the state 
acts as a barrier the emergence of modernity is possible. This makes the FMS concept an anti-
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orientalist concept. Moreover contrary to rentier state theory the FMS concept shows that the 
population are neither apathetic nor apolitical nor willing to trade their political right for a wad of 
money. In relation to other approaches the FMS concept indicates that these states are not in 
transition and at best they are not hybrid. The FMS combines two forms of failure; which they 
act as counter-revolutionary modernities and create immobile static situation which ultimately as 
a result every aspect of life falls into stagnation. 
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2.1 Background 
The ."'.0_r~d, the whole world, in that quaking era, so full of anticipation and 
possi?ihties, l~oked around, as slow as a tortoise, as swift as a bolt of lightning, to 
question,. to hsten carefully for distant thunder, watching with dread for the 
approac~mg moi:row. T~en, everything was open to re-evaluation, to 
reapportionment: ideas, regions, countries, even kings, sultans and little princes. 
New states rose suddenly, and others vanished (Abdul-alrhaman al Munif in 
Ikhtlaf Allul e wal Nahar, Variations on Day and Night) . (Halliday, 2007) 
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals an interesting affmity in the architecture and 
methods of Arab systems of governance and brings out features of an interwoven 
regional architecture comprising an Arab "integral whole" in which the systems 
are mutually reinforcing. It is therefore possible to speak of an "Arab model" of 
governance with specific traits common to most systems and in tum based on an 
Arab regional system that constitutes its political infrastructure (UN Development 
Programme, Arab Human Development Report, 2004: 129). 
A coercive despotic system was never alien to the Middle East. In his book 'the Roots of 
Despotism: a Reading of the Mesopotamian Ancient Literature', Makwi (1994) traces the 
phenomena of despotism back to the early Mesopotamian civilisation, especially the Babylonian 
civilisation. But the contemporary form of the system that dominates the region has a more 
modem date of birth. These systems, namely the territorial states or the nation-states, are 
"artificial creations" (AHDR, 2009: 22). The artificial opposes the natural and denotes that there 
is a maker and an interest behind what is made. To make an artificial entity in most 
circumstances is to engage in violence. To force what should not be there. This act was done 
through the reorganization of the political geography, loyalty, demography and culture. The 
borders of the Arab Middle Eastern states reflect this fact. This was accomplished through a 
series of treaties between the outside powers themselves on one the hand and on the other hand 
between the outsiders and the local elites. The artists, who were residing elsewhere, far away 
from the region mainly in places like London and Paris, fabricated the borders. As (Fromkin, 
1989: 17) puts it: 
It was an era (1914-1922) in which Middle Eastern countries and frontiers ~~re 
fabricated in Europe. Iraq and what we call now Jordan, for example, were Bntish 
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inventions; lines drawn on an empty map by Briti·sh p 1·t· · aft th p · . . . . o i ic1ans er e rrst World War; 
while th~ boundaries of Saudi_ Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq were established by a British civil 
~erv~t m 1922 and the frontier between Moslems and Christians were drawn b F h 
m Syna-Lebanon. Y renc 
Drawing the borders was followed by the establishment of an "artificial state system" (Fromkin, 
1989: 17) and as a result a new characteristic emerged, epitomised in the figure of state or 
'statehood' (Bacik, 2008). With the Statehood came government, the territory, sovereignty and 
nation: notions, which were novel to the culture and politics of the region. While the Europeans 
were planning the remaking of the region they had to find suitable local representatives to link 
the newly established system to the locals. 
The new king would be an authentic (and docile) Arab. He might even mollify Arnold 
Wilson and the Indian army command, who did not like ordering Muslim soldiers to 
attack the troops of the Caliph. Now they would be ordering these soldiers to fight 
alongside an Arab king-say, a descendant of the Prophet. Arid the British found just 
such a king-Husein ibn Ali, a descendant of the Prophet who was the hereditary 
custodian of the shrines in Mecca and Medina. The negotiations between Husein and the 
British, and later between Husein's sons and the British, affected the future of Palestine, 
Jordan, and what later became Saudi Arabia, but they also affected Iraq (Naiden, 
2007:60). 
Drawing borders indicates the marking of territory and distinguishing that territory from 
its surroundings was a modem phenomenon alien to the culture of the region. This designed 
territory was usually named and then handed over to a sovereign. The sovereign is a modem 
creature, but the spirit and imagination remained traditional. According to traditional imagination 
these territories were given which also indicated that they were possessed by the sovereign. This 
was achieved in the al a'qer treaty (al Naqib, 1989: 112). "The significance of alaqer was that it 
linked the border to the sovereign. This was not known in the Arab mashriq (east)". The 
introduction of the border was a paradigm shift in the history and the culture of the region. 
Historically a marked territory was never a component of the community. The absence of border 
indicates that there was no such thing as a State. The State is a territorially demarcated 
institution. In the pre-border era belonging (identity) was tribal and the tribes were nomadic. The 
nomad is characterised by movement and change, and is unfettered by complex systems of 
organisation. 
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The drawing of borders changed the relationship between the inhabitants and their land; 
as a result the marked territory became a component of the new life. It resulted in limitation and 
the restriction of mobility and the end of the freedom to wander. This introduction could be 
interpreted in more than one way. Firstly, when the outside powers, mainly Britain and France, 
drew the borders they attempted to introduce a similar system of W estphalian State in to the 
region. These borders were the first step towards the formation of state in the region. Secondly, 
the borders were a tool to divide and conquer. This particular understanding is common among 
pan-Arab nationalists. And finally, borders changed the purpose of traditional movement of the 
nomad, from grazing into a political move. As a result, the border gave those who were residing 
within its boundary a different form of identity. These were all modem elements forced upon the 
life of the people. Thus with the emergence of the state as an entity many other organisations and 
institutions followed, for instance sedentary life style, restriction of movement, new identity, new 
form of governing and most importantly the emergence of organised force in the shape of army 
and military. 
Whether the border drawing was done through the agreement between the colonial 
powers and the local elites or between the colonial powers themselves, for instance the Sykes-
Picot Agreement (1916) that led to the formation of the States in the region, one thing was given: 
there was a total absence of the local people and their true representatives. At the Paris Peace 
Conference of World War I "decisions, by all accounts, including those of the participants, were 
made with little knowledge of, or concern for, the lands and peoples about which and whom the 
decisions were made" (Fromkin, 2004: 399). This is a clear sign that the power or the State in the 
region, from the moment of its formation, was distant, alien and ultimately disregarded the 
aspiration of its population. This became one of the most enduring legacies of these states: 
politics without people. At any occasion, when the people demanded participation the States 
response was a shift from a total neglect to violence. 
The emergent States in the region were designed to fulfil interests, which were not 
· · A A b. (1995· 86) observed the colonial powers were necessarily the local people's mterest. s yu 1 · , 
aiming "in redirecting economic relations away from the Middle East and towards Europe." 
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The new borders were, therefore, the geographical manifestations of more profound 
changes in the basic premises of the political economy. The most notable of these changes as 
Samir Amin argues (1978: 25-30), resulted from the colonial policy of redirecting the economy, 
in particular the agriculture sector, to the needs of the international economic system. Most of the 
colonial powers, Amin asserted, sought to privatise the system of land ownership, and 
consequently, redistributed land among those who exhibited readiness to cooperate, mostly 
among tribal Sheikhs and urban notables. This is particularly correct in the early stage especially 
before the discovery of oil or in the countries with a significant agriculture sector. These 
economic ties and high interest were clear and documented by the Western side. A document, 
issued by the British Foreign Office stated "with the single exception of Egypt there is no foreign 
country in the Near and Middle East where British commercial interests are so well established 
and of such extensive scope as Iraq. It is difficult to estimate accurately the amount of British 
capital invested in the oil industry alone" (Tarbush, 1982: 35). According to the document the 
economic value oflraq and Egypt was of great importance. 
The lines, which initially were drawn on papers in faraway offices, later on became 
borders marking the territory of the States. They resulted in the creation of a space for the docile 
elites, who were chosen by the the external powers. These elites, who were alien to the majority 
of their populations, for the sake of their own survival traded their wealth for security. Without 
this the survival of the majority of them was questionable. Therefore, they had to redirect the 
goods and their economy toward the colonial power. Alien elites, the externally maintained 
security and redirection of economy became the essential characteristics of the States that 
emerged. These combinations put together created the possibility of the ruling elites being 
external from their population. This the externality became possible only because of the arrival 
of different modem tools and the impact and the need for Western modernity. The subject matter 
here is the newly emerged States. This State tried to function like every other state elsewhere. 
This functionary was realised through the capture of movement and the partition of space. 
However, these States like every other form of the State have their own particularities. 
Since "a state-idea, projected, purveyed and variously believed in different societies at different 
times" (Abrams, 1988), by the same token, the emerged postcolonial state in the Arab Middle 
East, was seen and purveyed differently in line with local culture. As Abdulla alAurawi (1993: 
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129) puts it "the contemporary Arab States are a combination oftw th · · o processes: e contmuation 
of the sultan form and the modem forms of reform" These duali'ti·es tr 1 t · th · are s ong y presen m e 
emerged postcolonial states. The postcolonial form of state was established to serve two sorts of 
elites namely internal and external. "The parent were unquestionably w estem, the midwife the 
local elites" (Pappe, 2005: 1). 
For Abrame (1988), the State is system and idea. The system is a "palpable nexus of 
practice and institutional structure centred in government and more or less extensive, unified and 
dominant in any given society". There is, too "a state-idea, projected, purveyed and variously 
believed in different societies at different times". Accordingly, the State as a system is universal 
whereas a state-idea is local. The dominant global form of the State and relatively to the same 
extent the nationalism is the product of Western modernity. This indicates that the system that is 
universal is the Western system. Thus the system of the failed postcolonial modem state is 
Western whereas the State idea is a mix of the local and the external i.e. W estem. This shows 
clearly that neither modernity nor tradition alone can be sufficient enough to form a state. 
If, both modernity and tradition are the sine qua non in making the postcolonial state, 
then the similarities in both modernity and tradition reinforce each other. While the differences 
are not engaging in a dialectical engagement but rather with the careful management of the State 
elite, through the State machine, they remain parallel to each other. When it comes to the 
authority and power system: the absolutism and despotism, in the form of kings, caliphs and 
princes, tainted tradition of the region, hence what followed is the total denial of the people' s 
right. This dominant traditional line merges with one of the dominant narrative of State 
formation in modernity namely Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan, as J.M. Coetzee (2007) articulates: 
It is hardly in our power to change the form of the State and impossible to abo!ish it 
because, vis-a-vis the State, we are, precisely, powerless. In the myth of the foundmg of 
the State as set down by Thomas Hobbes, our descent into powerlessn~ss was volunt~: 
in order to escape the violence of internecine warfare without end (repns~ upon reprisal, 
vengeance upon vengeance, the vende~a), ~e in.dividu~lly ~d ~everally yielded u~ to the 
State the right to use physical force (nght is might, might 1s nght), thereby enter!11g the 
realm (the protection) of the law. Those who chose and choose to stay outside the 
compact become outlaw. 
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This amalgamation, of both modem and traditional in establishing sovereign states played a big 
role in making the failed postcolonial modem state especi'ally when th d 1 , e mo em power purpose y 
had no desire to form a Western style modem state, i.e. a nation state that seeks legitimacy from 
the member of the nation. The new state did not educate people to become citizen; it had no 
intention of building a city. It fed traditional imagination of the power. This imagination as 
described by abdulrahman al Kawakibi (1984: 126). 
We b~came accustomed to regarding abject submission as polite deference; 
obseqmousness as courtesy; sycophancy as oratory; bombast as substance· the surrender 
?t: ba~ic rights a~ nobility; the acceptance of humiliation as modesty; the' acceptance of 
mJustJce as obedience; and the pursuit of human entitlements as arrogance. Our inverted 
system portrayed the pursuit of simple knowledge as presumption; aspirations for the 
future as impossible dreams; courage as overreaching audacity; inspiration as folly; 
chivalry as aggression; free expression as impertinence; free thinking as heresy; and 
patriotism as madness. 
The modem colonial power, to paraphrase John Stuart Mill's (1859) (1984: 118,119) 
argument, regarded it as a grave error to suppose that the same international customs and the 
same rules of international morality can obtain between civilized nations and barbarians. 
Accordingly the barbarians, non-civilised, non-Western, non-Europeans, cannot be depended 
upon for observing any rule. ''Nations which are still barbarous, is likely to be for their benefit 
that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners . Independence and 
nationality, so essential to the due growth and development of a people further advanced in 
improvement, are generally impediments to theirs". Furthermore Mill argues that the "barbarians 
have no rights as a nation." This attitude justifies the elite' s total rule over the local (barbarous) 
population. Since the elites are those barbarians who are partially modernised, they should 
follow the manner of the modem civilised people in their treatments and relations to the local. 
These characteristics show that the emergent postcolonial state, which later on became the 
FMS, was never fully established and never had the intention to run the population's affairs. This 
distance from the locals created a chasm between the emerged state and the population. This 
circumstance identified the sovereign with elite. The newly emerged (elite) State had no 
intention to transfer the sovereignty from the colonial to the people. The transfer was basically 
from the external elite to the local elite. If the barbarians are not a nation, (according to Mill ' s 
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argument), even after the emergence of the postcolonial state, in the Arab Middle East, they did 
not become a nation. When the State has no relation to the nation, it cannot tolerate notions such 
as: individuality, citizens, participation freedom etc In the newly e d tat th 1·1 , , , • merge s e, e e 1 es 
main concerns were to conserve and hold power. This motivation translated into a politics of 
survival. 
2.2 The Politics of Survival 
The FMS has only one goal: to remain in power, hence to survive. If the state has a 
programme, to paraphrase Mussolini's phrase, it is to rule at any price. However, it is axiomatic 
that every form of politics and politicians are challenged; therefore, it also goes without saying, 
that every political leader is concerned about his or her survival. Thus "the politics behind 
survival in office is the essence of politics" ( de Mesquita et al. 2002: 11 ). 
However, every system differs, in its engagement in the game of survival. The FMS has 
its own technique with regard to survival. What does survival indicate? The dictionary meaning 
of the word might help to shed some light on the matter. The first meaning of the word is; "to 
continue, to remain alive or in existence". Furthermore the word also means: "to carry on despite 
hardships" . This condition means for the FMS, to remain in power, to hold power and control, 
fighting all the real and potential threats that might disturb and disrupt the status quo. The above 
explanation indicates that there are many overlapping are as between survival and security. 
Security is an essential element of survival. It becomes the State's main concern. In FMS to 
quote from Giorgio Agamben (2001) "security becomes the basic principle of state activity". He 
continues ''the thought of security bears within it an essential risk. A state which has security as 
its sole task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by 
terrorism to become itself terroristic". 
The security in the FMS translates to the security of the sovereign. This is not necessarily 
in line with the security of the population. In most cases the reverse is true. For the security to be 
implemented it requires apparatuses. These apparatuses are sovereign tools to implement the 
sovereign security. When the FMS fears the freedom of its citizens it abandons them. "He who 
has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather 
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abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside 
and inside, become indistinguishable" (Agamben 1989· 29) Thus m· t d f 1 · d l , • . , s ea o aymg own ru es 
that guarantee them the exercise of their essential freedoms, the State becomes a source of risk to 
life and the freedom of the population. Thus, "instead of guaranteeing human security, the State 
itself turns into a major threat to it". "This makes both national and local disproportionately 
powerful security apparatuses often combine to tum the State into a menace to human security, 
rather than its chief supporter" (UN Development Programme/Regional Bureau for Arab States, 
title is Arab Human Development Report, 2009: 53). 
The elite whether they are backed by families, tribes, sects, ethnic groups or factions, 
have a clear desire to remain throughout time in the same place, holding the same power and 
influence. No change or renewal in their identity. The established elites have a recognised 
identity; whether it is family, clan, tribe, sect or an oligarch. This results in a clear boundary 
between the elite and the population. This is utilised as a mechanism for differentiation and 
boundary making. The society identifies the elite and the elite distinguish themselves from the 
rest. Except in the oligar-eh structure of Egypt, the other elites, who are running the FMSs, are 
established in a manner where it is impossible for any outsider to enter as well as for any insider 
to leave. Leaving is treason, in most cases punishable by death, especially when the one who left 
dared to leak any internal secret information. 
This ossified structure of the elites hampers any change from within and from outside. 
The elites are seen by the population as cohesive and as a result identified as one, thus as a 
consequence the state divides into the people versus the elite. This makes the maintenance of the 
elite the ultimate task of every elite member. This goal is not achievable easily. To survive is to 
remain in the same situation. This requires fighting against changes, real and potential. Change 
could happen in the balance of power, social cohesion, economic situation, or the nature of the 
population's awareness. Therefore, to survive is to engage in a multidimensional struggle. To be 
haunted by the spectre of change. This makes the survival for the FMS a perpetual state of war. 
The politics of survival, in the FMS, has some clear features: 
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1- An elastic division between friend and enemy· the identi·fi t· f fr" d d • 1ca 10n o ien an enemy, for 
the ruling elite, is elastic. It is not based on a constitution or law Th th St t · 1· · 1 . us e a e 1s a po 1hca 
actor refusing to be reduced to a legal system. This exception from the law makes the FMS a 
state of emergency or state of exception, perpetually. 
2- The survival of the ruling elite requires strength vis-a-vis the population: "a strong state is 
able to penetrate societies, regulate social relationships, and extract resources and determine how 
they are used" (Migdal, 1988: 4-5). In the FMS this strength is merely based on violence and 
fear. Not only in Iraq during the Saddam was reign the state 'the Republic of Fear' (Makiya, 
1989), every other FMS by necessity is practising the politics of fear. 
3- The weakness or non existence of civil society: If the State is strong then the society is 
weak. The State is continuously balancing of power: promoting some groups and classes, at the 
same time repressing others. 
4- When the survival and the security of the state and its elite is the goal, in a Machiavellian 
sense, then everything is permitted. This includes, as human rights organisations reports from the 
region show, killing, torture, forced masses movements, genocide and silencing. 
5- The FMS uses different aspects of modernity as tools for the sake of survival. Foucault 
(1997: 71) has convincingly argued that rationality is not equivalent to reason as such. Rather, 
particular rationalities take shape as a specific normative schemas of reason that organise 
subjects, states, and cultures and so "govern us" through their terms. Thus the knowledge and 
technology that was borrowed from modernity was used in the FMS for the purpose of governing 
the society and the individuals in way that guarantees the survival of the system. 
6- "Effective strategies of survival demand an elaborate set of institutions m order to 
administer rewards and sanctions meaningfully" (Migdal, 1988: 208). For instance, since 1989 
Jordan focused its survival strategy on three main centres: political parties, the parliament, and 
the press (Lucas, 2005 : 3). 
7- The emergence of the State class. Beyond the narrow circle of the ruling elite, the State 
creates a machine to run the population. These hordes of people or bureaucrats are qualified to be 
a form of a class. Their interest lies in their obedience to the State elite. The ruling elite permit 
them to become corrupt, so that they lose their moral value and their tie to the population. This 
group of people make up the bulk of middle class people. In contrast to the role of the middle 
class in making Western modernity this group is enforcing the tyranny. 
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2.3 The Identity of the State Elite 
The State elite are immersed in modern gadgets. Their premises and houses are made, decorated 
and filled with W estem modern materials. Their being modern goes to a level that goes against 
the general ethos of their society. In the prologue of his book, A World of Trouble: America in 
the Middle East, Patrick Tyler (2009: 1) offers a stunning example. "Night had long since fallen 
over central Saudi Arabia in early 2004 when George Tenant came trudging out of his bedroom 
in Prince Bandar bin Sultan's palace and asked for Scottish whiskey". In parallel to this modern 
tool and gadgets, there is a substantial presence of tradition. This materialises mainly as structure 
and facade. As a structure every ruling elite group is made-up in the form of a tribe. This 
formulation provides unity, identity, and justification for their behaviour. 
In his major work on the African state Bayart (2009: 42-43) outlines the features of the tribe and 
tribe mentality. Accordingly: 
Tribalists think more or less consciously, that the men and women of their tribe and clan 
are superior to others and that as a result the others should serve and obey them. The 
tribalist tries to impose the hegemony, the predominance of his tribe and his clan. In 
practice, tribalist ideas and feeling are used more often to create a clientele who can help 
them to satisfy their selfish interests and ambitions. Tribalism is expressed in different 
form of which the following are the main ones: 
1- The tribalist constantly exaggerates and boasts the qualities, merits, and good deeds of 
the people of its tribe and its clan; on the other hand he refuses to recognise their faults, 
and even tries systematically to hide them. With respect of other tribe exactly the 
opposite attitudes prevails. 
2- The tribalist indulges freely in liberalism and favouritism toward the people of his tribe 
and of his clan. By contrast he is in general very sectarian towards people of other tribes 
and other clans. 
3- The tribalist tries to grant all the privileges and posts of responsibilities to the people 
of his tribe and clans. 
4- Conversely the tribalists seek to exempt his own people from their duties and 
obligations, from any difficult work, or from most dangerous, difficult or humiliating 
missions. . 
5- Toe tribalists practice this favouritism in the division of the material benefits and the 
distribution of services. 
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With these attitudes in mind the elites treated holding the power as a natural right of their 
family, clan, tribe, and sect. This natural right had to be preserved and maintained. Therefore, the 
main concern for the power holders was survival. Immediately, these newly emerged states 
began to seek support from two very contradictory sources: namely tradition and modernity. 
Both tradition and modernity became essential forces that the ruling elites relied on to maintain 
their continuity. Thus, from a conceptual point of view it is accurate to say that, the postcolonial 
state in the Arab Middle East, from the moment of creation was heading towards becoming a 
FMS; that utilise both their own tradition and Western modernity for the sake of survival. By 
making both tradition and modernity a tool, a tool for a clear particular purpose, this post 
colonial state loses every form of authenticity, roots, relations, and most importantly identity. 
Exploitation of both tradition and modernity were not possible without the presence of 
both modem and traditional power in the sphere of the State. In other words it was impossible for 
the FMS to emerge without the arrival of modernity. From modernity, the FMS obtained the idea 
of exploiting tradition. It is also traditional mind behind the utilisation of modernity. When 
modernity becomes a tool: it is eventually drained of its revolutionary impact. It is not any longer 
a power for change but rather it becomes a power for continuity. Therefore, it is not astounding 
that the genesis of the FMS traces back to the immediate post-Napoleonic expedition to the 
region, which also marks the arrival of modernity. This state was Muhammad Ali's state in 
Egypt. 
2.4 The Ottoman Era 
After the fall of the Abbasid Empire the Ottoman Empire took control over most of the 
Arab world and ruled it for about 400 years. While the Arabs before and after the Ottoman 
E · t ' d · · 'lar despotic fashion but despite that they did not hesitate to call the mpire con mue m a sum 
Ott , z · h ·t t .b/.bJYI the age of decline Throughout most of the Ottoman era, oman era a sr a -m z a ..,,--- · 
Th h d rttl r nothing to offer for the Muslim people. there was little change or progress. ey a 1 e 0 
They ruled under the name of caliph when in reality they were nothing but despotic kings. Their 
· 1n bl · the face of the emerging modem model lack of any form of govemmg made them vu era e m 
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in Europe. Their entire system of Empire was established to se th 1· h Th s rve e ea tp . e tatesmen, 
especially in the Asiatic part of the empire were only seen duri·ng tax 11 t· Th th s , co ec 10n. us, e tate 
was only communicating with the population when it demanded tax p 1 tax d ·th . eop e were e wt out 
being either represented or protected or served Thus the Emprr· e was se b th 1 t· · , en y e popu a 10n as a 
force that only takes, and has nothing to offer. 
This distant relationship between the State and the society is the genesis of the negative 
attitude of people in the region, toward any form of establishment. The Iraqi social scientist Ali 
Alwardi has covered the situation in great detail in his lengthy eight parts, /amahat ft altarix 
aleraq alhadith, (Social Glimpses in Modem Iraqi History), Jly.ll ~.J\:i L>"' ..::..b.J. As other 
also confirmed, "the central government, concerned primarily in obtaining the annual tax, turned 
the governors of the provinces practically into chief tax farmers" (Abu-Manneh, 1994: 176). 
Moreover, the Ottomans had lacked any communication method, any education apparatus, and 
any discourse. For most of the people the empire was a heavy burden. 
When European modernity emerged, the Ottoman era began to decline. The Europeans 
began to put the idea of renaissance and modernity into practice. This had an immediate impact 
on the Middle East as the closest neighbour to the Europe. According to Lewis (1961:40) "the 
French Revolution was the ftrst great movement of ideas in Western Christendom that had any 
real effect on the world oflslam". The ideas that the French Revolution spread were challenging 
the legitimacy and the narrative of the Ottoman Empire. While the Ottoman inherited from the 
Muslim the idea that might is just and caliph has a divine right, the French revolution established 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Furthermore, the Ottomans began to be 
defeated on the battleground. 
European triumphs and the Ottoman defeats sparked the idea and the necessity of 
modernisation. This evolved in four main stratums. According to Demirag (2005: 142) they 
were: "Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism and Westernism". All four had a common 
goal, which was saving the empire from imminent collapse. This indicates that all these groups 
were agreed on the main premises but disagreed mainly on the methods. The manifestation of 
this novel identity is known as the Gulhane Decree of 1839. It is often considered one of the 
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most important documents in modem Middle Eastern history mark· th b · · f th , mg e egmnmg o e era 
of reforms in the Ottoman Empire. The period, which begins with the announcement of this 
decree and ends with the promulgation of a Western-style constitution, is collectively known in 
Ottoman history as the Tanzimat, an Arabic word that means reordering. The text includes three 
main principles: 
1. The guarantees promising our subjects perfect security for life, honour, and property. 
2. A regular system of assessing taxes 
3. An equally regular system for the conscription of requisite troops and the duration of 
their service (Inalcik, 1975). 
While the Tanzimat created a central bureaucratic elite keenly aware of its interests as a 
group and increasingly more independent of royal power, the provinces felt the impact of the 
reorganization only gradually. Many regions of the empire, including wide areas inhabited by the 
Arabs, were not touched by Istanbul's reform measures until the second half of the nineteenth 
century (Kayali, 1997). Yet, it was not solely via Istanbul that the provinces opened up to 
Western influences and ideas of reform. European merchants had penetrated some of the Arab 
lands, especially cities which, had harbours on the Mediterranean, long before the Tanzimat 
reformers. Cities like Aleppo in Syria had already experienced a period of reform. The region's 
early contacts with the West later affected the cultural and political life of the province. Trade, 
missionary activity, and emigration had exposed Mediterranean Arab towns to European culture 
and modem political ideals and brought about a climate of opinion sympathetic to what the 
Tanzimat stood for. 
The Ottoman system was unable to resist modernity. The Young Turks were hastily 
attempting to save the Empire, "without a coherent plan" (Fromkin, 2000:46). Through their acts 
they hoped that they could coin a new form of identity that all peoples of the empire could 
identify themselves with it, and consequently save the Empire. The Turks wanted to solidify their 
control of Arab lands and Turkify them while the Arabs sought to protect their culture and 
institutions within the empire's framework. Thus, despite their common interests, there were also 
centrifugal forces pulling Turks and Arabs apart. 
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Before the realisation of the modernisation the Ottoman E · · f , mprre was m a state o 
dogmatic certainty. This reality influenced directly the structure of the empire and the nature of 
governance. Throughout its time, like any other empire, the Ottoman Empire was in a continuous 
attempt to expand the border of the empire in order to collect more taxes. This hunger for taxing 
shaped the structure of the empire. For instance the empire was in direct control of the provinces 
like Aleppo, Damascus and Tripoli which had high a tax-revenue in the Middle East (Hourani: 
1991: 226). Other places were just controlled for seasonal or a short period of time in a year. For 
instance, place like Hijaz including Mecca and Medina were only controlled during the 
pilgrimage time. This policy resulted in the poverty and stagnation of these regions. If the 
Ottomans had Islam as an ideology of the Empire against the Europeans, it lacked any form of 
identity with its Muslim subjects. The Empire had neither an official language nor a distinctive 
nationality. Walking, nowadays, through a city like Istanbul one sees Parsi, Arabic and Turkish 
calligraphy written in different places, which symbolise the absent of any form of uniformity in 
the empire. Having said that, this does suggest that any form of tolerance or multiculturalism, it 
was mere unawareness. With the commencement of the modernisation project these were all 
seen as challenges by the Young Turks. 
What the Young Turk desired to build, on the ruin of the Ottoman Em pire, was a 
European style nation-state with one identity, one language, and one centre. A trademark copy of 
the emerging nation-state in the Europe. To attain their goal they did not hesitate to use every 
card they had, including force. The Ottomans during their reign over the Middle East were not 
the Other for the Arabs. The Empire was loose in term of culture, language and nationality. In 
reality the Ottomans preferred to trace back their genealogical origin to Arabs. The combination 
of The Ottoman Turkification and the arrival of the colonial power created the Arab revolt 
against the Turks. With the defeat of The Ottoman Empire and their withdrawal from the area the 
French and British arrived. The era of direct contact between European imperialism and Arabs 
had commenced. 
Modernity that arrived through the Ottomans into the Arab area was a particular sort of 
modernity. It was not an epistemological project. It did not introduce any paradigm shift in 
· 1 d 1·t· 1 What did it introduce were notions like nation, religion, soc1a , economy an po 1 tea areas. 
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origin and the Other, this emerged within the frame of Arab-Turk relationships. The Arabs built 
their understanding on the Ottoman interpretation of these concepts, and developed it as a 
reaction to the Ottomans. Modernity diffused to Arabs through the Ottomans was a mere 
technique to rearrange the army and a distorted imagination about how to rebuild themselves and 
combat others. 
However, the Ottoman's attempt to accommodate the Arab past in order to prevent the 
emergence of a new Arab identity. But Arab intellectuals grew increasingly more conscious of 
their ancestors' role in the origin of Islam and in early Islamic civilization. Especially after the 
revival of the classical literature, the close association between the Arabic language and Islam 
became more public and apparent which is the end provided a basis for Arab selfhood, which 
later on was strengthened further by the hand of the salafi movement. 
In summary the Ottoman era in the Middle East is significant in understanding the later 
events in the region. The Ottoman occupation of the region resulted in the isolation of the region 
from the rest of the world for many centuries. In the eighteen century when the Ottomans 
attempted to go through modernisation, Arabs in the Middle East reacted to the process. This had 
an impact on the political situation in the region in many ways. 
1-The Ottomans were a barrier between Arabs and Europe. Liberal Arabs considered this as a 
negative and by traditionalists as a positive. 
2- During the modernisation period, the Ottoman pushed to impose Turkish as the official 
language of the empire and as a response the Arabs awakened up the position of their language 
and consequently their language became the basis for their identity making. This was the reason 
behind the closeness to the German style of identity making. 
3- Through modernisation process the Ottoman wanted to strengthen their position and build 
more link to the Arab Middle East, for instance they built a railway to Hijaz and consequently 
hold the Middle East as their colony. 
4-Modernity which reached the Middle East, initially, and for a long time, was not the European 
modernity. It was modernity that went through the Ottomans. 
731 Sardar Aziz dissertation 
5- The Arabs were introduced to modernity as a process of coloni·s t· Th · ifi · a 10n. e sign 1cant pomt 
here is the presence of the coloniser, which heavily impacted the way Arabs received modernity, 
this ultimately forced, distorted and shaped the nature of the project. 
2. 5 Napoleon's Expedition and the Arrival of Modernity 
Napoleon Bonaparte's short occupation of Egypt between 1798 and 1801 can be taken as a 
departure point in a new relationship between the Middle East and Europe. According to Atiyah 
(1958: 73) "if any one date to be chosen as a marking the end of the long Arab sleep, it will be 
the day on which Napoleon set foot on Egyptian soil. Until that day the Arabs were still living in 
the Middle Age". The invasion was not only a break; it was according to Said (2003: 80) a 
'reinvention'. The mission was not limited to Egypt "Napoleon was inventing what we now call 
the modem Middle East" (Owen, 2007). If invention, reinvention and wakening are all concepts 
which indicate rupture and discontinuity with the past, they also indicate the emergence of a 
new, different view, and all this happened under the direct influence of modernity. There was 
another characteristic which made the expedition fully modern. ''Napoleon's Egypt may have 
been the first non-European country to have been conquered in the name of liberty because the 
French and American Revolutions had invented this rhetoric" (Cole: 2008). 
The rhetoric points to a particular circumstance where an outsider force comes to liberate, 
an outsider penetrating into the inside to liberate the inside from inside itself. An outsider put 
itself to a higher moral ground, establishes a hierarchy, and declares itself to be better, to carry a 
noble mission. These all without any ambiguities are modern and from modernity. Their slogan 
of liberating signifies that there is slavery and they are adamant to puts a halt on it. They bring 
the ethos of the French Revolution, to puts an end to the ancient regime. They crave to 
modernise and their vision of modernity is "characterized in terms of consciousness of the 
discontinuity of time: a break with tradition, a feeling of novelty, of vertigo in the face of the 
passing moment" (Foucault, 1984: 35). This rhetoric of liberation also marks the beginning of 
the arrival of liberalism to the region, as it is clear in the title of Albert Hourani's (1962) book 
"Arab Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-1939". 
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"Before the arrival of Napoleon the country was divided· t d d · 
m o aroun two ozen regions, 
each ruled by its own Mameluke hey, assisted with what was virtual! h. · M 
1 
k Y 1s own private ame u e 
army, whose duties remained purely military" (Strathem, 2008: 12). The Mamelukes who were 
originally slave soldiers, claimed power and became despots in the country. The Arab Christian 
Lebanese writer, Jergy Zedan, who wrote about Islamic history in a literary fashion, devoted a 
novel to the Mameluke under the title, estebdad almamake, the despot or tyranny of the 
Mameluke. The plot is about a businessman in Cairo, during the reign of Ali Beg Alkaber, whose 
name is Abdulrahrnan, Zedan is complaining of the harsh treatment that he endures in the hand 
of Mamluk. At best the Mamluk were as Ezzat Abdel-Karim (2004) describes "a people that 
remained foreign to the country, reluctant to mix with Egyptians, until they vanished from the 
historical stage". This indicates that pre-napoleon Egypt was not a sovereign independent state. 
For Napoleon the mission's sole aim was to 'destroy England'. It aimed also to fill the 
vacuum that resulted from the decline of the Ottoman Empire and build an empire. He wrote on 
16 August 1 797, "in order truly to destroy England, we must take Egypt. The vast Ottoman 
Empire, which dies every day, lays an obligation on us to exercise some forethought about the 
means whereby we can protect our commerce with the Levant" (Cole, 2007: 29). 
The impact of the expedition on Egyptian society is a matter of debate to nowadays. At 
the arrival of Napoleon the country was in a terrible situation. Its economy was bad. The climate 
was harsh and droughts were prolonged. The Nile flood was low. In addition there was an 
outbreak of plague and other diseases. Politically, the country was in a state of constant civil 
war. The Mameluk groups fought fierce and constant battles with each other; consequently they 
raised urban taxes to levels that produced misery. The country was in a state of total isolation and 
ignorance from what was going on outside its border. When Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti wrote his 
book Ajaeb Alathar, The Wonder of the Heritage, which was a chronicle for what, happened in 
Egypt and the world he did not mention the French Revolution. However, others argue 
differently, for instance Cole (2007) argues that Egypt had intense economic and diplomatic 
interaction with Europe and the Greater Mediterranean in the eighteenth century and was hardly 
a virgin wilderness to be "discovered" or introduced to modernity by Bonaparte. He argues that, 
· · · · rt d b the Anny to the Orient did not survive moreover, most of the specific mnovat10ns Impo e Y 
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the French departure in 1801, and that on the ground there was little long-term impact, save 
perhaps for the killing of tens of thousands and the disruption of Ottoman Egyptian society. 
Cole's view is rather rare; it matches only with Said's and people like Saat a!Hussari. 
While on the other hand there is a growing amount of literature dedicated to the topic, which 
holds quite a contrary view. If the French authors painted the expedition positively, for the sake 
of propaganda, there are many Egyptians and Arab writers who do not hesitate to see the positive 
side of the expedition. 
The Expedition did change the nature of society and power in the country. While most 
Arab thinkers acknowledge its imperialistic dimension they also stress its modernising effects. 
However, some went so far as to deny its imperialistic side and regard it as a holy Campaign. 
While alJabri (2005) regards it as a moment when the Arabs were woken up by the outsider to 
realise, not only their present weakness, but also their past glory. For alJabri (2005) Napoleon's 
invasion resulted in a revival or rediscovery of classical Arab or Muslim philosophers among 
them Ibn Rushd and others. The combination of imperialism and modernity of the Expedition 
"divided the consciences of the Arabs ever since" (a!Jabri, 2005). This view is confirmed by 
Bernard Lewis's (2005 : 36) view who also regards the expedition as the moment of introducing 
"Freedom and Justice in the Modem Middle East" and "changing perception". 
On the practical and pragmatic level through the summer and early fall of 1798 Napoleon 
tried to establish a pro-French representative government and to modernise Cairo. His ships had 
famously ferried over not just soldiers but a small group of French mathematicians, inventors, 
scientists, artists and writers. These savants explored the pyramids, discovered the Rosetta stone 
and assembled material for the "Description de l'Egypte," the 24-volume masterpiece that was 
published years later. They also did things like map Cairo, illuminate its streets, construct 
hospitals, supervise elections and even helped feed the population by building modem bakeries 
(Reiss, 2008) wrote in New York Times. 
Egyptians saw the public dance halls they built, they remarked on the ~usual ways they 
treated their women, they found themselves obliged to obey unfam1~1ar rules such as 
burying their dead outside the city, watering down the streets and hangmg out lanterns at 
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night, '.3-°d they watched as they undertook perplexing and disturbing public works such 
as teanng down the old alley gateways and the like (Abdul-alkarem, 1934). 
It is almost impossible to deny the significant impact of the expedition, the rupture it 
caused in the mindset and the change it made in every aspect of political and social levels. These 
are rather more apparent through the post Expedition event and movements. Tue immediate ruler 
of the country was Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman officer who admired Napoleon and tried to 
emulate him, he took power after Napoleon's sudden departure. The Expedition generated the 
chaos and agitation of the old system as it caused elsewhere. 
There is a parallel of events and similar results between Napoleon's Egyptian Expeditions 
and his later on the German invasion. When Napoleon invaded Germany the political structure of 
the German states disintegrated. Under the influence of overwhelming Napoleonic power, the 
delicate states, which the Holy Roman Empire had maintained among the many political 
constitutions of central Europe, dissolved (Celia, 1990: 8). The Holy Roman Empire structure 
had a similarity with the Ottoman Empire both structures could not hold in front of the, post 
revolutionary modem Napoleon's army. If the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire resulted in 
the emergence of new concepts like: "Heimat, Nation, Staat and Volk" (home-land, nation, state 
and people) (Celia, 1990: 8). The dissolution of the old structure of the Ottoman Empire resulted 
in the birth of colonialism, nationalism, reform, Islamism and modernisation. 
Napoleon's invasion or expedition was military, scientific and cultural. The army and the 
intellectuals marched together. Power and knowledge were combined. However, the military part 
failed but the scientific and cultural side left impacts on both sides. The expedition changed the 
region in many ways: 
1-The French Expedition ushered in the age of Westernisation and modernisation into Egypt. 
Along with the army, Napoleon recruited scholars and engineers who systematically collected, 
classified, and represented all available material on the history, geography, and culture of the 
country. It was the combination of knowledge and power. 
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2- The expedition resulted in rupture with the old system m· d h" hl" h many ways an 1g 1g ted the 
necessity of modernisation. This rupture m ainly occurred on t w d"ffi t 1 · o 1 eren p ateaus, one 1s 
military and the other scientific. 
3- The defeat unleashed a new phenomenon, the realisation of the necessity of change or 
modernising. In the other words, it is a defeat that becomes the premise of modernisation. This 
had a severe impact on the identity and the nature of modernisation. It emphasised on the 
weakness of the colonised and the necessity to catch up, to mimic, became the goal of the 
process. 
4- The expedition amalgamated modernity and imperialism, knowledge and power, to a degree 
that even nowadays the majority of the Arab thinkers fmd it hard to distinguish between the two. 
This might be expressed in many different ways and conceptualised through various words, like, 
cultural invasion, Orientalism, modernjahlya, but the content still remains mainly the same. 
5- As a reaction to the imposed modernity, Islam was revived. Ironically Napoleon attempt to 
control the Egyptian society, while attempting to understand how the previous, Mameluk reigned 
for such long time, concluded, that it can only be possible through the religion. 
6- While the French were using Islam as an ideology to implement their plan, in contrast the 
Mameluk were using the idea of enlightenment to encourage the ordinary Egyptian to fight the 
French. This was the commencement of utilisation of both modernity and tradition by power. In 
afirman, an imperial decree, issued by Sultan Salim ill calling for a holy war Jihad against the 
French stated that, "the French think that men, born equal, must be equally free; that all 
distinction between men is unjust, and that each ought to be the master of his own opinion and 
his manner of living" (Strathern, 2008: 234). This clearly indicates the low awareness among 
people and the place of women in their eyes. Another crucial point is the problem of association: 
for Mameluks and many Egyptians, anything that came from the French, regardless of its value, 
was regarded as evil. 
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7- This was possible because the society throughout its hi'story w tr d't• 1 T d' · 1 , , as a 1 10na . ra 1tiona as 
the etymology of the word indicates, from Latin tradita, handed down i.e. trying faithfully to 
preserve the inherited idea and change as little as possible. Therefore, while the French were 
surveying the country, the ordinary Egyptian paid little heed to them. Even among the educated 
elites while they raised their eyebrows and tried to explain, the background knowledge, which 
they had acquired within the walls of Al-Azhar, was of no avail in producing sensible answers . 
2.6 Genesis of the FMS 
To suggest that the Egypt of today was founded by Mohammed Ali, or he is the founder 
of modem Egypt as Henry Dodwell (1931) puts it, is merely a cliche. He arrived in Egypt, as an 
Ottoman officer, after the departure of Napoleon's army. The country was in the midst of chaos 
and shock. During these circumstances the whole society, as a result of the occupation, defeat, 
and supremacy of the French army, went numb. There was a vacuum in governance; the whole 
country was ready to be taken and even to be exploited. At this very moment came Muhammad 
Ali. His origin is disputed. One thing is certain that he was neither Arab nor Egyptian. He was an 
outsider. It is not a rarity in Arab history, for an outsider to become the change maker. 
He admired Napoleon to the degree that he tried to emulate him, "I was born the same 
day as Napoleon" he liked to boast (Karsh & Karsh, 2001: 28). Similarly he dreamt of an empire. 
"I am well aware that the [Ottoman] Empire is heading by the day toward destruction, and that it 
will be difficult for me to save her. And why should I seek the impossible. On her ruin I will 
build a vast kingdom ... up to the Euphrates and the Tiger" (Karsh & Karsh, 2001: 28). His 
mimicry of Napoleon or the West was in line with the Levantine character. To be a Levantine 
[I] s to live in two worlds or more at once without belongin~ to either; to. be ab!e to. go 
through the the external forms which indicate the possession of a certam nationality, 
religion or culture without actually possessing it. It is no longer to have a standard of 
one's own, not to be able to create but only able to imitate. It i~ to b~long to no 
comm~ity and to_ ?ossess noth~g of o~e's o~. _ reveals itself m lostness, 
pretent10usness, cymc1sm and desparr (Houram, 1946. 70 ). 
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If Muhammad Ali was seen by the W estem commentator as a sort of Levantine, in 
contrast, Arab commentators, regarded him differently, Alsharef (2000: 1) Nagm (1967: 23), 
Raouf Abbas (2005). He realised that the weakness of the Islamic state stemmed from its military 
underdevelopment and that it would only be able to withstand the encroaching threat from the 
West if it acquired the means and capacities of deterrence with their might. He further 
understood that a thorough overhaul of the military arm of the State required closing the 
civilisational gap between the countries of the Ottoman Empire and the West. 
He began to tear down traditional structures that had been part of Egyptian life from time 
immemorial such as; 1 and, and tax, industrial, religious, and educational. Reforms seemed 
nothing short of a revolution to his Egyptian subjects. He established a state apparatus to be 
erected upon a primitive agricultural community. He submitted them to the power of the despotic 
emperor, the sole and transcendent property owner, the master of the surplus, or the stock, the 
organiser of a large scale works. These changes made him a despotic ruler. However, there was 
nothing new with a despot ruler for the Egyptian society. Wittfogel (1957: 153) claimed that a 
particular form of social organisation, "Oriental despotism characterized in its most intense form 
by the State being among other things the sole control of massesive irrigation projects", as was 
common in Egypt since the Pharaohs. The ground was ready for the emergence of a despot in 
terms of history, culture, and the structure of power. 
True to his class, he despised the Egyptians and continued to base his government and 
army on the 'foreign' Muslim, mainly Turko- Albanian-Circassian' aristocracy'. But the 
lesson to Muhammad Ali of the events of 1815 was invaluable. He was determined to get 
rid of traditional troops and in the interim to keep them as far as possible from the vital 
parts of his government. He became even more determined to s~egu:ird his autonom_y 
and to limit The Ottoman influence and patronage, as far as possible, m areas under his 
control (Abir, 1977: 295). 
In a first step toward despotism, from 1803 to 1811 he established his personal power 
and destroyed all potential opposition within the country. The end of this process was marked by 
the infamous massacre of the remnants of the former rulers, the Mameluks, in the Cairo Citadel. 
He killed them, while they were dining in his castle. This event and method became the favourite 
d h. · d r with their oppositions. From 1812 to method for the other despots who followe llll, m ea mg 
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1827 he continued to build up his land and sea forces The typ1·cal desp t t d ak" · o moves owar s m mg 
the military the sole strong power in the country vis a vis the soci·ety To d thi · l 
. nowa ays s part1cu ar 
structure of governing is rampant in the region. From 1811 to 1818 he suppressed the Wahhabis 
in the Arabian Peninsula and recaptured the holy cities of Mecca and Medina; a move to seek a 
religious background to the power through which he can claim holiness. 
Indeed Muhammad Ali is the founder and the father of the modem form of governing and 
State, not only in Egypt but the entire Middle East. He had grandiose and unrealistic ambitions. 
He spent the money that he collected through taxation, on building a grand mosque, which 
"majestically stands at a north W estem bend of the Citadel and is visible from almost every 
location in Cairo. It has become the symbol of the Citadel" (Rabbat, 2005). His fascination with, 
rather unnecessary, citadel at a time when the society was in dire need for every development, 
was an emblematic despotic move. However, he believed "it is possible that Egypt will regain 
its place and again become a centre of civilisation" (Abu Nur, 2005). This illusion that history 
can be repeated is the source of a chronic misunderstanding called the fixation with the past, 
which signifies the impotence of creating or establishing anything new. If Muhammad Ali like 
Hegel believed "that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice, he 
forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce" as Marx sarcastically indicates, 
(Marx, 1852: 1). 
Muhammad Ali's reform unlike the Ottoman re form, did not introduce the idea of 
"citizenship, or changes in the moral basis of government" (Hourani, 1991: 273). Throughout his 
changes and reforms he set a pattern of a model of a state; neither modem nor traditional. 
Therefore, he could be regarded as the legitimate father of the FMS. He puts the whole society 
and its resources in the service of his state. He hated the population and never related to them. 
The State was a mega-central-machine, functioning to strengthen itself. Like all the others, who 
came after him, to lead the FMS, he established dynasty. He regarded his people as backward, 
though he attempts "through these three methods, schools, academic missions and translation, to 
transfer knowledge from the West to Egypt to further his aim of building a modem state". Yet 
"he did not attempt to transfer Egypt itself to the West, but rather preserved its heritage and 
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Eastern customs" (El-Gemeiy, 2005). It was more significant for him to be accepted by the West. 
He did not attempt to become what is possible, but rather to become what is desired. 
2.7 The Nahza 
The movement that was initiated during the reign of Muhammad Ali's era is known in 
Arabic as nahza or nahda. The concept is used to denote "enlightenment", "albeit with reference 
to our own enlightenment, as distinct from but related to the European Enlightenment of the 18th 
century" (Mursi Saad El-Din, 2005). The nahza is a reference to an event that never 
occurred. Thus it is not a historical event. It is merely a desire. Therefore, in this context the 
concept refers to a dream, to an event to come, not to a tangible or actual event. Nahza in Arabic 
means standing up, to waken up. It is antonym to fall. According to a!Jabri, (1982: 22) the word 
nahza refers to the Renaissance rather than the Enlightenment, however both are absent in the 
region's history. For alJabri Nahza is a discourse looking for reality. It is not "an age of 
questioning, and of the celebration ofreason", (Mursi Saad El-Din, 2005), as Arabs would like to 
imagine it in line with the occidental enlightenments. It is an event and a concept with its own 
characteristics. The nahza is a moment of realisation of how backward Arab society was in 
comparison to European society. Thus, it was just natural for Europe to end up being mimicked 
and imitated, and also the place to borrow modernity from. 
For Muhammad Ali modernity meant, the collection of skills and techniques to serve his 
ambition to realise a strong centralist state. For him modernity was rather pragmatic practical 
steps not a societal, cultural or political movement, to establish a strong despotic power. All the 
radical changes he introduced were centred on this particular aim. All the schools, he established 
(Abdel-Moneim, 2005), were under the authority of the department of the military and their main 
focus was on the military training and militaristic issues. 
The other education schools which he developed were designed as apparatuses to support 
the machine of military. Among these were the School of Medicine, the School of Agriculture, 
· · A d F the sake of well being the soldiers the School of Engmeenng and the Language ea emy. or ' 
had to be taken care of; therefore, it is to be expected that the School of Medicine should be the 
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oldest advanced institute in Egypt. It was established at Abu Zaabal, north of Cairo in 
1827
, with 
the aim of producing Egyptian doctors for the army. The army and the military to fulfill their 
aim, in the age of pre-technology, needed animals, consequently, the school of veterinary 
medicine, was the next to follow. The speed and the amount of graduates signify the importance 
of the institute, "within a decade, the school had graduated 420 doctors and pharmacists for the 
army" (Abdel-Moneim, 2005). To further perfecting his army, Muhammad Ali, opened, a 
number of military academies including the Infantry Academy in 1820, the General Staff 
Academy in 1825, the Cavalry Academy in 1830, and the Artillery Academy in 1831. These 
were to be followed by "a naval academy on a battleship to graduate naval officers" (Abdel-
Moneim, 2005). According to Nwehz (1992: 203) Muhammad Ali's reign was a time when the 
contemporary form of the Middle Eastern Arab states emerged and divorced from the society. 
Imitating the West was not fulfilled only through a strong army, the new form of state 
realised the need of knowledge. This realisation was the moment of emergence of a different 
form of elite. If the concept of elite was signifying the political elite, coming in contact with the 
West and modernity another form of elite was born. The new forms of elite were the 
intellectuals: people who had knowledge rather than other forms of power. The emergence of 
this group and their relationships with the States is one of the crucial elements in emergence of 
the particular form of state that came out. The intellectuals play various roles: think tankers, 
advisers, but more importantly they contribute to what Louis Althusser (1970) called "the 
Ideological State Apparatuses". 
With changes in the form of governing the use of power also changed. The power during 
the era of pre-Western-influence was a machine based in a limited space, a castle, and had no, or 
limited, intention to extend its influence beyond that limitation. During the era of the Ottoman 
Empire people's only obligation was paying tax to the authority. In that regard the State relation 
to the land, territory and people was different to the modem style of the state. Land concerns 
state only when it becomes a territory. Territory is a space that power of the central state is 
functioning at it. Here, it is worth dwelling a bit more. When taxation ends up being the only line 
· · s th th tur of this link has an impact on the of mteractton between the people and the tate en e na e 
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nature of the relation between the State and the people Thi·s proc ft t· · th • ess o axa 10n IS not e same 
as the process of taxation in the modern capitalist state. 
In the ~odem model_ of_ state ~e tax~tion_ monitories the economy, creates money. It 
necessanly creat~s It m motion, m crrculation, with turnover, and also with 
~orresp?ndence with services and goods in the current of that circulation. The State fmds 
m tax.ah~~ the means for f?~eign trade. Through taxation the goods and services become 
commodities and commoditles measured and equalised by money (Deleuze & Guattari 
2004: 489). ' 
As it becomes apparent, through taxation, the modem capitalist state becomes a machine 
to tum over goods and service into commodities, which at the end are measured and equalised by 
money. This process was missing in the Ottoman style of governing in the region. One crucial 
point is the location of the central power. The centre of the Empire was in Istanbul, the region of 
Arab Middle East, apart from Damascus and Cairo, were mere margin or frontiers. Therefore, the 
region was merely used as a source of revenue to the faraway centre. This was operated through 
local representatives. Local representatives were apparatuses to serve the centre; since the centre 
had no means to monitor their activity, closely, they were more inclined to engage in corrupt 
practices. 
The State was only intended to serve the ruling elite, through imposing heavy tax on 
people. Therefore, the State acquired an image of the oppressor. Consequently paying tax was 
seen as a duty to avoid harm by an evil power. Here lies the genesis of the negative image of the 
State as an entity of pure evil, in the mind and the psyche of the people. Therefore, it is expected 
that the population will remain aloof from the State and its apparatuses. This attitude toward the 
State has resulted in an unbridgeable gap between the State and society. The State has been seen 
throughout history, as an apparatus of capture on top of organic (human) apparatuses of capture, 
a meta-vampire (Deleuze and Guattari 2004). In other words the State did not take a part in 
cultivation of land, in husbandry of animals, neither in advancement of the society, nor in growth 
of market or industry. It only built an army to collect tax, to deferred the territory and to serve 
· · gm· g the society and its daily issues. The Itself. As a consequence, there was a vacuum m mana 
tribe as an old form of governing ended up filling the vacuum. The tribe is a machine of 
repetition, guarding the continuity and punishing severely anyone who de sires to break or 
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discontinue with tradition. This particular character became more significant later on, when the 
European colonial power colonised the region and attempted to intervene in different spaces such 
as social, natural, traditional and economical. The collision between the two was imminent. 
However, with the emergence of a new form of State and governance, still the sovereign 
body was not just a metaphor, but a political reality and its physical presence was necessary for 
the functioning of the State. On the other hand it was a moment of realisation, in contrast to the 
pre-modem form, that society as a whole needs to run the modem style of the state. With this 
comes the realisation of the role of knowledge and of people like technicians, bureaucrats and 
intellectuals. People who played the role of linking power to people, through their labour and 
discourse create a new image of the state and in the end attempt to legitimise it. 
2.8 The Colonial Making 
The image is taken from the BBC website 
th F h and British governments are prepared to 
It is ac~ordingly underst~od between e br::~e or a confederation of Arab states (a) and 
recogruse and protect an mdependent Artha . ty fan Arab chief That in area (a) 
(b) k d th annexed map under e suzeram o · 1 mar e ~n e '. in shall have priority of right of enterprise and loca 
France, and m area (b) Great Bn~ ' b G t Britain shall alone supply advisers or 
loans. That~ area_ (a) France, and m ;:a ilab :~:te or codfederation of Arab states. That 
foreign funct1onar1es at the request O e 
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in the blue area France, and in the red area Great B ·1 · h II b • 
h d
. • d" . . n am, s a e allowed to establish 
sue rrect or m rrect admm1stration or control as the d · d h · .th Y esire an as t ey may think fit to 
arrange w1 the Arab state or confederation of Arab stat (S k p· A 
1916, as quoted in McArthur McArthur, 1992: 88). es y es- icot greement, 
The colonials formed the States according to their "strategic calculations" (Anderson & 
Stansfield, 2004: 13 ). The States that emerged had a missions namely to serve the interest of the 
colonial power. For this particular goal to be achieved a form of localisation was required. The 
State has to have a local face and some sort of roots. Thus as Rosemarie Said Zahlan (1989: 19) 
puts it: 
The one important and constant element in the political evolution of the Gulf state was 
the position of the rulers. He signed the treaties, and he was personally responsible for the 
application for all their clauses. The British authority - whether the Political Resident, the 
Political Agent or the Senior Naval Officer of the Persian Gulf Division- dealt with him 
only. 
The local ruler was appointed, made and protected, by the external power. When he was 
ready to sign a treaty his personal position was strengthened and his influence continued and was 
guaranteed. The rulers, who were mostly the local sheiks, were never accountable to the ordinary 
people. In the new system, the colonial, enhanced and continued the old one. In the past, the 
sheiks regarded themselves as accountable to Allah. This was translated into: being accountable 
to no one. But another crucial feature of this system of accountability was that: Allah is beyond 
the community. Thus, the sheiks had no reason to seek legitimacy from the locals. They were 
inferior people to them. This system appropriated the colonials. In a similar fashion, the colonials 
were beyond the community. They regarded themselves as superior to the people. The old shecks 
found it absolutely normal to seek the protection and support from them and ignore the locals. 
Affiliation with the white-superior-strong-civilised-man was the source of prestige for the shecks 
in the eyes of the local. "Moreover, since the second half of the nineteenth century the local 
elites and the sultans were recipients of the regular payment from the British Empire" (alNaqib, 
1989: 105). This military, economic, and symbolic support from the British Empire isolated the 
elite from the people and consequently resulted in a circumstance that the emerged local elites 
and their states were in total isolation from their societies. This was not in contrast but rather was 
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a natural and expected continuation of the historical structure of d h · · th power an aut onty m e 
region. 
The British not only managed everything, since the local elites were not familiar with 
modem notions like state, society, economy, sovereignty. They also ranked the local elites 
according to their own criteria. "In 1929, for example, the rulers of Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar 
were the recipients of seven-gun salutes; the ruler of Abu Dhabi received a five gun salute, and 
the ruler of Dudai only a humble three" (Said Zahlan, 1989: 20). The number of gun salutes was 
based on the behaviour of the elites. The more modem they behaved the more gun salute they 
received. This trivial ranking shows clearly how the elites were everything but statesmen. It also 
demonstrates that the colonial administrators were fully aware how much the fake prestige and 
pride was an essential component of the psyche of the elites. "European rule during the twentieth 
century was, as Lewis puts it, an imperialism of interference without responsibility, which would 
neither create nor permit stable and orderly government" (Anderson, 1987: 5). 
The elites had the sources and all the tools they needed to rule their community from 
outside. This established non-relational- relationships with the local community. The local were 
non-existed unless they posed a danger to the elites. Locals were subalterns. Subaltern, according 
to Spivak cannot speak. If the "speaking is a transaction between the speaker and listener" (1996: 
289), this did not happen in the case of the local population, locals were not listened to. They 
were not permitted to use their language to express their concerns, engage in a dialogue, or to 
even think. Through these policies they were reduced to apolitical being. All they could have 
was their religion as it was during Islamic caliphs; philosophy was discussed in the palaces and 
religion was for the people. If administration and implementation of that was less demanding in 
the small Gulf States, in others with a substantial population other additional tools were 
employed. As Aziz Al-Azmeh (2005) puts it, in case of Saudi Arabia 
W ahhabism it was a manner of domesticating Arabian tribesmen under the authority of a 
trading and ~atrimonial clan, the house of Saud, by re-socialising them in th~ context of a 
new polity formed out of a system of tribal hierarchies, at the apex of which stood the 
Sauds and their priestly partners, the Al Al-Shay~, the des~endants of Muh~ad Ton 
'Abd al-Wahhab. Toe emphasis was on so managmg the tribes that they acquiesced to 
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payment of zakat, the religious translation of a tax to the State str· tl ·fi d · th . . . 1c y persom 1e m e 
person of the Imam, later the King (an mterv1ew with Iran Bulletin23, Jan. 2005). 
Once accountability has been set aside, and once the society, with all its institutions, have 
been reduced to serve a single goal namely the survival of the elites, as a result a circumstance 
prevails that leads to the triumph of evil. The evil prevails when accountability is subdued. 
This situation might vary from one state to another but despite that the similarities are 
rather stronger. One of the main noticeable differences between the Gulf States and the other is 
that ''the Gulf States did not go through the nationalism period that the Levant and Egypt and 
Iraq went through" (alNaqib, 1989: 104). But the Arab nationalism is not an ideology to establish 
a nation state. It is a doctrine which postulates the existence of"a single [Arab] nation bound by 
the common ties of language, religion and history ... behind the facade of a multiplicity of 
sovereign states" (Sati al-Husri, 1955: 11-13). Similar to other grand theories, socialism, fascism, 
Nazism, Arab nationalism had a grand vision and a goal set in the future. This is why the 
movement has been criticised as "a misnomer. It does not represent a genuine national 
movement or ideal but is rather a euphemism for raw imperialism" (Karsh, 2006). In the case of 
Nasser the pan Arab nationalism was a euphemism for an Egyptian leadership of the Arabs. As 
Pachachy (1991: 69-70) puts it: 
While Abdul Nasser was a fervent Arab Nationalist, most of his close associates and 
Egyptian people in general were not. He dragged a reluctant Egypt into playing a central 
role in Arab affairs. In so doing he was not only serving his Arian nationalist ideals but 
also promoting the interest of Egypt itself. He realized that Egypt by herself was no more 
than an over populated impoverished underdeveloped third world country, but as leader 
of united Arab world she could play a decisive role in international affairs. For Nasser 
Arab solidarity was only a step toward eventual unity but also an instrument of great 
potency in Egypt's the external relation. For this reason he wou_ld not tolerate any Arab 
government breaking rank and defying Egypt's claim to leadership of the Arab world. 
The situation was similar for the Ba'th party in Iraq and Syria. The Ba'th Party in both Syria and 
Iraq were involved in occupation and annexation of other neighboured countries: the Syrian 
occupation of Lebanon in 1970s and the Iraqi case for the annexation of Kuwait in August 1990. 
These examples crystallise how the Arab nationalism was nothing more than an expansionist 
plan. 
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Arab nationalism, whether theoretical or practical did not lt · bl' . , · resu m esta 1shment of a nat10n 
state. The State "Placed in historical context the regime of s dd H · , a am ussem appears less as an 
aberration, and more as a logical culmination of the pathologi·es b dd d · th s em e e m e tate of Iraq 
since its creation in 1921" (Anderson & Stansfield, 2004:13). 
2.9 The Debacle of 1967 
The Current form of the States in the Arab Middle East was shaken by the 1967 defeat to Israel. 
Thus 1967 is a critical juncture in the contemporary history of the region. In that year a short 
war: a war that lasted only six day, changed everything everlastingly. The war started on 
Monday June 5. 
At 7: 45 A.M. Private Yehoshua Bar-Dayan wrote on his diary: 'I believe the war has 
started. Two Mystere squadrons flew by law'. By the time he made his next entry, forty 
five minute later, the war had been all but won: the planes flying overhead destroyed 
hundreds of Egyptian aircraft, most still grounded on their base" (Segev, 2007: 405). 
As a result, "all facets of Arab life were subject to ruthless assaults: Islam, the Arabic 
language, the capacity of an Arab as an individual, the record of radical Arab states (Ajami, 
1981: 26). He continues "the secular pan-Arabists lost their self-confidence and traditionalists 
recovered theirs. The latter no longer seemed as anachronistic as the former had said they were" 
(pp. 67-8). Henceforth, modernity became an evil. A defeat became the name of the project: a 
defeat that in Arabic has been described endlessly. Arab literature, ever since, tainted with 
sorrow, mourning, and a paradigm shift to the past. Modernity was blamed for the defeat. Thus, 
Islamic fundamentalism triumphed, and hence, the West became an evil. June 1967 was an event 
had shown the Arab states and their leaders and their fundamental weaknesses. So far it is an 
unrecoverable defeat. The event of defeat might encourage a beginning of a new historiography, 
as an Arab nationalist theorist Constantine K. Zurayk, articulated in post 1948 (1956: 34) quoted 
from Hasso, (2000: 492): 
The victory which the Zionists have achieved ... lies not in the superiority of one peop~e 
over another, but rather in the superiority of one system over another. The reason for this 
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victory is that the roots of Zionism are grounded in modem w t li£ h"l £ h . . . . es em e w i e we or t e 
most part are still distant from this hfe and hostile to i·t Th 1· · th d £ . . . ey ive m e present an or 
the future while we contmue to dream the dreams of the past and t tu fy 1 
·th ·t "' d. 1 o s pe curse ves wi is 1a mg gory. 
Such historiography might result in an "inexhaustible wellspring of intellectual progress" 
as Koselleck articulated it (Schivelbusch, 2003: 4). But this was not the case. The event of 1967 
ended the dream of Arab nationalism or rather pan-nationalism. Similar to Napoleon's invasion 
of Egypt, the defeat of the 1967 resulted in shock. 
In the 1970s and the 1980s, the political and economic edifice of the Arab world began to 
give way. Explosive demographic trends overwhelmed what had been built in the 
postindependence era, and then a furious Islamism blew in like a deadly wind. It offered 
solace, seduced the young, and provided the means and the language of re sentiment and 
refusal (Ajami, 2003: 3). 
For Egypt and her leader the war or 'the liberation of Palestine' was a road to become the 
grand Arab leader and establish a united Arab state under the rule of Nasser. As a result of the 
defeat the territorial state became the norm. After the decline of European empires and the 
emergence of America as a global power America moved to the region to fulfil its need and 
fantasy. "A half-century of regional involvement in every conceivable way-through diplomacy, 
aid, culture, education, espionage, subversion, and (not least) the projection of military power-
has secured the 'holy trinity' of American interests: Israel, oil, and anti-communism" (Hudson, 
1996: 329). Throughout the cold war America had to fight to contain the threat of communism in 
the region. This policy had resulted in the support of the ruling elites. This the Campaign did not 
attempt only to eradicate the "communists and socialists, but any element calling for democracy 
and land reform, including liberal, left-of-centre and other reformist groups and movements" 
(Halperin, 2005: 1135). In January 5 1957 President Eisenhower in a message to the congress 
announced his Doctrine on the Middle East. In it he proposed. 
It would first of all authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or 
group of nations in' the general area of the Middle East in the development_ of economic 
strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independenc~. It would, m the s~~ond 
place, authorize the Executive to undertake in the same_ region. progr~s of mil!tary 
assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid. It 
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would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the 
~mplo_yment of~~ ~ed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial 
mtegnty and poht1cal mdependence of such nations reque t· h ·d · 
d · fr . , s mg sue a1 , agamst overt anne aggress10n om any nation controlled by International Communism. 
The era of American presence in the region did not result in any change in the form of the State 
in the region. 
2.10 Conclusion 
The idea and the presence of the state in the Middle East are millennia old, the current 
forms of the States, which are the brainchild of the Western modernity, are relatively new. The 
contemporary form of the States, elite led machine, which has authority over a marked territory, 
supported and recognised by the international community and the external to the society, is 
imported and planted in the region by the outsider. This alien figure, the State, was a modem 
form of power that was handed over to docile local elite. The local elite had their own vision and 
understanding of power, for them: to rule is to possess. Leadership is ownership. This has a root 
in the concept of gazza. The Arabic word indicates what has been captured is owned. Thus the 
State that was handed over to the local elite was seen and dealt with as personal property. This 
personal property required care, and survival. While this mindset emerged from tradition, the 
idea and the structure of the State, as a modern form of organisation, brought with it the idea of 
citizen, law, civil society and democracy. This made modernity stand in contrast to tradition. 
While tradition justified the ownership of the State by the elites, the concept of modernity 
disputed that and stood contrary to it. This awkward fact caused the ruling elite to be jealous of 
their being sovereign, suspicious of every member and always vigilant for their own survival. 
But modernity also brought technique of governing, law, bureaucracy, army and arms. This 
occurred virtually everywhere in the Middle East. This common background allows us to talk 
about a particular form of the Arab states. 
There is near consensus in the Arab world today concerning the serious flaws in the State 
of Arab affairs· it is a rare consensus among rulers and ruled in which class dist~ctions 
disappear and ' regional, sectarian and even ethnic differences fade. ~ere is_ al~o 
consensus, as demonstrated by the agreement at the May 2004 ".':ab s_um~nt meet~~ m 
Tunis which focused on political reform that the heart of the fa1lmg bes m the political 
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sphere, specifically the architecture of the Arab State, and that reform must begin there 
(AHDR, 2004: 128). 
The current states in the region are deformed modem national territorial states. This form of the 
State is neither modem nor traditional. It is a particular form of state, opposes the true essence of 
both modernity and tradition. Both forces; modem and tradition (mainly religion), are 
threatening the peculiar structure of this state, but none is able to change it. The historical 
presence of the other, an outsider shows clearly the strategic position of the region. This presence 
of the other impacted the region both negatively and positively. The failed modem state as a 
form of total state controls every form of communication with the outside world. Therefore, 
after the emergence of these state the outside power had only to go through the apparatuses of 
these state to communicate with the inside. The PMS which locates in the gray area between the 
outside and inside found it more beneficial for its survival to appease the outsiders, to fulfil the 
outsiders' wish as long as they are not affecting the future of the system. 
The outsider is driven to the region by their interest: when their interest is met at best through the 
state i.e. failed modem state, as they wish, whether it is peace or no hostility with Israel, or the 
flow of oil, or the opening up markets, then the outside power does not bother this state. This 
makes the state China wall between the outsiders and the populations. This leads the population 
within the failed modem state to view the outside power as their enemy and the backer of their 
regimes. This enmity is interpreted by culturalist and rentier state approaches as an essential part 
of the culture of the region. 
No doubt the outsider play a vital role in shaping and surviving of this particular form of state 
but ultimately it is the failed modem state structure shapes that role, and sometimes pushes the 
outsiders toward their current position. Thus it can convincingly be argued that these states have 
a dynamic of their own and that their existence is determined by the outside power alone. 
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3.1 Concept: Failed Modern State 
This chapter outlines the concept of the Failed Modem State (FMS) It 1 · h h · . exp ams w at eac smgle 
word in the phrase indicates and how in combination they form a concept to understand and 
analyse the complex phenomenon of the State in the Arab Middle East Aft 1 · · h · . er exp ammg w at 1s 
meant by the concept generally, the first word of the phrase (Failed) will be discussed. While 
elucidating the meaning of failure it is critical to ask the question, is there a failure on the 
ground. Providing the answer to such a question is a process of linking the coined concept to the 
reality on the ground. It also requires explaining the meaning of modem in that context and what 
sort of state as a result emerged. 
3.2 The Concept 
The FMS is a phrase compound of three words and one ellipsis. The three visible words are 
failure, modern and the state, while the ellipsis word, which is included within the meaning of 
the word failure, is tradition. These words, which makeup the phrase, individually, carry a 
different function and meaning. While together, like a chemical substance, they stand for a very 
different meaning and function. Through this combination the phrase becomes a tool to 
demystify, criticize, argue and analyse the problem which the concept is directly connected to. 
Since a word in itself fails in its neutral meaning to function as a concept "we have to impose a 
[particular] meaning up on it" (Heywood, 2007: 18). This is the process of concept construction. 
In light of what is being said, the FMS is a system of singularity that attempts to 
understand the problem of a particular sort of political event. It also attempts to understand the 
nature and the essence of these systems, which so far stubbornly remain as puzzle in the general 
area of the State and regional study. As we explained in literature review chapter in more detail, 
there have been many previous attempts to name the nature of States that exist in the Arab 
Middle East such as military regimes, single-party regimes, traditional/patrimonial, sultanistic, 
pseudo-democracies, electoral authoritarianism, and predator states, Rentier state, weak state, 
dependent state, despotic state, and totalitarian state. This thesis argues that n one of these 
concepts or descriptions is able to elaborate the particularity and exceptionality of the nature of 
the States in the Arab Middle East. These concepts basically fail to penetrate the complex 
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structure of the art of governing. In order to crystallise the imposed meaning of the concept an 
etymological exercise for each word is needed. 
While the Arab Middle East exists as a phrase and as a geopolitical region what it signifies is not 
fully apparent. It is clear that not all Arabs live in Middle East nor all Middle East is Arab. When 
Burton I. Kaufman (1996) employed it for the title of his book, The Arab Middle East and the 
United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower Diplomacy, he included the Levant, the 
Persian Gulf States and Egypt, Libya and Sudan in North Africa. But when William L. Cleveland 
(1994) wrote his 'A History of the Modern Middle East,' he did not include Libya and Sudan. To 
regard the Levant, the Persian Gulf Arabs and Egypt as one cluster is a common pattern. When 
Gershoni and Jankowski (1997) edited their seminal work Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab 
Middle East, they did not include any country from the North Africa apart from Egypt. This was 
so for a clear reason that the sense of Arab unity among the rest of North African Arab states is 
nonexistent. Egypt in North Africa is the only country, which shared and in many cases leads the 
aspiration of Arab unity. Moreover Egypt, especially post 1952 Egypt, gravitated more toward 
the Asian part of the Middle East than Africa. The wars with Israel (1967, 1973), the short unity 
with Syria and the establishment of an ill-fated solidarity group with Iraq, Jordan and Yemen are 
among many other attempts to link to the Asian part of the Arab Middle east. 
What are known as Maghreb in French political dictionary are countries in which 
French is still the predominant language among the educated. It is overwhelmingly the 
medium of instruction, especially at the secondary and higher levels of education. The 
spread of this language and the preponderance of French culture in North Africa are the 
most salient and longest-lasting features of the colonial legacy. The mission civilisatrice 
that France, as the colonial power, felt it was carrying out in these countries resulted in 
the creation of francophonic and, to a great extent, francophile elites (Allouche, 1989: 
411). 
This particular feature distinguishes the Maghreb countries from the rest of the Arabs. Libya 
unlike Egypt has no shared experience with the rest of the Arab Middle East such as Arab 
nationalist aspiration, war, or regional unity. 
When the work on the thesis commenced I had the whole Middle East in mind. After some 
research I came to realise that despite the similarities, not all Middle Eastern countries share 
similar political, social, cultural and historical experience. Some countries were stood out from 
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the early stage such as Turkey and Iran, for their d"ffi h. . 1 erent istory, traJectory, relation to the west 
and culture. The states that I have chosen to d 1 . . . eve op my concept share, despite their difference 
m pohtical structures, similar languages expe · d • . ' nences an aspirations unlike the rest of the 
Middle East. 
Tradition 
The Masses 
3.3 The Failure 
The first word in the 'FMS' phrase is failure. Failure as a word and as an event indicates that 
there is an undesirable condition on the ground which the efforts to changing it have failed. The 
undesirable condition was traditional initially, which is encapsulated within the failure as an 
ellipsis. Failure indicates the failure of modernity, the failure to cause a rupture with tradition, 
the failure of the hybridisation of tradition and modernity. In the failure there is a sign of an 
attempt. This elucidates (a) that there is an awareness of the condition of the reality on the 
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II 
ground; (b) there is a desire and certain will to change that undesirable reality; ( c) the change is 
possible; (d) but this possibility never materialised. This attempt is an attempt to become 
modem. The word failure is a noun. The English word has a French origin fail/ire, which dates 
back to the seventeenth century, which also meant to fail. The word could mean omission of 
occurrence, like a failure to perform a duty. It also indicates the state of inability to perform a 
normal function, like the failure of an organ of the body. It might also mean an abrupt cessation 
of a normal function and also a lack of success. Despite all these meanings what is rather 
germane to the conceptualisation is the meaning where failure is the state or condition of not 
meeting a desired or intended objective after having attempted it. While in the general meaning 
of the word it is not clear whether the failure to meet the objective is predetermined or otherwise 
remains unclear, but in the FMS phrase failure is clearly, predetermined. 
The failure to meet a desired or intended objective refers firstly to a situation, which is 
the dire condition situation and necessitating change. This situation, from which one desires to be 
departed, is tradition. Here the ellipses word becomes rather apparent. When tradition is the 
situation from which one wanted to depart, then, the failure, in the phrase, indicates that that 
particular effort did not succeed in reaching its desired objective. But despite that, an attempt 
occurred, so, tradition has been departed from but the failure indicates that the arrival, the final 
step of the journey (modernity) has failed to materialise. Both, the desire for change, which 
entails realisation and the rejection of tradition, and the effort, means that tradition, did not 
remain as it was. It ended up in the situation of it being impossible to return-back-to. In the pre-
modem era tradition was a sleeping force. It was awakened by the forces of modernisation. 
Therefore, one can say, as a result, tradition was remade and to some extent, to borrow from Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1992), 'reinvented' . Hence the commencement of 
modernisation is simultaneously the recommencement of tradition. "Tradition was born in 
opposition to something: to ideas accompanying foreign merchandise, or to universally 
proclaimed liberalism", as Abdullah alLroui claims (Sheehi, 1997: 43). 
To summarise the failure in the concept of the FMS indicates: the failure to leave , 
tradition behind and to cause a rupture, or an epistemological rupture, with it. When the 
evolution of tradition began, and was maintained by forces like states and thier elites, then there 
was no space for the full implementation of modernity, hence the failure to become modem. A 
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double failure: a failure to cause rupture and a failure to become modern. This crystallises the 
position of the FMS, which is neither tradition nor modernity. It inhabits the middle between the 
two contested poles: tradition and modern, and has no desire to move. It desires to remain, to 
resist, and to be static. As a result a tradition and modernity, as two parallel lines, are making up 
the FMS, despite their very contradictory nature. These contradictory elements in the 
composition of the state are not unique. According to Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 388) "political 
sovereignty or domination has two heads: the magician king and the jurist-priest .... 
Undoubtedly, these two poles stand in opposition in term by term". But their opposition inside 
the body of the FMS "is only relative, they function as a pair" or more correctly the FMS makes 
them function as a pair. Consequently they are the principal elements of the State apparatus. 
Hence failure is multifaceted. It is a failure to rupture with tradition, or to obtain a 
different view on tradition. It is also a failure to achieve modernity and to become modern. This 
atmosphere of introducing part of modernity, by the elite, into traditional sphere, while at the 
same time maintaining tradition and withholding or not encouraging modernity to be realised, is 
the permanent failure. For the failure as a concept to have an analytical merit, failure must be an 
event and phenomena on the ground. Failure of modernity signifies the absence of modern 
standards of the human rights, economic development, democracy, freedom, health, education 
and many others. The absences of these features are bluntly and tragically everywhere 
throughout the region. 
How to judge failure? Why is it assumed that there is failure? It would be rather apparent 
that the adequate answer to this question would be fact based. In recent years several studies 
have covered the economic and social performance of the region, focusing on such aspects as 
growth, employment, trade, knowledge, women, and poverty among others. These are areas, 
which are directly linked to the role of the State and the function of the State. 
In Egypt, the country which regards itself as the leader of the Arab states "about one in 
every four Egyptians lives in a shantytown; more than a third of Cairo' s 19 million residents live 
in areas known as ashwaiyyat, without clean drinking water or proper sewage systems" (Shatz, 
2010). On the other hand the state spies on its people and controls its people through apparatuses 
like the ministry of the interior which has "an army of about two million informers: one Egyptian 
in every 40" (Shatz, 2010). This is not unique to Egypt. The first regional United Nations Human 
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Development Report for the Arab States (2002) covered 22 countries from the Maghreb to the 
Gulf. The Report concluded that Arab countries needed to embark on rebuilding their societies 
on the basis of: 
• Full respect for human rights and human freedoms as the cornerstones of good 
governance, leading to human development. 
• The complete empowerment of Arab women, taking advantage of all 
opportunities to build their capabilities and to enable them to exercise those 
capabilities to the full. 
• The consolidation of knowledge acquisition and its effective utilisation. As a key 
driver of progress, knowledge must be brought to bear efficiently and 
productively in all aspects of society, with the goal of enhancing human well 
being across the region (AHDR: 2002: 9). 
The areas that were highlighted indicate that ordinary people have no rights in front of authority. 
Disempowerment of women shows that the vast majority of the population is marginalised and 
silenced. While calling for the utilisation of knowledge for development demonstrates that 
modernity is being curtailed. The knowledge that was borrowed is not utilised to serve the 
population. 
The subsequent Arab Human Development Report (2003) a year later focused on the 
issue of the Knowledge deficit, an area that was highlighted more than a century ago by a 
Kurdish activist and scholar alKawakby. In his book Characteristics of the Tyrant .il~YI ~4b he 
states "the tyrant would shiver in fear of worldly knowledge such as theoretical wisdom, 
intellectual philosophy, the rights of nations, civil policy, history, literary rhetoric and other 
knowledge that pierces the veil of ignorance and enlightens people" (1984: 50). 
In its closing conclusion the report puts forward a strategic vision for creating knowledge 
societies in the Arab world built on five pillars: 
• Guaranteeing the key freedoms of opinion, speech and assembly through good 
governance bounded by the law. 
• Disseminating high quality education for all. 
• Embedding and ingraining science, and building and broadening the capacity for 
research and development across society. 
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• Shifting rapidly towards knowledge-based production in Arab socioeconomic 
structures. 
• Developing an authentic, broadminded and enlightened Arab knowledge model 
(AHDR, 2003). 
All the recommended areas are directly related t o modernity. Their shortage signifies how 
modernity is being implemented. It shows how the region is lagging behind the rest of the 
world. The AHDR 2004 report with its focus on freedom stated: 
Despite variations from country to country, rights and freedoms enjoyed in the Arab 
world remain poor. Even disregarding foreign intervention, freedoms in Arab countries 
are threatened by two kinds of power: that of undemocratic regimes, and that of tradition 
and tribalism, sometimes under the cover of religion. These twin forces have combined to 
curtail freedoms and fundamental rights and have weakened the good citizen's strength 
and ability to advance (AHDR, 2004: 8). 
The findings illustrate that freedom is threatened by two forces modernity (undemocratic regime) 
and tradition (tribalism and religion). Both modernity and tradition are aiming at the same 
objective. They both serve the state and its elite and threaten freedom, and work in parallel to 
serve the State. The 2009 report branded the Arab States as: 
A state which departed from the legitimate rules and subsequently becomes a source of 
risk to life and freedom. Instead of guaranteeing human security, the state itself turns into 
a major threat to it. It is fair to say that, across key dimensions of performance, the record 
of Arab states has been mixed, with negative impacts on human security. While most 
Arab states have embraced international treaties and adorned their constitutions with 
clauses that enjoin respect for life, human rights, justice, equality before the law and the 
right to a fair trial, their performance shows a wide gap between theory and practice 
(AHDR, 2009: 54). 
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It is worthwhile mentioning the UNDP which after a decade of producing human-development 
reports and indexes (HDis) to determine quality of life, after 2000 decided to focus on a specific 
region for the first time. The reports were not welcomed by the states of the region. "In some 
countries, officials were highly uncooperative" (Fergany, 2002). The response was as expected, 
denial and even attempts to terminate the report. Because the reports aimed at a "new social 
contract" they actually benefit the bulk of the population. This, means empowering people in the 
face of the state. FMS inhabits a foggy zone; that is not easy for people to look through. 
Therefore, knowledge is crucial; it helps citizens, to see, to realise, while secrecy helps the states 
and the machine of bureaucrats. Therefore, the FMS is inherently a secret state and abhors, in 
every shape and form, any information about it. Knowledge is the antitheses to the FMS. 
Among Arab intellectuals, complaining about the failure of the State is universal. The 
concept used to describe the situation is azma i.e. crisis. The use of the notion of crisis indicates 
the crucial and decisive characteristic of the situation. If the notion of crisis usually indicates a 
turning point, the Arab crisis as Fahrni Gad'an (1996: 95) puts it "is a crisis with a closed 
horizon". The parties that hold responsibility for the crisis are, according to most Arab thinkers 
(Gad'an, 1996) (Algabri, 1996) (Zreq, 1998) (Gahlion, 1994), a combination of the state, society 
and the culture. 
"The failure of these systems-whether in their patriarchal, monarchist version as in 
Saudi Arabia or their fascist, republican version as in the Ba'athist states-is the result of the 
stagnation of power, meaning the lack of any turnover or renewal of elites" (Ghalion, 2004: 127). 
In an interview with Farrukh Iqbal, lead economist and author of the World Bank (2006) report 
"Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development in the Middle East and North 
Africa" Iqbal states: 
Some may not think that poverty is a serious issue in the Middle East and North African 
region, given its association in the public mind with oil wealth. But this is a misleading 
image. Although the region has a low poverty rate compared with other developing 
regions, the fact is that one of every five persons there may be considered poor (at the $2 
ppp line) and that little progress has been made in reducing this ratio since the mid-
1980s. 
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Thus one of the main observations of the report is "slow growth has a social cost". The failure is 
the failure of state to play its role as the main player in achieving a better life. The State is not a 
mobilising force in the society. It is more the controller. "They [the state elites] serve only the 
interests of the clans who hold power, they communicate in no way whatsoever with their 
citizenries, and they depend for their survival solely upon coercion and multiple security 
services" (Ghalion, 2004: 127). 
The state's desire is that the population should remain poor, so that they can be easily 
controlled; this poverty is not merely in the area of income. "A person who is not free is poor. A 
woman who is not empowered is poor. And a person who has no access to knowledge is poor" 
(Fergan, 2002). The main responsiblity for the poverty of freedom, poverty of power, and 
poverty of knowledge is the state. As Bayart (2009: 60) puts it "the state is a major manufacturer 
of inequality". 
There is a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions in terms of 
participatory governance. The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most parts of 
Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and a big part of Central Asia in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s barely reached the Arab states. 
During democratization's "third wave," democracy ceased being a mostly Western 
phenomenon and "went global." When the third wave began in 1974, the world had only 
about 40 democracies, and only a few of them lay outside the West. By the time the 
Journal of Democracy began publishing in 1990, there were 76 electoral democracies 
(accounting for slightly less than half the world's independent states). By 1995, that 
number had shot up to 117-three in every five states. By then, a critical masses of 
democracies existed in every major world region save one the Middle East. Moreover, 
every one of the world's major cultural realms had become host to a significant 
democratic presence, albeit again with a single exception-the Arab world. Fifteen years 
later, this exception still stands (Diamond, 2010: 91). 
d l t and is one of the most painful This freedom deficit undermines human eve opmen 
manifestations of lagging political development. While de Jure acceptance of democracy and 
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human rights is enshrined in constitutions, legal codes, and government pronouncements, de 
facto implementation is often neglected and, in some cases, deliberately disregarded (Middle 
East Quarterly, 2002: 65). 
The root of this failure in almost every area of life is, as Marina Ottaway (2004) puts it 
"fairly simple". According to her the central dilemma of democratic reform is that: "The 
Presidents and kings remain too powerful, untrammelled by the limits imposed by effective 
parliaments and independent judiciaries. Countervailing institutions remain weak, if they exist at 
all" in other words, total power is in the hands of president or the king. 
This absolute form of power is the very frame of power that continues from tradition. 
This tradition of absolute power has deep roots in history. The idea and organisation of the 
shepherd and flock relationship can first be found throughout the Mediterranean East, in Egypt, 
Assyria, and Mesopotamia and with the Hebrews, as Foucault (2007) calls it "pastoral power". In 
the Middle East the existence and the presence of this form of power, ossified and continued as it 
used to be. Prophet Muhammad used the exact word of shepherd and flock for describing the 
relationships among members of society, in a saying "Each of you is a shepherd, and all of you 
are responsible for your flocks ." (Saheeh Al-Bukhari, Saheeh Muslim). 
The notion of shepherd and flock application within tradition first and then within the 
FMS differs substantively from what Foucault attempts to conceptualise. The shepherd flock 
relation is not the relation of care and "sacrifice of one for all, and the sacrifice of all for one" 
(Foucault, 2007: 129). In traditional and FMS, the shepherd is the one who is political. Whereas 
the flock has no right to be political: thus any attempt by a member of the flock to be political is 
regarded as law breaking. This makes the FMS an exceptional and an external state. It is external 
to the population. External means the state machine is outside the realm of the community. 
Throughout the reign of the Ottomans for the Iraqis the state meant collecting tax and remained 
distant. This resulted in a pattern of thinking among the ordinary people that the right place of 
the state is external to the society. 
Thinking historically the Ottoman Empire when it was the sole power holder in the 
region for more than four centuries followed the same method. The extemality of the state to the 
society, as Iraqi sociologist Ali Al-wardi remarks, was the main reason behind the survival of the 
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Ottoman Empire for such a long time. In his book ~.i.:Ji Jly.ll (;-1 •. ):i u-- L.Jb.J Social Aspects of 
Iraqi Modern Society, about the modem Iraqi sociological history, Alwardi (1977: 22) asks: why 
the Ottoman Empire lasted for many centuries, whereas the British Empire struggled to sustain 
the power for few decades only. For him the main reason for the durability of the Ottoman and 
the difficulties of the British lay in the British's relation with the people. The British colonial 
administrators intervened into social and political areas which resulted in a backlash and revolt. 
Especially the British attempt to change the way people continued to do their centuries old daily 
life rituals. They behaved modems and forced the people to become modem. Modem signified 
better and that justified using force. The British forced people to walk on curbs, cross the road in 
designated places, use toilet rather than urinate in backyards. This indicates that the British 
introduced into daily life organisation, rules, hygiene and ultimately a different way of living. 
But this was all conducted in an atmosphere where there was no proper communication. Thus, 
misunderstanding between the two was the norm. Nowadays in an atmosphere contaminated 
with conspiracy theory and paranoia misunderstanding about most aspect of politics and life is 
rife. 
The failure of the FMS countries are apparent through their records of human rights 
abuses, their fortress against democracy and democratisation, their lag behind the world, their 
underdevelopment, their high illiteracy rates, etc. Deterioration is the pattern. It is also apparent 
through the draconian laws that restrict basic freedom of expression, association and assembly, 
restrictive press laws, defining law in vague and loose terms to increase the scope of the death 
penalty. Introducing provisions like "anyone who commits an act which undermines the political 
regime or incites others to do so, and anyone who acts individually or collectively to change the 
economic social or fundamental situation of the society" (Jordanian antiterrorism law October 8, 
' 
2001) can be sentenced to hard labour. 
3.4 The Ellipsis (tradition) 
Ellipsis is a noun. According to, Oxford University Dictionary, its origin is Greek: from 
· t ·t means omission of words either from el/eipein, which means to leave out. In its curren use 1 
· · d ·th· ·t aning the word tradition. Tradition in speech or writing. The word failure mclu es w1 m I s me 
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the phrase FMS has been omitted. Even in reality this tradition is in the state of omission. 
Because of the rhetoric of modernity, tradition is in a state of unspoken, of ellipse. As Mona 
Abaza puts it "the government has been trying to sell for the Western 'democratic' and free 
world an image of a civilized, 'enlightened' government, combating its 'dark' opponents" 
(Abaza, 2010: 32). The government does that to hide its Middle Ages practices. 
Tradition in itself is rather complex. It indicates both religious and non religious acts, 
both Islam and the local culture. There are lines, which overlap and also run in parallel with each 
other. When it comes to ruling the society the non religious part of tradition has been dominant 
throughout the history. Islam always played the role of ideology, justification, or the maker of a 
secondary reality. This situation resulted from the lack of a coherent approach towards 
sovereignty, state and state-making, on the one hand and on the other hand from the ambiguity 
towards the political in Islamic canonical texts. Therefore, the main pre-Islamic cleavage 
survived even after the birth of Islam, slipped through the Islamic resistance to it. 
One of the main concepts in this regard is Assabiya. According to the Oxford Dictionary 
of Islam "Assabiya is a social solidarity with an emphasis on group consciousness, cohesiveness, 
and unity. In the modem period, the term is analogous to solidarity''. According to Al-Jabri 
(2008), Assabiya is different from the tribe, since the tribe has a blood connection among its 
members, either real or illusionary. Assabiya is based on interest, feeling, survival, and locality. 
In the desert the basic element of society is Assabiya, because man as an individual cannot 
survive. Therefore, the conflict for survival is the conflict between the Assabiyyat (Arabic plural 
for Assabiya). 
Assabiya is regarded by Islam as a malady, "O people, we created you from the same 
male and female, and rendered you distinct peoples and tribes, that you may recognize one 
another" (Qur'an, 49: 13). As the verses stress the aim of differentiation is not to result in enmity. 
The only purpose is recognition, as equal, not inferior. This is especially the case in Meccian 
Koran: the verses, which were revealed to Muhammad in Mecca, before the hijra (migration) to 
Medinah and establishment of his authority (State). The problem also concerned Muhammad, 
Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq, reported from the Prophet who said: "Whosoever possesses in his heart 
Assabiya even to the extent of a mustard seed, God will raise him on the Day of Resurrection 
with the Jahiliyyah (age of ign.orance i.e. pre-Islam)." 
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Despite all that the Assabiya survived, Islam itself internalised it and took advantage from 
it through its reign. The genealogy of this phenomena traces back to the era of the second 
caliphate Omar. Assabiya as a form of grouping emerges as a result of social and psychological 
linkages among a distinctive group of people, for the purpose of assaulting the other or defending 
against assaults. If the cruelty of the desert necessitates that the individual has to gather together 
and establish the Assabiya, this social prototype underwent very little change throughout the 
history of the region. 
This reality of Assabiya, as a basic element of society, hinders the birth of the individual 
as an independent political actor. The birth of an independent individual was the basis of 
Western modernity. For instance in Hobbes's Leviathan (2002: 93) the component of the 
community is "man" as he states that 
nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be 
found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, 
yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so 
considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another 
may not pretend as well as he. 
It is apparent that Hobbes' concern is 'men' as individuals in relation to society. While for a 
prominent Arab sociological thinker Tun Khuldun it is the Assabiya not the individual that is the 
basic component of the society. 
The Assabiya is a form of identity. In society, which is based on Assabiya, there is no 
room for the modern style of identity like individual or nation. Nation in that sense denotes a 
larger group of people who are capable through imagination to imagine their-being as being a 
member of one community. Whereas, the member of Assabiya are known to each other and in 
most case they share a relationship. The Assabiya survives on invasion, attacking, and the spoil 
of war. Therefore, the connection between Assabiya and the other people resembles the colonial 
experience. With the arrival of modernity, the Assabiya, which secured power, with the help of 
technologies of transport and surveillance, of domination and repression, secured its survival 
against other Assabiya. For their own endurance the modem rulers were quick in implementing 
the methods of the modern style of power. When in Egypt Muhammad Ali Pashas became the 
ruler of the country, he hired an advisor into Cairo, who according to Mitchell: 
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[he] was _the friend and assistan~ of the English reformer Jeremy Bentham, who in turn 
was the mventor of the Panopbcon, the institution in which the use of coercion and 
co~-~ds to control populatio~ was replaced by the partitioning of space, the isolation 
of md1v1duals, and their systematic yet unseen surveillance (Mitchell, 1991: X). 
Modernity also changed radically the form of the army. However, the change was in limited 
form not to loyalty. The new army, as it was explained in an official Ottoman pamphlet: 
[ the new force] should not, like the rest of our forces, be composed of sellers of pastry, 
boatinen, fishermen, coffee-house keepers, baccals (greengrocer), and others who are 
engaged in the thirty-two trades, but of well disciplined men (Effendi, 1820: 234). 
The other fold of the ellipse, tradition, is Islam. Islam in regard to the FMS is an ideology on the 
one hand and a counter discourse on the other hand. Islam is the official religion of every single 
FMS countries. Every state has a special ministry for religious affairs. The wide network of 
mosques within the countries functions as an ideological state apparatus. Tradition is a main part 
in daily life practices. It shapes families, personal relationships, ethos, and morality. This 
tradition in most cases prepares the ground for the FMS to function. Tradition resists human 
rights, democracy, women rights, secularism, individualism, freedom of expression, liberty etc. 
Therefore, tradition and its agents- clerics and tribal leaders are the closest supporters of the 
State- fight on behalf of the state against modem forces. As Bassma Kodmani puts it the 
"conservative Islamic authorities that claim to be non political are more problematic and 
dangerous for social progress than legally recognized Islamic parties participating in the 
democratic process" (2005: 3). 
3.5 The Modern 
The concept of modernity and its diffusion to Middle East is the concern of the thesis. The 
concept of diffusion indicates that modernity migrated from a place to another one. What is 
modernity, in its birth place, how modernity travelled, and what it resulted in, are questions 
which require answers. As Hardt and Negri (2000: 74) put it: 
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Modernity is not a unitary concept but rather appears in at least two modes. The first 
mode is a radical revolutionary process. This modernity destroys its relations with the 
past and declares the immanence of the new paradigm of the world and life. 
This new emergence, according to Hardt and Negri, determined a counterrevolution: a 
cultural, philosophical, social, and political initiative that, since it could neither return to the past 
nor destroy the new forces, therefore, sought to dominate and expropriate the force of the 
emerging movements and dynamics. This is the second mode of modernity, constructed to wage 
war against the new forces and establish an overarching power to dominate them (2000: 74). 
The two forms of modernity remained in parallel throughout the modem history of the west. The 
first modernity is the modernity of the revolution; the second modernity is the capitalist 
modernity. This dualist nature of modernity has been visible and felt outside Europe also. If 
colonialism belongs to the counter-revolutionary modernity, anti-colonialism belongs to the 
revolutionary modernity. Thus what is branded as occidental modernity is a twofold modernity. 
When this modernity diffused to the Arab Middle East, initially it resulted in an awakening. The 
awakening had two directions, one toward past and the other toward future. One was directed 
toward tradition and the other one toward modernity. Therefore, the tradition that emerged in the 
region was the counter-product of modernity. Since the dominant modernity was the counter-
revolutionary modernity it "also began to realize the possibility and necessity of subordinating 
other populations to European domination" (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 77). The two counter-
revolutionary modernities, one occidental and the other Middle Eastern monopolized the scene. 
This made it possible for European modernity to ally with tribal and religious elite with little or 
no difficulties . It was a meeting of two elites to manage the situation. The state, as the complex 
body of domination and management of society and people, that emerged had no difficulty to 
take from occidental modernity elements to enhance its power and secure its survival. Similarly, 
since it was ruled by traditional elite, it never had intention to abandon tradition. 
What does modem denote i n the FMS phrase? Modem, for the modernist, and the 
activists who are inspired by the W estem version of modernity, is an aspiration to-come. 
However this has been, aimed at, planned for and desired in the last two centuries, despite that it 
is an event still to take place. It is set in the future. Modem is the status hoped to be reached in 
future. It also indicates that the future has to be modem. The crucial thing about modernity is that 
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it never reaches maturity. Or it is in reality never allowed to reach maturity. While modernity is 
the future for the Arab modernists, it is not so for Europeans. For the Europeans, the West-
modernity is history. It is already achieved. An event has already taken place. Despite the claim 
by some (Habermas, 1992) that the project of modernity can be redeemed, the post-modem or 
the departure from modem has already occurred. This emphasises the irredeemable chasm 
between the Arabs and the West and their being [Arabs] in a process ofnever being able to catch 
up. One can claim that modernity is for the Arabs at the same time actual and virtual: actual in 
the sense of technology and virtual in the sense of thinking and consciousness. Modernity is in a 
condition of multiplicities, each of which is composed of actual and virtual elements. Pure actual 
modernity does not exist. 
Since this part is concerned with the modem in the phrase ofFMS, it has no ambition to trace the 
genealogy of modernity in the West. It only focuses on modernity in the FMS. 
In his book, What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response, Bernard Lewis, 
(2002) dwells specifically on the concept of modernity and the historical circumstances that 
made the Middle Easterners, who at that time were ruled by the Ottoman empire, realise the 
necessity of borrowing modernity from the West: both its actual (material) and its virtual 
( cultural) aspects. 
In the first half of the eighteenth century, the struggle was indecisive, and even brought 
some gains for the Ottomans. In 1710 and 1711 they won a significant victory over the 
Russians who, by the Treaty of the Pruth ( 1711 ), were obliged to return the peninsula of 
Azov. But another war against Venice and then against Austria ended with another defeat 
and further territorial losses, specified in the Treaty of Passarowitz of 1718 (Lewis, 2002: 
20). 
According to Lewis the defeat of the Ottomans in the war against the Europeans, was an event 
the Ottomans were not used to. This was the main reason behind their realisation of modernity 
and subsequently made it an urgent process. It was a defensive modernity. The Ottomans from 
the beginning had drawn their legitimacy from holy war - gaza - on the frontiers of 
Christendom. The subjugated regions of Europe formed the richest, most populous and 
politically prised zones of the empire, and the theatre of the overwhelming majority of its 
military campaigns, as successive sultans set out for the House of War to enlarge the House of 
Islam. Toe Ottoman state was founded, as its most recent historian writes, on 'the ideal of 
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continuous warfare' (Anderson, 2008). The idea of gaza, which leads to fat 'h, which means 
opening, has its root in Islamic religion. It is regarded as jihad, duty, over Muslims to spread 
their religion over the earth, by every mean. This idea of perpetual warfare, which was 
legitimised by the religion, and those who died, in their path, were shahid martyrs, and rewarded 
by Allah in gana heaven, was utilised by the Ottomans as their source of income. Since 
expansion meant legitimacy and wealth the empire was always eager for expansion. 
Having said that, this does not indicate that the Empire had no, or did not recognises 
frontiers. In recent years in some conferences and meetings scholars have begun to discuss the 
existence of borders and frontiers. Documents recently discovered give evidence that a real 
border already existed at the end of the fifteenth century, at least in some regions of the Empire 
(Pia Pedan, 2002). There are concepts and words used by the Ottomans to describe the border in 
their documents. Words like snur, hdud, which is also used in other Middle Eastern languages, 
snur in Kurdish means border and hudud in Arabic means border, also a word like add which is 
driven from the Arabic word hadd which means limit, did exist. The existence of the concept of 
border might indicate that the Ottomans recognised the Other. The people who were beyond their 
realm of power, people who differed from them, but they did not regard them as equal. For them 
the people beyond their frontier were people, who should either be converted or subjected. This 
superiority feeling continued until the emergence of European modernity. Henceforth, the 
Ottoman defeats in war after war commenced. Defeat a fter defeat brought home a painful 
realisation, to a level that "it was no longer sufficient, as in the past, to adopt Western weapons. 
It was also necessary to adopt Western training, structures, and tactics for their effective use" 
(Lewis, 2002: 20). 
The issue was not technological per se. While "the Ottoman state and armed forces were 
as effective as they had ever been, in traditional terms" (Lewis, 200:20), they realised that being 
Muslim is not the source of victory as it was in the past; being Muslim in the similar way, after 
the advance of modernity in Europe, was instead a liability. This marked the commencement of 
the phenomena of borrowing modernity. Here lies the genesis of catching up, being like the 
other, the feeling of inferiority, despising oneself, renouncing one's own culture. are phenomena 
which hamper the emergence of modernity event at the present. 
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For the Arabs modernity marked "the end of a long sleep" (Atiyah, 1958: 73). Sleep differs from 
death. Being end itself; death has no end. Unlike the sleep, which no matter how long it lasts has 
an end, death is infinite. The end of sleep is waking up but the end of metaphorical sleep is 
awakening, an abruption, a realisation of a new world and ultimately a different realisation of the 
self. The metaphor of 'sleep' indicates that Arabs were not dead. They were present in the world, 
but without any communication, reflection and influence. Their sleep was long. They departed 
from the world's events for a long time. They were so in deep asleep, required a strong the 
external force, like Napoleon's army in 1789, to wake them up. This departure from the world 
signified among many other things; unawareness of progress, changes, innovation, therefore, the 
wakening up was rather an experience of shock and surprises. Since they were woken up by the 
Other, consequently they faced the Other. The Other was a force from modernity empowered by 
the superior knowledge and technology. The French who played the role of the Other, the one 
who were waking and disturbing, occupied Egypt between 1798-1801. They were the first 
colonial conqueror who endeavoured to bring the Enlightenment to the Orient. The invasion was 
justified exclusively by the assumed superiority of the W estem value system, "liberating" the 
Orient from the yoke of barbaric despots. Before this expedition, colonisation was rationalised 
by religious arguments; now reason, rationality, and scientific thought justified the conquest of 
an extra-European country. Thus when the Arabs woke up they did not only face an occupier, 
they faced a new system, a new rhetoric and a new paradigm. Consequent to this shocking 
realisation numerous questions emerged: questions evaluating the identity, who are we, which 
merely directed toward the past. Who are these people, and why are they so a dvanced in 
comparison to 'us' . For them Europeans and their culture, is the future that they were ambivalent 
how to reach it. 
3.6 The Modern in the FMS 
The word 'modem' in the FMS phrase signifies the ultimate achievement, the goal, the moment 
when the Arab Middle East and their states are on a par with the Europeans and the European 
states. But this modernity for the state and the state elites has arrived. It is there. What is not 
there is the reality of modernity. Reality is the social reality and real is the "inexorable abstract" 
(Zizek, 2009: 11). Modernity from the early days became part of the State. 
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Jeremy B~nth~ corresponded w~th local rulers in all these places, including the 
go_ve1:1or m Cairo, Muhammad Ah Pasha, advocating the introduction of the panoptic 
p~mc1~le and_ other new t~chni~ues. For many Europeans-military officers, Saint-
S1momst engmeers, educationalists, physicians and others-a place lik · t th c · · d ' e nme een -
century air~ p~o,1_1 ed the opportunity to help establish a modem state based on the new 
methods of d1sc1plmary power (Mitchill, 19991: X). 
Modernity arrived fast for the State and the State elite. They soon realised the principle of 
holding power. The ruling elites became familiar through their Western advisers; they made 
themselves familiar with how to use modem tools. The most notorious of these advisers were 
Gertrude Bell and Lawrence of Arabia. When the French dethroned the King Faisal, Bell 
persuaded the British to make him king of Iraq. With all his family in Mecca, the lonely Faisal, 
knowing virtually nothing about his new kingdom, took Bell as his most intimate adviser and ' 
some hailed her as the uncrowned Queen of Iraq. Bell in her diary, available online, expresses 
that in a quite clear way: 
Baghdad Aug 28, 1921 
My letters seem to behave in just the same curious way. Well, we've had a terrific week, 
but we've got our king crowned and Sir Percy and I agree that we are now half seas over. 
The remaining half is the Congress and the Organic Law. 
As she confesses to her parents, she and her colleagues had a 'terrific week'; as they crowned 
their 'our king' . The possessive pronoun 'our' indicates that the King belonged to them (the 
British). The King was crowned by them (the colonial) to be the King of the Iraqi people(s). The 
other thing that catches attention is the shortness of the time it took to crown the king. In a matter 
of week, a foreign person made the king of another country, whom the majority of the people did 
not welcome it. At the core of modernity is technology. Technology by definition "include both 
physical tool and organisational artifices such as bureaucracies" (Frankenfeld, 1992: 461). Thus 
technology and modernity are without essence. Human beings as agents give the essence of 
modernity and technology. When both modernity and technology become part of the State-
formation in its modem form, they are in danger of making people an obsolete figure within the 
state. 
Here the boundary between, whether the state is modernity or modernity is the state, is 
blurred. Technology provides mastery to man, mastery over nature, and also consequently over 
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fellow men. Consequently the state, as an organisation, as technology, slips from the human 
control. If this is correct for the European modem states and it is the essence of the Middle 
Eastern States. In his article; 'the Question Concerning Technology' Martm· H ·d 1 · , e1 egger exp ams 
how technology changes drastically the relationship of man to the nature: 
A tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals 
itsel_f as a coalmin~g district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field the peasant formerly 
cultivated and set m order [ bestellte] appears differently than it did when to set in order 
sti~l meant to take care of and to maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the 
soil of the field. In the sowing of grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of 
growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has 
come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [stellt] nature. It 
sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food 
industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield 
uranium, for example uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy (1993: 320). 
If nature is challenged through technology and as a result "comes under another kind of setting in 
order" so too was the human field, the society. 
A government ordinance of January 1830 confmed them to their native districts, and 
required them to seek a permit and papers of identification if they wished to travel 
outside. 'It was scarcely possible', we are told, 'for a fellah to pass from one village to 
another without a written passport.' The village was to be run like a barracks, its 
inhabitants placed under the surveillance of guards night and day and under the 
supervision of inspectors as they cultivated the land - and surrendered to the government 
warehouse its produce. 
No one before had thought to organise Egypt as one would barrack and discipline an 
army. The acts of confmement, regulation, and supervision of the population dawned 
suddenly. Wherever people looked, they were to be inspected, supervised, or instructed. 
If they left the village, it was generally under guard, forcibly drafted into the still harsher 
discipline of the corvee or the military the Camp - unless they were 'absconders' who 
abandoned their homes and fled, as tens of thousands began to do. If they were guards 
rather than those who were guarded, they still did not escape surveillance. Spies were 
placed at every point, and the hierarchy of supervision an~ in~pectio~ was to ascend. fr~m 
the field and the shop, through the levels of village, d1str1ct, regional and prov~c1al 
supervision, to the central Bureaux of Inspection (dawawin al-taftish) under the drrect 
supervision of the Governor (Mitchell, 1991: 34). 
From this early stage the divorce between the state and the nation occurred. The state and also 
the nation are historical phenomena, historical in the sense that they are not natural. The concept 
of the state predates the concept of nation. 
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The co_ncept of nation _in Europe developed on the terrain of the patrimonial and 
abs?lutist state. The patnm~nia! state was defined as the property of the monarch. In a 
variety _of analogous forms_ 1:11 different countries throughout Europe, the patrimonial and 
absolutist ~tate was ~e political form required to rule feudal social relations and relations 
of production (Negn & Hardt, 2000: 93). 
The nation was an ideological necessity for the modem secular state that emerged after the 
French revolution lacked a cement to unite the inhabitants within the territory. 
The concept of nation in these early years of the French Revolution was the first 
hypothesis of the construction of popular hegemony and the first conscious manifesto of 
a social class, but it was also the final declaration of a fully accomplished secular 
transformation, a coronation, a final seal. Never was the concept of nation so reactionary 
as when it presented itself as revolutionary (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 104). 
But the history of the event of the emergence of state and nation did not continued in a natural 
manner of diffusion of knowledge to the Middle East. Initially it was brought to the region by the 
Europeans and later on it was borrowed and mimicked by the locals themselves. Borrowing 
requires flexibility and pragmatism from the start. This is followed by willingness and an ability 
to adapt, to utilise talent and accept allegiance from many sources, and to make multiple appeals 
for support. In the nature of the relationships between East and West; between the owner of 
technology on the one hand and on the other hand the one who needs technology, as a 
precondition it demands openness to technological innovation, and being ready and willing to 
change. Above all borrowing indicates pragmatism and the non-ideological nature of the state. 
For the Ottomans the aim of the borrowing of institutions and technology was apparent, to 
continue to rule the empire. "Thus Ottoman society and Ottoman bureaucracy brought about 
institutional change in selective areas-for example, military technology and organization and 
public and private finance" (Pamuk, 2004: 226). 
Whereas, imposing modernity differs from borrowing modernity in many aspects. 
Imposing include the imposer and the imposed: the civilised and the savage. The civilised who 
realises his being civil in interacting, imposing, leading, teaching, the savage; who in return, 
comes face to face with his savageness through encountering the civil. The savage is not fully 
human, he is merely an object; an object to be avoided, to be tamed, to be overcome, to be 
civilised. As Balfour puts it clearly "we are in Egypt not merely for the sake of the Egyptians, 
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though we are there for their sake; we are there also for the sake of Europe at large" (Said, 2003 : 
34). 
In the case of imposing, the imposed up on has no right to speak for himself, to represent 
himself, to remain himself. (There is no need to mention herself). He will be reduced to a 
machine. In the space where modernity is imposed by a foreign power, Human beings are 
reduced to a machine. Like a machine they are treated as having no subjectivity or organising 
centre. They are nothing more than the connections and producers. They are under a constant 
process of deterritorialisation, or becoming other than themselves. 
Deleuze and Guattari "insist that the machine is not a metaphor and that life is literally a 
machine. An organism is a bounded whole with an identity and end. A mechanism is a closed 
machine with a specific function. "A machine, however, it is nothing more than its connections; 
it is not made by anything, is not for anything and has no closed identity" (Colebrook, 2002: 56). 
Accordingly, the inhabitants of the colonial space became the machine, their existence and their 
being only valued in relation to Western culture and Western modernity. As Pappe (2007: 3) 
explains in his comment on the theory of modernisation, "this definition [modernisation] takes 
for granted not only that local pre-modem past are irrelevant but also that, as long as they are not 
Westernised, the local themselves are not part of modem history". As Pappe explains further, the 
local "appear only as receptacles, passive human beings whose live are changed through the 
intervention of the external and dynamic powers saving them from stagnation" (2007: 3). 
This vision did not only lead to degrading and dehumanising the people, their past, their 
way of life, their history; it also reduced them to an obstacle which during the time of difficulties 
the power should not hesitate to remove them. For instance, when the British army's faced 
rebellion and resistance in Iraq in 1920 from the Kurds and the Arabs, Winston Churchill did not 
hesitate to sanction the use of chemical weapons against them. Churchill as a colonial secretary 
was sensitive to the cost of policing the Empire and was in consequence keen to exploit the 
potential of modem technology (Geoeff, 2004: 214) in reducing cost. This sensitivity toward 
economic cost led him to disregard the indigenous population as equal human beings. 
Accordingly, he did not hesitate to quell the resistance in an economical way. Churchill was 
particularly keen on chemical weapons, suggesting they be used "against recalcitrant Arabs as an 
experiment". He dismissed objections as "unreasonable". He justified the act by saying "I am 
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strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes - [to] spread a lively terror" 
(Jonathan Glance, (2003). This policy "beginning with the British idea of order the use of 
violence to suppress dissent, much of which took violent form itself, has been reproduced and 
elaborated on by central government in Baghdad since the foundation of the state" (Tripp, 2000: 
6). Commenting on that both Anderson and Stansfield (2004: 24) state "repressing the 
'uncivilised' Kurds through the liberal use of violence was to become something of national 
sport in Iraq over the next 80 years, but the Kurds have not been the only victims". This very 
policy of imposing modernity was seen from the eye of the imposer very differently 
If it is our business to govern, with or without gratitude, with or without the real and 
genuine memory of all the loss of which we have relieved the population and no vivid 
imagination of all the benefits which we have given to them; if that is our duty, how is it 
to be performed?" England exports "our very best to these countries." These selfless 
administrators do their work "amidst tens of thousands of persons belonging to a different 
creed, a different race, a different discipline, different conditions oflife (Said, 2003: 33). 
These are the premises which show how the process of modernity contributed in making the 
FMS. What can be concluded is that Modernity in its colonial form brought policies, techniques, 
systems, and concepts through which a new organisation was born. This new organisation was 
the State. 
3.7 The State 
The states or the territorial states which exist in the Arab Middle East today are a result of the 
colonial planning by the French and British. The Sykes-Picot Agreement on 16 May 1916 
declares 
That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab 
State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marke~ on the annexed 
map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (A) France, an_d m area (B) Great 
Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. 1:'hat m ar~a (AJ France, 
and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or for~1gn functionaries at the 
request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. That m the b!ue area ~r8!1ce, 
and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or mdirect 
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administration or c~ntrol as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab 
State or Confederat10n of Arab States (from BBC website). 
As Ayubi (1995: 86) rightly observed, the colonial powers were ''the most instrumental in 
drawing up boundaries in roughly their present form, in redirecting economic relations away 
from the Middle East and towards Europe ... in defining - often very artificially - the units that 
were to be singled out as distinct states". One could deduce from this the following premises: (a) 
the states are not a result of changes and progress within society; (b) The states are imposed from 
outside; ( c) The states are not established for administering towards local requirements; ( d) The 
main purpose behind the newly established states was economics (imperialism). These 
consequently marked the form of administration as Samir Amin explains "most of the colonial 
powers, sought to privatise the system of land ownership, and consequently, redistributed land 
among those who exhibited readiness to cooperate, mostly among tribal Sheikhs and urban 
notables" (Amin, 1978: 30). 
In order to fulfil this, a dvancement in two areas was need namely: technology and 
bureaucracy. These two sides indicate the material and management (organisation) side of 
modernity. From the technological side all related sectors necessary for promoting agricultural 
commercialisation were developed: railways and roads were built, irrigation networks were 
established or improved, and credit institutions emerged. On the bureaucratic side, some forms of 
parliamentary democracy were advanced, but the access to political life remained confined to a 
special stratum within society, tribal sheikhs, urban notables (in the Arab East mainly), and the 
aristocratic class (mainly in Egypt). 
While in addition to all these, the background, the history and the culture, of the state 
enterprise originated from two very different sources which shared considerable similarities. One 
is the Ottoman Empire the other is European colonialism. Both were alien to the native people. 
Neither was concerned with seeking legitimacy from the people. For the Ottomans people were 
an uncapped source of tax money without any services. For the Europeans the people were not 
considered as human beings with human rights. For the Europeans what was valuable were raw 
materials and latter on the market. For both the Ottomans and the Europeans, tradition and 
modernity establish the premise of the postcolonial State. This external genesis of the States in 
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the region makes externality one its main characteristics. The state was established by the 
external, for the external purpose, and remained aloof from the local. 
From this background the contemporary states elites in the region inherited externality 
from the population and an attitude that the state as combination of range of complex institutions 
is their property. Thus the first task of these new elite was to ensure their remaining in power. 
Therefore, they arranged the state machines in a particular structure that shapes the population 
and the wealth in a manner that serve their continuation in power. This particular arrangement 
required element from modernity, without implementation of modernity, simultaneously needed 
tradition with return to the traditional structure. 
The contrasts between the state agendas of Arab republics and monarchies are profound. 
The monarchs generally claim divine right to rule (some add tribal rights and descent 
from Muhammad's line as well). The presidents generally adopt Arab nationalism and 
socialism and propagate an image of modernity. However, the presidents are also keen to 
project an image of Islamic piety in order to take advantage of the Islamic injunction to 
obey the Muslim ruler (Elhadj, 2009: 61). 
Thus the state elite utilises the state apparatuses to perpetuate their position. Consequently the 
state structures shapes in a form that only designed to serve the elite. In other word the state is 
not neutral. This also indicates that this particular state structure cannot be run by other than the 
current ruling elite. 
3. 8 On the Tool 
The essence of the tool is interference between two or more domains in order to facilitate more 
effective action. The resulting action is always of one domain upon the other. Consequently tool, 
through its function, creates hierarchy, establishes domination, and gives all the power, force, 
violence, to one party (domain) over the other. Through mediation the tool establishes an 
unequal relationship between two entities tool is a medium; it simultaneously links and separates 
two different entities. Therefore, when two entities relate to each other through tool they are at 
same time unrelated. 
The use of tool is techne. In the Greek myths Techne is the gift of Prometheus. It is making 
something into something it is not. The action is accompanied by "conscious, wilful, violent, and 
productive" mind (Meagher, 1988: 159). Based on Aristotle's division of knowledge in the 
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'Nicomachean Ethics' the techne is unethical. According to him knowledge is divided into three 
categories: theoretical (episteme), productive (techne), and practical (phronesis). Works of art 
result from techne but ethics falls under the domain of phronesis, which is "a state of grasping 
the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about what is good or bad for a human being" 
quoted from (Haney, 1999: 32). In the PMS the state establishes a techne, in the other words 
productive unethical relation to the modem and traditional values. Consequently, the values 
tradition, costumes, laws, rights and principle become tools. 
The significance of linking State elites and the concept of tool lies in the ethos of their 
relationships. For Foucault (1982: 208) power is structured "in a way in which certain actions 
may structure the field of other possible actions". Accordingly, the tool relation establishes a 
field where practicing power over the whole society is possible. To relate in a tool manner is to 
relate in a non relational relation. This indicates when the PMS is in the tool relation with the 
people; consequently they are in non-relational relation. This is a form of abandonment by the 
state. Abandonment is a form of a relation. It is possible according to Agamben (1998: 28) in the 
'state of exception' ''the relation of exception is a relation of ban." To be banned by the state is to 
be in relation with the state. 
He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to 
it but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which 
life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable. It is literally not possible to 
say whether the one who has been banned is outside or inside the juridical order 
(Agamben, 1998: 28). 
The state of exception or emergency is official in Syria and Egypt. The rest of the countries 
qualify to be categorised as in states of emergency, especially when it comes to their relationship 
with the law or the constitution. The state of exception is "suspension of the entire existing 
juridical order" (Agamben, 2005) a state where the law is a tool in the hand of the sovereign. 
While the State applies the law to the population but the population does not enjoy comparable 
rights. The State has been exempted from the law. The result is a production of"refugeeness, and 
statelessness". 
Drawing on that, one cannot apprehend the Arab politics by referring to the legal system 
in the Arab countries highlighting the type of political regime, but by examining the 
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practices of the apparatuses of rule and bureaucracy on using governrnentality tools in 
order to divide their populations into categories that can be manage (Hanfi, 2008). 
One can trace the modem origin of the model of the tool relationship back to Machiavelli. 
In chapter XVID of his book the Prince (1979: 59) he says "it is unnecessary for a prince to have 
all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them". Thus, 
one of the dominant views of Machiavelli was "to see him [ the prince] as treating religion, and 
other values, functionally, as an instrument promoting desirable political behaviour" (Colisb, 
1999: 598). To make something a tool is to relate to it without possessing it. In this way the user 
of the tool eliminates the effect of the tool on him. The sole purpose of the tool is to have an 
effect on the others. In the course of talking about Ferdinand of Aragon, Machiavelli regarded 
him as ''the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but who in reality 
had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who, had he allowed himself to be influenced by 
such motives, would have been ruined" (1979: 73). To treat values as a tool is essential for 
survival. As Machiavelli affirms: 
And you have to understand this that a prince, especially a new one, cannot observe all 
those things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, in order to maintain the 
state, to act contrary to fidelity, friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is 
necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and 
variations of fortune force it (1979: 60). 
When one uses a certain value as a tool one manages to detach from it and use it in a rational, 
calculating way. This makes the value, of which a tool was made, have no value. This loss of 
value, frees the value from its restriction. The devalued value gains or bas potential to gain a 
different value, endless use, ultimately serving whatever purpose, through its use. The human, 
Western relation to tools, equipment, is a relation of use according to Heidegger. For him 
understanding is not a cognitive activity, instead, his emphasis is on know-how. Therefore the 
available "equipment" appears to a person primarily in terms of the possibilities that it can serve: 
"the available is discovered as such in its serviceability, its usability" (Kaufer, 2003: 84). 
The understanding and usability of the elites who have all the power and the possibility of using 
the tool and change the values of tools is self serving understanding. This is fully justified by the 
modem liberal understanding of rationality. This self serving, making a tool out of values, which 
ultimately results in a divorce between ethics and reason, is critiqued by Levinas. For him the 
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separation of ethics from politics results in a development of "The State of Caesar" which in the 
end 
separate~ humanity from its deliverance by developing without hindrance and reaching 
the plemtude ( or hypertrophy - natural, as it were) of the form it received from the 
Graeco-Roman world, t?e p~gan State, jealous of its sovereignty, the State in search of 
hegemony, the conquermg, unperialist, totalitarian, oppressive State attached to realist 
egoism (Levinas, 1994: 184). ' 
The FMS is in a relationship with both tradition and its components and modernity and its 
components in a tool or techne manner. This status of both tradition and modernity provides the 
State with all the opportunities it desires to control the population and guard its jealous 
sovereign. The tool relationship provides the regime in these States with no clear identity or no 
identity as such. This absence of identity makes the State a void that can claim different 
identities, without difficulty, under different circumstances. It offers the ruling elites freedom to 
use and manoeuvre among various different policies. The rationale behind the tool relationship is 
the politics of survival. Such politics are inherently paradoxical. In his attempt to explain the 
politics of modem Italy the Sicilian, Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, coined a memorable 
phrase: ("Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga come e, bisogna che tutto cambi! ") "If we want 
everything to stay as it is, everything has to change" (Rowland, 2009). 
In order for the system, the regime, the state, to remain as it is everything has to change. 
Through this the state resembles Allah, the divine that changes without being changed. This 
change is managed, watched, observed and directed in a particular direction. The state in its 
attempt to manage the survival is engaged in permanent movement in response to pressure, 
events, demands, needs, projects, policies, plans, and programmes. Therefore every process 
might be derailed for a different reason. In describing Jordan's commencement of the 
liberalisation process in late eighties Tahir al-Masri then Prime Minister ensured that the process 
was going to be very controlled: in his words reported by New York Times of October 26 1989 
"we will take it in small doses from the king" (Amawi, 1992: 28). The fact that the ultimate 
political power rests with the throne, and that it is willing and able to exert this power, has led 
many to perceive no real change in the political institutions and the balance of powers. As Layth 
Shubaylat, a popular independent Islamist member of parliament, notes, "this is a decorative and 
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superficial democracy which has not changed the rea11·ty of our si·tu 1· th th a 10n; e power centres at 
administer and run the country are still there" (Amawi, 1992: 28). 
This engagement in manoeuvring is the nature of the very game of survival. The game 
also confirms the tool relation idea. Projects, process and policies are commenced by the State at 
a certain time for a limited purpose and after achieving their short term goal, abruptly 
abandoned. In addition to capacity and power, the State has perfect know-how in the use of tools. 
This combination of know-how and unrestricted access or power and resources within the 
territory of the State, creates a situation where the State can, in most circumstances, in a trouble-
free way attach to and detach from the tools. In this game: times, momentum, the duration, are 
immensely important. 
The PMS is a State for itself. It has no political end apart from its continuation. This 
unique state purpose creates an atmosphere where modem tools and traditional tools have 
different roles and functions. As long as it remains this way the PMS can tolerate neither 
modernity nor tradition as independent forces in society. Thus, only after change in its purpose 
of can the PMS tolerate aspects of both tradition and modernity. This occurs only when modem 
and traditional tools lose their independence and become a supportive part of the system. This is 
done through the machine of the state. One could ask, what is the ultimate implication of the tool 
relationship? Through the tool relationship the State reduces both modernity and tradition into 
tools. As a result of this process, a situation emerges that hollows both modernity and tradition. 
The state would be the balance and the buffer between the two. In their current state of affairs 
both modernity and tradition are broken, unable to answer and deal with the problems on the 
ground. This makes the State the only viable force that has the power to change but changes in 
the State take place only if they enhance the status qua. The hollow modernity and hollow 
tradition play a vital role in making the PMS. Hence, neither of them can ever be set in motion, 
since that would mean moving away from being under state control, this makes any step toward 
modernity or tradition, seen by the State, as an attempt to destabilise the whole system. For this 
reason, any change or reenergising modernity in any sort or shape, whether it is through; 
democratisation secularisation or liberalisation the State resists it vehemently. 
' 
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3.9 The Prohibition of Society 
The form of society in the FMS, which clears the way through which the FMS can relate through 
both modem and traditional tools, is not society in the modem sense of the word. The concept of 
society indicates civil society. In Western political thinking this has a genesis in the Greek City 
State. The society is an imagined po/is. In Western political thinking longing for a lost 'original 
community' is a common tradition (Kellogg, 2005: 340). The po/is signifies a certain power 
structure which has implications for society, culture and the modes of order. It is an arrangement, 
where there is the possibility for one to be a citizen. "The society is a structure of unlike 
elements; where the total equality cannot come into consideration" (Simmel, 1911: 388). These 
'unlike elements' are sources of mobility, change and the basis for democracy. For Deleuze 
(1986: 2) society is "something that never stops slipping away". This indicates that society is 
made up of different groups wit h different interests. Therefore, its main characteristics a re 
multiple and constantly evolving. Each group for its self-interest establishes relationships with 
other groups, through this power emerges. For this to happen there must be freedom, respect and 
security. 
The FMS cannot tolerate such a structure. Any form of fluidity or mobility, outside the 
control of the FMS, if it is not managed by the State, is seen by the state as a source of potential 
danger to the existing power structures. Therefore, the population in the FMS has been derailed 
from becoming a society. Through utilisation of both modem and traditional tools the FMS 
transforms the population into the masses. These masses are run in a Camp style of 
administration: as it is explained in the following chapter in detail. 
In the FMS, there is no gap between the state and the population the State fully intervenes 
and shapes the population in a manner that serves its power structure. This makes the state the 
only holder or the cement as Durkheim puts it (DiCristina, & Gottschalk, 2008: 25) of the current 
shape of the population. For Durkheim, the cement is the collectively held belief and sentiment 
that resides at the core of social life. It is the beliefs that bind individuals into a society. 
Therefore when there is no accentuated society individuals are forced into being a mass, and this 
mass has to live the life of the Camp, this makes the current structure fragile and always at risk 
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of falling. The immediate consequence of the Saddam Hussain regime collapse in 2003 was the 
fall of so-called Iraqi society. This is similar to or possibly happens with the commencement of a 
democratisation process in these states. This imminent fall is postponed by the State and its 
apparatuses. Therefore, when the state collapses the current shape of the masses collapses 
immediately. This collapse or disseverment of the non-societal structure results in re-emergence 
of the pre-modem structure of togetherness namely tribe, sect, etc. 
Prior to the emergence of the FMS people in this area were not living in societal forms. 
After its emergence the FMS did not aspire to create a society. Like forced marriage, FMS 
created a form of forced living together. Furthermore the population never enjoyed the status of 
citizens. For instance when Iraq was created, the people of the country were not in a relationship 
with the state, the state viewed them as people with no allegiance, no sense of nationality or 
patriotic pride. As King Faisal I in 1933 observed "there is still no Iraqi people, but unimaginable 
mass of human beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal ... connected by no common tie, giving ear 
to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever" 
(Batatu,1978: 28). This clearly indicates that in the pre-FMS era there was no society and after 
the emergence of the FMS that reality remained the same. 
3.10 The FMS as a Void 
The FMS is neither modem nor traditional. It hollows both tradition and modernity. Being 
neither modem nor traditional and utilising both is only possible by being a void. When the state 
is described as a void it is a state which has a frame but nothing to hold it as permanent within 
that frame. Only through becoming a frame can the state claim both modem and traditional 
identities without being either. A void is where there are no clear rules and norms according to 
which politics is to be conducted. When tradition and modernity become tools, the state brings 
them together, amalgamates them, but does not establish from them a hybrid. The amalgamation 
of modem and tradition is not to produce a third space. However, both tradition and modernity 
might mix, within a space that is watched and limited by the State, but this mixture is for 
production of the void. In this situation both tradition and modernity are counterbalancing each 
other. 
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The void is permanent because the state resists the occurrence of any event. Nothing has 
to happen, because every occurrence might destabilise the situation. It might destabilise security 
and the meaning of the authority. For the State, the status quo has to be preserved. By avoiding 
any association, any meaning, and any identification the FMS gains a free hand in utilising 
tradition and modernity. When the State is a frame and that frame is filled according to the game 
of the balancing of power then the State becomes the ultimate barrier in front of any form of 
communication. Eliminating communication is the precondition for survival. 
In order to survive the state has to end every sign of communication. Communication 
might result in an event. The event and truth are related. According to Alan Badiou (2002), "a 
truth appears in its newness because an eventful supplement interrupts repetition". it is a moment 
of revelation of truth. When something occurs, an event happens, in other words, a disruption in 
the flow of the status quo, resulting in a break; through this break the truth is revealed. Thus, the 
ultimate aim of the void is to eliminate t he possibility of a break and ultimately stop the 
disclosure of truth. The revelation of truth is unbearable for the FMS regimes. 
The void is not natural. It needs to be made. The FMS is constantly organising occurrences that 
are not events and cannot become an event. In other words activities that do not reveal any truth. 
These occurrences happen through endless rituals. 
On an occasion Fahd [former King of Saud] telephoned the people building his Al Salem 
Palace in Jeddah to tell them of his wish to visit the site. In accordance with Islamic 
custom, sheep are butchered on these occasions, and 1000 sheep were slaughtered in 
anticipation of his arrival. Fahd did not show up, but telephoned to say that he would 
come the following day. The sheep-slaughtering exercise was repeated and again there 
was no Fahd. He made a promise to appear a third time, with the same result. Three 
thousand sheep had been slaughtered for nothing (Aburish, 2005: 59). 
Toe void implies total control over every activity, every internal movements. In terms of 
the State's relationships with the world, being void has an immense advantage. For the State, 
being a void and becoming a void through, shifting between modernity and tradition, resists 
being identified with either, is the key for holding power and being able to defuse and resist 
internal and the external pressures. The void provides the state with the capacity to resist or 
accommodate the external pressures. When there is for instance, a pressure for democratisation 
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from outside, the State has no difficulty in adopting democratic rhetoric and allows or loosens 
restriction on some civil society actors internally. The State is assured that these minor activities 
do not affect its nature. The void is permanent, any other forms are temporary and it is adopted 
for the sake of remaining void. The void refuses to be filled. This is maintained through a virtual 
civil war between modernity and tradition. The state has no difficulty in emphasising its modern 
or traditional side in order to build a defence mechanism. The FMS cannot be democratised. 
Democracy is a modem phenomenon whose full realisation will be a death certificate for the 
FMS. Democracy among other things emphasises legitimacy, transparency, and the transfer of 
power, the FMS is structured in a way to resist the implementation of these concepts. 
The void nature of the State can explain the easiness with which shifts in loyalty take 
place, especially in the area of international relations, from one pole to another. For instance 
when the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, the leaders of the FMS, who had once 
looked to Moscow for help and sponsorship, without any difficulty, in terms of ideology or 
belief, began seeking ways to put themselves in the good graces of the United States and the 
West (Ibrahim, 2007: 9). The clear evidence of the utilisation of tradition to counterbalance the 
pressure from modernity is when the leader of the FMS utilise the imminent danger of Islamic 
extremism. The slogan is "it is either us or Bin Laden (Ibrahim, 2007: 9)." The ''us" is the elite 
leaders of the FMS. This scenario is expressed vividly by Zakaria, when he describes the 
meeting between an American diplomat and Egyptian president, in his palace. 
Then the American gently raises the issue of human rights and suggests the 
Egypt's government might ease up on political dissent, allow more press 
freedoms, and stop jailing intellectuals. Mubarak tenses up and snaps. 'Ifl were to 
do what you ask, Islamic fundamentalist will take over Egypt. Is that what you 
want?' The conversation moves back to the latest twist in the peace process 
(Zakaria, 2003: 119). 
For Ibrahim (2007), this is nothing but a 'cynical trade-off. It is an attempt to narrow down 
people's choice to theocrats versus autocrats: theocrat being the extern and a failed part of 
tradition and autocrat being failed modem system of the FMS. While the state scaremongers the 
West with talk oflslamic radicalism, simultaneously it opposes political modernity. Ibrahim puts 
it: 
In Egypt, for example, the Mubarak regime tries to decimate all liberal altem~tives. At 
the beginning of this decade, I was imprisoned. In 2005, the Tomorrow Party s Ayman 
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Nour (who had_ finis~~d s~cond in the presid~ntial election that year) was sent to jail, 
whe~e as of th~s wntrng rn early 2007 he still languishes. And Talal Sadat, the late 
President Sad~t s nephew, has just received a one-year prison sentence. The younger 
Sadat had ~tee been elected to a parliamentary seat from which he criticized the 
Mubarak regtme '.1-°d the autocratic ~redicament in which Egypt frnds itself, and worked 
for a more genurne. democracy. His real offense was publicly challenging Mubarak's 
sc?~me to groom his _son as s~ccessor to the presidency. Talal Sadat was tried by a 
m1htary court from which there 1s no appeal, and taken immediately to prison (2007: 9). 
Despite being void, the FMS desires to become normal. Normal means apolitical. The policy to 
establish this is nothing but a repetition through time. 
Once leadership is firmly vested in the members of the family qualified to exercise royal 
authority in the dynasty, and once (royal authority) has been passed on by inheritance 
over many generations and through successive dynasties, the beginnings are forgotten, 
and the members of that family are clearly marked as leaders. It has become a firmly 
established article of faith that one must be subservient and submissive to them. People 
will fight with them on their behalf, as they would fight for the articles of faith (Tun 
Khaldun, 1967: 318). 
3.11 Conclusion 
This chapter explained what FMS as a concept indicates. It outlined what each word in the 
phrase means and explains it in the framework of the political, social and historical spheres. In 
contrast to all the other theories and methodological approaches to denote the Arab Middle 
Eastern states, the FMS approach is complex. This complexity is shown through the presence of 
both modem and traditional in the same sphere and the control of the masses by the State 
through these tools. The State makes tools out of both forces and through this toolification 
process and tool relation it manages to change both tradition and modernity into forces in 
contrast to their own nature. It reduces them, limits them, and frnally exploits them. Thus the 
realisation of traditional or modem political form is beyond possibility within the FMS. In the 
matrix of the FMS both tradition and modernity, while they might appear to be opposing each 
other, are separated by the state which acts as a buffer zone of to eliminate the possibility of 
establishing a dialectical relationship. In the absence of modem form of society as a modem 
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fonn of togetherness, there is a perpetual potential for a civil war. In fact there is an ongoing 
virtual civil war between the two forces, which fuelled by the state; directly and indirectly. The 
enmity between the two forces modernity and tradition, the state manages to divide society and 
play the balance of power game to ensure its survival. This division with the population hampers 
every kind of progress, any form of improvements, and any possibility for modernity. The State 
is unwilling to form a nation. FMS is a state against the birth of nation, as a collective form of 
identity within its border. Through its complex structure the theory offers an answer to the key 
questions regarding the area. If the idea of modernity rests upon rupture, the structure of the FMS 
theory shows why the state elites are reluctant to abandon tradition and embrace modernity. 
Through the formula of the FMS, these states have managed an elastic strategy of liberalisation 
(promoting modernity) on the one hand and on the other hand, (reiterating on tradition) to control 
their population and remain robust in their will and capacity to repress. 
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4
· The Camp: How the FMS Functions 
I enter restrooms with identity papers in my hands, 
I leave the coffee-bar looking right and left 
even the little bud looks right and left 
before it blooms 
Syrian poet Muhammad al-Maghut 
The puzzle that dominates the political study of the Middle East is why States, or authorities, 
despite their lack of legitimacy, unpopularity and their authoritarian structure, from traditional 
(Jordan) and conservative monarchies (the GCC countries) to secularist (Egypt, Iraq, and Syria), 
last so long. Why, despite the enormous pressure from inside and outside these sates are able to 
continue the status quo? The FMS theory approaches this issue from a different angle. This 
chapter attempts to answer the question of how the FMS functions. Dictators are long lasting in 
the Arab Middle East. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak has been in power for 28 years. The 
regime that he leads has ruled the country uninterrupted since 1952. "There is no evidence of an 
internal threat to that stability at present and, in particular, on all available evidence, no 
indication of a resurgence of violent Islamist extremism," according to the International Crisis 
Group (ICG, 2003 :3). Today the main debate in Egypt is whether Mubarak's son Jamal will 
succeed him in the Syrian fashion. When Hafez Assad died after three decades as president of 
the Republic of Syria, the constitution was amended swiftly to ensure the smooth passing of 
power to his son Bashar. When the leader of Iraq's largest Shite Muslim political party, the 
Islamic Supreme Council oflraq (ISCI), died in Tehran at the end of August 2009, the leadership 
of the party passed smoothly to his inexperienced young son Ammar al-Hakim. This is a 
common practice among the other countries in the region too. 
For Khouri (2009) this situation evokes "a major question that hangs over the Arab world 
like a ton of bricks". He raises the question: ''why do its top-heavy, non-democratic political 
control and governance systems persist without any significant popular opposition or public 
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challenge", in other words why do dictators in the region endure so long? In the first instance, 
one cannot blame the dictators for being dictators; similarly one cannot blame the dictators for 
holding power for so long. The question is how can they [the dictators] manage to hold on to 
power while being so unpopular. Why the Arab people who are suffering, in Khouri's word 
(2009), the abuse of power by: 
a self-contained ruling elite, the absence of meaningful political accountability, 
dominance of the power structure by security-military organs, prevalent corruption and 
financial abuse, mediocre economic management, enforced leadership-worshipping and 
personality cults, and strict social controls, especially on the young and women, are not 
rebelling? 
Is there a bargaining relationship between the regime and the people? Khuori's (2009) answer is: 
[The] angry or frustrated Arab men and women do not relate to their central government 
in the same way that Iranians do (or Turks). Indignant Iranians or Turks fed up with their 
government's' abuse of power demand a change in government behaviour, and use 
available means to bring about that change. Arabs in a similar situation seem to largely 
ignore their governments, and instead set up parallel structures in society that satisfy the 
same practical services and needs that governments in more coherent countries normally 
provide. Discontented citizens throughout the Arab world have channelled their energy 
into several arenas that coexist in parallel with the State. These include Islamist and other 
religious movements, tribal structures, non-governmental organizations, and the private 
sector to a lesser extent. 
(It is possible that the momentum of the events in the region infuriated Khouri. He wrote 
the piece during the last post-election-demonstration b y the Green movement, in Iran. The 
comparative sense is noticeable). 
While there is some truth in the answer that he provided to the question, it fails to provide 
a sufficient analysis, therefore the answer is incomplete. Why do Arab men and women not 
relate to their central government? It is apparent for every single resident of the Arab States that 
the State and its elites are the main holder of power and are responsible for all the shortcomings. 
The elites are the ultimate decision-makers. What is the reason behind the deliberate apathy 
toward their government? 
In reality the Arab people do not discounting their governments. They are rather avoiding 
them. Seeking a parallel entity with the State is a clear sign that the people want to divert their 
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anger and misery away from the State as a pragmatic solution, for a short-term gain, because the 
FMS does not tolerate people' s frustration. 
Another rather striking example of this phenomenon of staying away from the State is the 
condition of the situation itself. By not addressing the government and not holding it 
accountable, every other solution either fails from the beginning or it is nothing more than a 
short-term gain. While it is immensely difficult to answer the question as to why people do not 
rebel, it is rather more fruitful to ask the question: what are the techniques that are employed by 
the States, regimes or governments that eventually make individuals in the FMSs submit to 
illegitimate and repressive government? 
A corpus of Western literature is based on the formula that was established by Karl Marx 
namely "the absolutely desperate current State of affairs fills me with hope" (Deladurantaye 
2000:8). Accordingly the desperation of the situation is a preparing ground for a change or a 
revolution. This formula has been applied in various ways. For instance, the idea of an 
international embargo clearly epitomises this formula: when people are under harsh 
circumstances, they react and rebel against it. But history, especially the history of the region, 
proves otherwise. The desperation of the situation results rather than breaking down regimes, in 
people surrendering to the regime, in the emergence of a new sort of life. In a country like Egypt 
people are dying while queuing for bread, as reported by the Arabic newspaper in London alquds 
alarabi, (01/09/2009). But there is no sign of any hope in this desperation. One of the most 
sophisticated scholars in addressing this issue was Kanan Makiya. In Republic of Fear (1989) 
and later on Cruelty and Silence (1993) Makyia detailed the work of the system by telling the 
personal narratives of witnesses. 
Salim was about to sit down to dinner when the knock came. Toe two men did not come 
in or identify themselves. They confirmed Salim's identity and politely told him to 
accompany them for a few questions. His wife asked too loudly whether anything was 
wrong, what was the problem; they hadn't done anything, and so on. Salim reassured her 
as though he knew all about it; he stepped outside with the men, and gently pushed the 
door shut in her face. Salim remembered his hands turning clammy in the car, although it 
was not hot, and feeling his stomach had caved in on itself although he was no longer 
hungry. The car stopped at the local Amn headquarters (Makyia, 1989: 3). 
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In his second book Makiya focused on the silence of the intellectuals. To play around 
with both Makiya's concepts Cruelty and Silence, a question can be drafted. Can a regime 
silence the population through cruelty? Makiya did not address this question. The Arab 
intellectuals' silence toward the cruelty of their regimes was his subject matter. There is no 
doubt that cruelty plays a big role in silencing the population. But the cruelty or the fear alone is 
not sufficient. The Arab Middle Eastern regimes are engaged in a complex game to assure their 
survival. 
The model implied here is a Camp. The concept was coined by Giorgio Agamben in his 
book State of Exception (2005). The State, namely the FMS, transforms the masses or the 
population into Camp dwellers. In the Camp everyone is subject to the sovereign authority and 
has been reduced to being an inmate. The inmate is someone who is devoid of personal dignity 
and rights. In this reduced status, people are not legally or morally protected against 
mistreatment at the hands of the State. Since the Camp is only possible in the State of exception, 
the State, to prepare the ground for changing the masses into a Camp has to become exceptional. 
The exceptionality of the State is a precondition for the establishment of a Camp. The Camp is a 
relationship tool par excellence that is practiced by the FMS. It is a process whereby the whole 
masses of the population are transformed into an instrument, inmates. 
The making of the Camp, the transformation of the population from societal organisation into the 
Camp organisation, requires certain policies. The Camp is contrary to the idea of society. Since 
their inception Middle Eastern States have been engaged in making the Camp. The building of 
society, based on the idea of Greek polis, or building a city to accommodate citizens, was never 
an option. 
4.2 The external Factors 
The corps of literature that regards the external power as the ultimate grantor of the regimes in 
the region is vast. Holding the West, especially America, responsible for all calamities is 
common. "A common complaint is that the U.S. government has supported autocratic regimes" 
(Rubin, 2006: 55). 
This section attempts to integrate two different but related issues. First is the issue of the external 
f: · · d · · th FMS The second is how the FMS builds its relationships actor m creatmg an sustammg e · 
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with the outside world. There is no doubt that external factors play a b" 1 · · · · th 1g ro e m mamtammg e 
stability of the Middle Eastern regimes domestically. Y om et al argue that "international factors 
remain extremely relevant to autocratic regime stability in the post-Cold War Arab world. 
Whereas Western powers prioritized the promotion of democratic change in other regions at least 
rhetorically, in the Middle East they not only tolerated but actively buttressed authoritarian rule 
in numerous ways" (2008: 55). Yorn et al based their conclusion on Eva Bellin's (2004) article. 
In it Bellin concludes: 
Some conditions responsible for the robustness of this authoritarianism are exceptional to 
the Middle East and North Africa; others are not. Access to abundant rent distinguishes 
the region and subsidizes much of the cost of these overdeveloped coercive apparatuses. 
Multiple Western security concerns in the region guarantee continuous international 
support to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa even after the cold 
war. But the prevalence of patrimonialism in State structures and the low level of popular 
mobilization are not unique to the region. Together, these factors reinforce the coercive 
apparatus' capacity and prevent democratic reform (Bellin, 2004: 152). 
Y om returned in (2008) to the subject with an attempt to fill the theoretical gap "by furnishing a 
new theory of 'cliency' to delineate the causal linkages between international patronage and 
client regime durability". She found that: 
Long-term patronage from the external powers generates a perverse effect. On the one 
hand, it expands the client regime's autonomy from masses opposition within society by 
bolstering its political, fiscal, and military resources without exhausting its domestic 
productive base. Yet it ironically constricts the autocrat's autonomy from key support 
groups, such as business elites and political minorities, because their own fortunes 
become tied even more intricately with authoritarian continuity (Y om, 2008). 
There is no doubt that the external factor has significant impact on the maintenance and 
survival of the regimes. Yet the nature of the relationship between the States in the region and 
outside powers is constructed solely by the State sovereign. In other words it is the State and its 
structure that shape the type of relationship with the outside world. This is primarily based on the 
structure of the FMS. The FMS withholding both tradition and modernity in a failed status and 
utilises them as tools to maintain authority. This ethos of resisting the emergence of full 
modernity and full tradition plays a central role and shapes the relationships of these States with 
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the outside world. For instance when modernity structured by the State to be a mere tool and then 
when an external factor, whether a state or non-state factor pushes for more freedom, civil 
society and democracy, it is the State that resists the materialisation of these efforts. For instance 
Fareed Zakaria (2003) in his description of a meeting between the Egyptian president and an 
American diplomat, epitomise this fact. The setting is inside the Heliopolis, the neighbourhood 
of Cairo from which President Hosni Mubarak rules over Egypt. The palace is all a bad imitation 
of the imperial French style. And then the infamous dialogue about the choice between human 
rights and terror and the rhetorical question "Is that what you want?" (2003: 119). 
A close reading oft he event reveals how the FMS functions . Firstly, the place, as 
described 'bad imitation of French imperial style', discloses how the desire to live in a modem 
space, to feel the dwelling of a W estem style modem place, without being modem in practice, is 
an integrated part of the system. Secondly, the bad imitation is not only in the style of decoration 
it is an essential part of the making of the whole system. Mubarak likes to feel French in Egypt, 
to borrow modem art, technique, tools and ban modem freedom, democracy and rights. The 
conversation shows how the Egyptian president utilises tradition, to sustain his own personal 
power. The untold part of the story is, as Mubarak stops the Muslim Brotherhood from reaching 
power and establishing a clerical state, at the same time persecuting the liberals, the advocates of 
modem style of governing. This is the FMS in action. 
Moreover the case for the external fa ctor has been exaggerated. It is clear that the 
external factor alone is not sufficient to hold, protect and save these regimes. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that, if the local elites in the Arab Middle East were to democratise and 
liberalise their States, their effort would not face any considerable challenge from the West, 
especially in the post Cold War era. In post 11 September world there is a realisation, among the 
world super powers that the policy of supporting unpopular regimes is not as a fruitful policy as 
it was. In her speech at the American University in Cairo, US Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice, in June 2005 stated: 
For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of 
democracy in this region, here in the Middle East, and we achieved neither. Now we are 
taking a different course, we are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people. 
(Quoted from BBC News) 
1331 Sardar Aziz dissertation 
No matter how ironic the speech was it shows that America especially, and the West in 
general, will not oppose a democratic liberal State in the Middle East in principle. This is not 
disputing the wretched history of the region as a result of the external intervention and 
unflagging support of the authoritarian dictators. But the argument does not hold when the 
question is asked; why does the West support dictators? The West is pursuing its own interests. It 
is up to the sovereign States to negotiate with that egoistic interest. This suggests that there are 
local elites, with a particular local arrangement and power structure. These local elites to ensure 
the continuation of the present structures establish their relationships with the outside, in order to 
support their own particular form of governing. Therefore, the local ruling class establishes 
relationship in order to receive greater autonomy from the population and receive military and 
political support. In this situation outside factors are more advantageous. The ruling elites are 
unloved and undesired by the population; therefore their reliance on force and outside support 
becomes a matter of life and death. This State is on a life-support machine. The local ruling 
elites, who never had any sort of relationship with the population, and in most cases consider the 
people of their own country as the enemy and treat them on that basis, needs outsiders to protect 
them. Nevertheless the end of outside support does not indicate that these States are becoming 
modern, democratic or protectors of human rights. It could be argued that it is not the outside 
world that sustains these authorities. Saddam's regime was under total embargo for more than a 
decade but this did not result in the collapse of the regime. 
The concept of the Camp combines both the inside and outside factors. When the State is 
in the form of the FMS, it only survives when it organises the masses of the population into the 
form of the Camp. The Camp structure is not only related to the area of security but also to the 
economic, social and military. One of the main characteristics of the Camp is the reduction of the 
inmate to an absolute powerless being, and this is only possible when the regime or the FMS can 
rely on the support of outsiders. The Camp concept crystallizes that the external support without 
a robust internal mechanism cannot continue to survive. The reverse is also true: the internal 
structure without the external support cannot live. When the FMS is composed of both modernity 
and tradition, modernity can be regarded as the outsider and tradition as the insider. Modernity is 
army, arms, technology, governing, international relations, market, modes of transport, finance, 
global political structures; while tradition is family, tribe, sect, religion, loyalty, booty forms of 
economic, cultural ethos, and customs. 
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The FMS is structured in such a way that neither pressure nor cooperation from outside can 
change its structure; the recent history of the region is testament to that. 
4.3 Why the Camp? 
Why does the FMS make a Camp rather than a society? The society is a space where 
differences remain, negotiation occurs, exchange is the norm. What can the Camp provide to the 
structure and the maintenance of the State? The FMS functions on the utilisation of both 
modernity and tradition. It utilises them to survive and changing society into a Camp can 
contribute to this particular end. The Camp is both a structure and a method: the structure 
concerns the relationship between the State and the population, while the method concerns how 
both realms are run. As a structure and a method of governing the Camp is borrowed from 
modernity. It is, as Agamben claims, the 'nomos' (1998:108) of modernity. FMS model of the 
Camp is not necessarily similar but overlap in many ways with the modem the Camp. What 
happens when the entire mass of the population is run as a Camp? The Camp is a form of a 
structure that holds everything in a static and constant status. It is run by a power based at the 
centre and nothing changes without the approval of the central sovereign. It is the total control of 
the population. 
If the Camp is the space that is only open when the State of exception begins to become 
the rule, as Agamben (1998: 108) puts it, then accordingly the State that desires to be 
exceptional, beyond the law, by necessity has to run the population in the Camp format. The 
formula which emerges here is as follows: the population, which is structured in a form of the 
Camp, prepares the ground for the exceptional State and the exceptional State survives as long as 
the population is run as a Camp. The Camp is a place outside the juridical order. This does not 
indicate that no law applies to the realm. It is otherwise. As the AHDR (2004:127) puts it; "the 
absolute central powers in the hands of the executive which are not subject to normal legal 
restraints, which are supported by additional mechanisms that increase the centralization of 
power in the executive", are making the exceptionality possible. Here it is fair to ask, on what 
premises does the concept of the Camp rely? This particular inquiry is dealt with through more 
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than one line. First, the Arab States in general, apart from 'authoritarian State' are also described 
as the "black-hole State" (AHDR, 2004: 126). 
We can call this model [the Arab States] the "black-hole State", likening it to the 
astronomical phenomenon of extinguished stars which gather into a ball and are 
converted into giant magnetic fields from which even light cannot escape. The modem 
Arab State, in the political sense, runs close to this model, the executive apparatus 
resembling a "black hole" which converts its surrounding social environment into a 
setting in which nothing moves and from which nothing escapes. Like the astronomical 
black hole, this apparatus in tum forms into a tight ball around which the space is so 
constricted as to paralyze all movement. 
The 'black-hole model' clearly resembles the Camp, but suffers from a severe lack of 
political imagination. Unlike the Camp, the black-hole model cannot explain adequately, the 
structure of the State, the State-masses relationship, the machine of the State, and the economy. 
However, the concept of black hole, through the apocalyptic picture of the State masses 
relationships contributes positively to the illumination of the concept of the Camp. 
Another line which enhances the concept of the Camp is the attitude of the population 
toward their 'own' State. In a question regarding the best forms of government (during a survey 
conducted by the Centre of Strategic Studies University of Jordan) Jordanian public opinion was 
consistent with earlier responses which favoured democracy. The results showed that 81.0% of 
Jordanians believe that democracy is the best form of government with only 5.8% opposing this 
position. Meanwhile, an authoritarian system of government received large disapproval, with 
only 21.2% in support and 63.0% saying that this form of government would be "bad or very 
bad" for the government of the country (Braizat, 2007). 
Toe result of the survey can be applied to the other Arab States based on their 
similarities, as Burhan Ghalioun, (AHDR, 2004: 127) states that it is "possible to speak about a 
single unified, integrated Arab system for tyranny and control". The people favouring democracy 
over authoritarian system implies that the majority of the population are disenchanted with the 
current system. The concept of democracy also reveals that the people have a clear desire to be 
part of the governing machine and to have power over who is ruling them and ultimately become 
the final source of decision making and be sovereign. 
136 Sardar Aziz dissertation 
Moreover, favouring democracy and abhorring authoritarianism indicates that the 
majority of people dislike the current style of governing. From this it can be argued that the 
people are living within a geographical boundary and under a system which they do not approve 
of. This makes people live an unwanted life, in an unwanted manner under an unwanted system. 
These are all characteristics of Camp living. This feeling enhanced the attitude of the population 
toward the cause of the underdevelopment of their countries. In a survey conducted by the 
Centre of Strategic Studies University of Jordan) one of the questions asked was: 
Someyeople believ~ that the lack of development in the Arab World compared to other 
areas 1s the result of mternal or the external factors, what do you think is more important 
Internal factors 27 .1 
The external factors 22.8 
They are both of the same importance 40.0 
Don't know 10.1 
Similar surveys with similar questions resulted in similar answers in other countries such as 
Syria, Lebanon, and Kuwait. As becomes clear from the survey result, the sums of those who 
regard the internal factors as the cause of their underdevelopment exceed those who regard the 
external factors. This shows that people hold their own States as a primarily responsible for their 
political and economic situation. 
Combining this result with the previous results on the democracy survey, it becomes clear 
that both politically and economically people are in disagreement with their own government. 
These are all signs of the presence of a wide gulf between government and their population. In 
this very circumstance the State has to rely solely on force and violence rather than consent to 
sustain its power. This makes the State become the external entity and distant from the 
population. Then the State of exception is realised as normal and the Camp becomes the 
necessary feature. In this condition the sovereign no longer limits himself 
to deciding on the exception on the basis of recognizing a given factual situation ( danger 
to public safety) he now de facto produces the situation as a consequence of his decision 
on the exception. This is why in the the Camp the quaestio iuris is, if we look carefully, 
no longer strictly distinguishable from the quaestio Jacti, and in this sense every question 
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concerning the legality or illegality of what happened there sun· pl ak Th 
. . y m es no sense. e 
the Camp 1s a hybnd of law and fact in which the two t h b 
. . . . erms ave ecome 
md1stmgmshable (Agamben, 1998: 128) 
The Camp is an exceptional place. It emerges only in the State of exception. The Camp as 
a place and a phenomenon has its own distinctive history. According to Giorgio Agamben 
th~ historian debates whether the first appearance of the Camps ought to be identified 
with ~e the Campos de con~entraci~n that were created in 1896 by the Spaniards in 
Cuba m order to repress the msurrect1on of that colony's population, or rather with the 
concentration the Camps into which the English herded the Boers at the beginning of the 
twentieth century" (2000: 37). 
The Arabic words for the Camp are mukhaim, and ma 'askar. The mukhaim is a place where a 
khaima is in place. Khaima is the Arabic word for tent. Thus the the Camp indicates the place 
where the tents are being assembled. This has nomadic, militaristic and refugee connotations. 
This implies that, when one is living in the Camp, one is displaced. A person who is displaced is 
forced to leave his own original abode. This shows that the inhabitant of a Camp is one who is 
forced to abandon his place to relocate to another temporary place. Moreover this relocation 
occurred against one's will. Thus the Camp is a place where the inhabitants are there against 
their own will, and have no freedom to leave. As Makiya puts it "in the early 1970s, Baghdad 
was divided into security zones, the planning of which required citizens to sell their properties in 
certain areas at a price set by the government" (1989: 3). Accordingly, the State was forcing 
people, to leave, to live elsewhere, according to the State's desired policy. To maintain this 
situation force has to be present and be used continuously. The name Ma 'skar originated from 
askar, which indicates soldier. Thus ma 'askar is a military the Camp. Both names are new in the 
Arabic language. They are basically made up in response to Camp and the emergence of the 
military, which is essentially a modem phenomenon. Adding the Arabic meaning to the English 
word the Camp, the concept, indicates living unwillingly somewhere and having neither power 
nor choice to relocate. The militaristic connotation as a concept of the Camp highlights its 
structure: order, centrality, strict rule of law, uniformity, lack of freedom and absolute docility 
toward authority. 
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The Camp h as some distinctive features. Firstly, it is only possible in the State O f 
exception. Secondly, the Camp is always ruled by a dictator. Thirdly, the dwellers of the the 
Camp are not citizens but inmates. It is apparent that both the State of exception and dictatorship 
are inextricably linked. Thus the foundation of the Camp society is based on a dictator who 
hijacks the State and suspends the law to establish a totalitarian authority. So, there is a figure, in 
the centre. Around the figure there is a State, which functions as an apparatus to serve and 
protect the figure. Below the State there is a population (society), which has been changed into 
the Camp. The dwellers of the Camp have to love the leader, remember him perpetually, and 
never dream of opposing him or replacing him. The Camp has a constitution. It is written to 
regulate and assemble the Camp. For instance article eight in the Syrian constitution indicates 
that the "leading party in the society and the State is the Socialist Arab Baath Party. It leads a 
patriotic and progressive front seeking to unify the resources of the masses and place them at the 
service of the Arab nation's goals". When the society is the Camp, it is a landscape where the 
central figure and the State members, the sovereign can act with impunity. The State or the 
"political administration" as Mustafa Hijazi argues: 
[h]angs together on the basis of each level in the hierarchy of authority demeaning the 
one directly below with the object of keeping it in place. This results in a circumstances 
that the ''whole apparatus of State is united in regarding the citizen as an outsider placed 
at the very bottom of the heap. All personnel, from the lowliest clerk to the most exalted 
minister, treat every transaction performed as gratuitous generosity on their part. The 
notion of a public service, a merit system of promotions, or a citizen's inviolable right to 
something has always been absent. Instead, relations of conflict, diminution, and 
overlordship permeate all levels of the bureaucracy in its dealings with the public. Hence 
arises the tendency to grovel before authority, or to seek . a personal solution to 
problems-wasta [a mediator] as it is called in Iraq (Makiya, 1989: 36). 
The figure at the centre of the FMS is not a figure or a single individual. Despite having a 
single individual at the hub, it is always elite, rather a homogenous elite. The membership of this 
elite are generally related to each other in a traditional manner; family, tribe, sect. This 
traditional formation has been amalgamated with modernity and the result is a static form of 
identity. Among its main characteristics are: one is either a member or not, one has no freedom 
to leave the membership. The act of leaving is regarded as treason and generally punishable by 
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death; for instance in the case of Hussain Kamel Saddam's son m· l b h" · , - - aw, mem ers 1p 1s not open 
to any outsider. 
When it comes to the individual in the society of the Camp he or she, as Carl Schmitt puts it, "is 
merely a means to the essence, the State is what is most important" (Wolin (1990: 396). For 
Schmitt as Richard Wolin (1990: 396) put it: 
Law itself has no validity prior to the State. Instead, it must pass through "the State as a 
medium" in which it undergoes "a specific modification."' The State, in its extra-legal 
capacity as pure "executive authority," is deemed the ultimate arbiter over questions of 
"concrete indifference": it is the State that must in the last analysis decide. By 
subordinating the autonomy of the legal sphere to "reasons of State," Schmitt strips civil 
society of any independent, oppositional potential. 
In this situation politics assume primacy over legality. And the politics is the politics of survival. 
When elite forms a State, it is by necessity an exceptional State, i.e. a State of exception. When 
the State is a State of exception then the emergence of the Camp is imminent. According to 
Agamben (2000: 38) "the Camp opens up when the State of exception becomes the rule". The 
State of exception is where the law has been suspended. As Agamben emphasises "one cannot 
overestimate the importance of this constitutive nexus between the State of exception and 
concentration Camps". The State of exception is a form of State, which "appears as a legal form 
of what cannot have a legal form" (Agamben, 2005: 2). The only legality of the State of 
exception is that it has been legally permitted to be above the law. The State of exception does 
not signify the total absence of law. Here the law is suspended when it come to the State. 
Whereas, when it come to the public the law has been reinforced. This signifies, on the one hand, 
that the State has a total right to implement a harsh law on the people with impunity, whereas, on 
the other hand, the people have no legal rights to protect themselves from the State. 
The State of exception is not exclusive to Egypt and Syria (which are formally in a State 
of emergency); it can be argued that it is endemic in the region. This very situation resulted 
legally in "what Arab constitution grants, Arab law frequently curtails. And law renders legal, 
actual practice often violates, people are thus besieged in their own country (AHDR, 2005, III). 
For Agamben the Camp is a paradigm, though asking particular questions, helps him to deduce 
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the definition of Camp from the events that took place during the Second World War. For him 
the concept is rather 'juridicopolitical' (Agamben, 1998: 107) therefore Agamben asks questions 
like: "What is a Camp, what is its juridicopolitical structure, that such events could take place 
there? This will lead him ''to regard the the Camp not as a historical fact and an anomaly 
belonging to the past ( even if still verifiable) but in some way as the hidden matrix and nomos of 
the political space in which we are still living". For Agamben the Camp is a paradigm. As he 
himself puts it, in an interview, 'I work with paradigms' for him a paradigm is something like an 
example, an exemplar, and a historically singular phenomenon. 
As it was with the panopticon for Foucault, so is the Homo Sacer or the Muselmann or 
the State of exception for me. And then I use this paradigm to construct a large group of 
phenomena and in order to understand an historical structure, again analogous with 
Foucault, who developed his 'panopticism' from the panopticon (Ek, 2006: 372). 
Here the Camp is used as a concept and phenomena. The concept serves two main purposes: it 
names the structure and it serves as a key to decode it. The concept of the Camp is able to 
explain the structure of economy, governing, and general State society relationships in the FMS. 
4.4 The State of Exception and the FMS 
Syria, since 1963, and Egypt, since 1981, are formally in states of emergency. This exceptional 
situation granted presidents limitless power. The State of exception is a law, an emergency law 
to suspend all laws. Under this continuous State of emergency, this has been successively 
approved by successive parliaments: 
the authority' s gains far-reaching powers to arbitrarily and systematically curb human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the name of national security. Arbitrary arre~ts on the 
grounds of upholding "national security" or "public order", pro_longed detentions, far-
reaching media censorship, prohibition of strikes, demonstrat10ns and el~c~oral ~e 
Campaigns, the use of violence against people who ar~- peacefully exe~c1smg therr 
constitutional rights, and the referral of civilian cases to m1btary courts, ar~ JUSt a few of 
the far-reaching powers the authorities can exercise with impunity. Accordmg to Human 
Rights groups, the State [Egypt] holds at least 10,000 people detained without charge on 
the basis of the emergency law (Kausch, 2009: 13). 
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The Camp is where every human action has a different meaning. In such circumstances, for 
instance, a professional occupation is not a normal activity where one works, produces, and 
participates. It is a form of belonging and being accepted by the State. Occupation and 
employment are being enlisted by the State and offered to those who show their loyalty to the 
system and work, especially in government and the public sector area, to accept fully the State 
action. Work, in the FMS, is a way of silencing the individual. Thus the work, labour, is emptied 
from every form of human productivity. Through this the FMS dehumanises the human. It makes 
him or her feel powerless, unproductive, dependent, and above all, hollowed. Every worker is a 
virtual worker. The worker realises, and painfully feels that he or she is not necessary, does not 
contribute, and ultimately is not needed. This feeling of worthlessness translates to 
powerlessness. The message of the FMS is clear and tells every worker: show your presence to 
the State, make sure you are not involved in any other things, remain busy, don't produce 
anything, don't get bored, and (because boredom might lead to creativity and that is not 
permitted), do not engage in politics and earn your bread. 
In Survival in Auschwitz, Primo Levi narrates this vignette: "Driven by thirst, I eyed a 
fine icicle outside the window, within hand's reach. I opened the window and broke off 
the icicle, but at once a large, heavy guard prowling outside brutally snatched it away 
from me. 'Warum?' I asked in my poor German. 'Hier ist kein warum' [Here there is no 
why], he replied, pushing me inside with a shove" (Schweber, 2008: 156). 
In the FMS one is constantly watched by official police and plainclothes informers. In a country 
like Egypt there are "two million informers: one Egyptian in every 40" (Shatz, 2010). In FMS's 
the Camp one is watched, one is eavesdropped and one is not allowed to say warum, why? 
4.5 The Camp and the Opposition 
The Camp as a model of organisation and management ensures, above all, the State's centrality. 
This also indicates that political opposition to the state is banned, restricted or allowed but 
·th t Th tr· ht ban on the opposition is the most common case. But with the 
Wl OU power. e OU 1g 
pressure and the change in the global landscape of politics (end of the Cold War, democratic 
M
.ddl East) there are would-be signs of reforms. "Arab regimes 
waves, war on terror, new 1 e , 
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have been very good at providing the impression that reforms were being enacted" (Mathews, 
2009: 4). The absurdity is that they also have mastered the art of introducing reforms that have 
no effect. Why do the non-refonning refonns take place? The FMS paradigm denotes such an 
uncanny phenomenon. The refonn is judged by its outcome. When the outcome of a reform is 
not a change then the reform is just a game, a security game, to ensure and enhance State power. 
In contrast, when the outcome of a refonn is a change in the situation then the reform is real. An 
ineffective reform is common and necessary for the continuation of the FMS. Through the 
creation of the Camp the dominant mode in the FMS is stagnation. Such an atmosphere is hard to 
maintain. For the State to maintain and renew its dominance there have to be 'events' . Through 
these events the State wears new masks, utters new discourse, and creates an impression that 
something is happening, it re-engages people, and refreshes memories. But above all through 
these events the State renews itself and enhances its power. For instance now Bahrain has an 
elected parliament. This is a new establishment. But this parliament is only partially elected. This 
is done to bring in the Shia representatives of the country through their political party Al Wefaq 
National Islamic Society. Through this the Bahraini State elite, who marginalised the majority of 
the Shia population throughout their history, now gives face, voice and representation to this 
population, but without much effect. The parliament, or as it is called nuab, is designed in a 
manner that even if the opposition won every electable seat they would still not have a dominant 
position in the parliament. 
Through the Camp structure the State has no difficulty in embracing international treaties 
and adorning their constitutions with clauses that enjoin respect for life, human rights, justice, 
equality before the law, and the right to a fair trial. It is only a gesture to mask the true face of the 
State. Because of utilising both modernity and tradition the FMS has no difficulty to curb the 
opposition. If the Camp signifies (among many other things) a total controlled sphere then 
managing the opposition within this sphere, to the degree of total ineffectiveness, is the custom. 
To achieve this goal the ruling elites either crush the organisation or execute their members. The 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, an off-shoot of its larger Egyptian counterpart, has been banned in 
Syria since 1958, and according to a 1980 law [Emergency Law 49], known membership in the 
group is punishable by execution (Telhami, 2001 :120). Another method of crippling the 
opposition is through direct interference by the ruling elite in the structure of opposition groups. 
Through this the authority determines who is allowed and not allowed to participate in the formal 
1431 Sardar Aziz dissertation 
I II 
11 
I 
political arena. This is done through official law or unwritten legi"sl 1· Th" affi a 10n. 1s system ects, not 
only the relationships between opponents and the State but also th 1 ti· h" b 
, e re a ons 1ps etween 
various opposition groups. 
This wide gap between appearance and reality is a hallmark of the FMS. It is crystallised 
in the Arab Human Development Report (2009: 53): 
... weak institutional curbs on State power; a fragile and fragmented civil society; 
dysfunctional elected assemblies, both national and local; and disproportionately 
powerful security apparatuses often combine to turn the State into a menace to human 
security, rather than its chief supporter. 
This shows how the State ruling elite, in order to enhance and maintain their reign, are utilising 
the different aspects of modernity. 
Both modernity and tradition are effectively employed in creating an atmosphere of the 
impossibility of opposing. The question around the change in the leadership in the FMS is not 
focused on any form of power transformation. The question concerns succession. This is equally 
so in republican Egypt and the Saudi Kingdom. Stressing succession signifies that the current 
power holder has no intention of leaving the crown. This indicates that neither people nor the 
oppositions ever have an opportunity to accede to power. Traditional aspect that is utilised to 
sustain this situation is around the role of the leader. This differs from a kingdom to a republic. 
But the difference is rather trivial. In the republic the identity of the successor is unknown or it is 
known but never definite. Whereas, in the royal systems the issue of succession less ambiguous. 
When the successor is not known and the system does not allow any person to claim such 
a position then the population remains without gaudiness or leadership beyond the candidate of 
the State elite. The FMS knows very well that the population can only be mobilised from a head 
with a clear leadership. The culture that never permits any form of autonomy or individuality 
finds it difficult, if not impossible, to organise itself. Even in the case of the emergence of a 
particular personality the Failed Modem Sate, through its powerful media, creates a fearful 
image of him. 
Both Drysdale (1985) and Lisa Anderson (2001) reflected on the succession in Syria. 
Anderson (1987: 219) observes "that al-Asad carefully prevented the development of 
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independent powerful competitors" she concludes wrongly, "and in doing so cleared the field for 
the mediocre and the ruthless". The picture she paints that there are engineered elections which 
president stands and competes with mediocre and the ruthless. Clearly that is not the case in 
Syria. Despite being a republic the leadership remains in the (right member) family. When a 
wrong family candidates (wrong person or at a wrong time) emerges, the state media, with the 
permission of the leader, eclipse their chance. This was the case of alAsad brother Rifaat in 
Syria. When the system, through the Eighth Regional Congress of the Baath party, confirmed 
Rifaat's eclipse, then the criticism commenced. 
Initially, the delegates were reluctant to criticize him, fearing it would be unsafe to do so, 
but as they gained confidence, criticism of Rifaat became very vocal and charged. Hafiz 
would not allow his brother to defend himself and interceded only to calm some of the 
critics. Reportedly, television cameras studiously avoided showing Rifaat, who according 
to one source was completely isolated. Significantly, although Rifaat was re-elected to 
the Regional Command, three of his supporters were not: Ahmad Diab, a Sunni who was 
in charge of the crucial National Security Office, Nasir al-Nasir, the Sunni Minister of 
Interior, and Ilyas al-Lati, a Christian. The places of the late Iskandar Iskandar, former 
Minister of Information, and Mahmud al-Ayyubi, who is suffering from a terminal 
illness, were also filled. Nevertheless, the Congress did not resolve the succession 
question once and for all. In all likelihood, President Hafiz al-Asad will not explicitly 
single out anyone as his heir apparent. Now that he is apparently well, he has no reason to 
(and many reasons not to). Rather, he will leave himself as much flexibility as possible 
(Drysdale, 1985: 257). 
The whole scenario of moving the presidency of a republic smoothly from the father to the son in 
a Kim II Sung style is portrayed and conceptualised by the Egyptian activist Saaddin Ibrahim 
during an interview with Alan Johnson (the interview was conducted in 2006 and published in 
2007 in the journal Democratiya): 
On the day of my arrest [by Egyptian authority] I had published an article in Al-Majalla, 
a London-based magazine distributed across the Arab world. Let me tell you how that 
article came about. An Arab satellite station, Orbit, asked me to be an expert 
commentator during the funeral of the Syrian President, Hafez al-Ass_ad, on !une _ 13 
2000. The funeral was a protracted affair lasting several hours an~! was hve on arr ~mg 
questions from callers. Two or three questions concerned the pohtical fu~e of Syria ~d 
who would succeed Assad. I began to develop an ad hoe theory about pohtical succession 
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in non-democratic regimes. I pointed out that it was easy to predict the future as we could 
see on our screens that Bashar al-Assad, the oldest surviving son of the deceased 
President, was meeting all the dignitaries quite as if he was already Head of State. A 
caller asked how the son could succeed the father without holding a formal position. I 
said 'Oh, I am sure the Ba'ath party will get together and fix that.' Another caller pointed 
out that his age, 34, would debar him. I said 'Well, even the constitution too can be fixed. 
They will lower the age-limit from 40 to 30' (as it turned out they lowered it by 
constitutional amendment from 40 to 34 - they were not even subtle!) One caller 
wondered if we were seeing a precedent being set in the Arab world, and asked where 
else this kind of familial succession might take place. I mentioned Iraq, Yemen and Libya 
(Johnson, 2007: 156). 
The event exemplifies how modernity and tradition are utilised by the FMS to fix a suitable form 
of power arrangement. The utilisation of modernity and tradition was also done during the death 
of Jordanian King Hussain, when he was kept alive artificially using modern life support 
machines, in order to arrange for his son Abdulla, not his brother Hassan, to succeed the crown 
(Heakel, 1999: 114). Since having a successor signifies ones limits, not appointing a successor is 
an act by the sovereign to portray his limitless and timeless reign. This act of divine imitation of 
autocracy is more common in the republic States. 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, as reported by APS Diplomatic Recorder July 11 
2006 states "there is no need to appoint a vice-president". Therefore it is not surprising that 
.. .if any form of "freedom" has been expanded in Egypt, meanwhile, it has been the 
freedom of the presidency from the informal constraints that earlier limited its authority. 
Over the past two decades, Mubarak has acquired substantial liberty to have his 
opponents convicted in military trials, for example, or to shut down newspapers and 
professional syndicates, or to jail human rights activists (Brownlee, 2002: 6). 
This divine form of autocracy is haunted by the image of Allah. The leaders in the region are 
obsessed with imitating ultimate power divine. The source of this imagination is the structure of 
the Islamic ruler and the Islamic theological understanding of Allah. As Hourani, (1981:3) put it 
the Islamic ideas of a ruler is a person who has absolute power, "standing apart from the society 
· d t h" h1"ghest self' While Islamic theology he rules, responsible only to Go or o 1s own · 
distinguishes and, at the same time, it joins together, redemption and creation, 'imperative' (amr) 
and 'creation' (khalq). 
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The Middle Eastern leaders, whether monarchs or presidents, understand the practice of 
power as being in a position to have divine power; for instance, to create through utterance. It is 
common practice that people visit the majlis (the place of sitting) and recite poetry before the 
king and the king fulfils their wishes. This autocracy imagines its power, like divine, to be 
neither divided nor limited. This divine absolutism is only possible for the sovereign through the 
utilisation of the rest of population. Therefore, only through the externality of the State and the 
Camp formation is the realisation of such a kind of authority possible. The outcome of these 
combinations gives rise to the following type of situation 
In Egypt the ruler is regarded as a God until he falls . He is above criticism, until he 
departs. He is the history and geography [of Egypt] until he is replaced by someone else. 
He always fancies Egypt as his private property, his hamlet or his larger village. He is the 
State and the fatherland. Loyalty to the fatherland is synonymous with loyalty to his 
regime, and to him personally .. . He regards any criticism of Egypt as criticism of him 
personally and, hence, an unforgivable treason (Naijar, 2008: 117). 
This being god is only possible through the utilisation of modernity and tradition. Another 
faction that the FMS produces and utilises are the intellectuals. If the intellectuals are the opinion 
makers, or the brain of the nation, then the State, according to David Hume cannot do without 
them. 
Nothing appears more surpnsmg to those, who consider human affairs with a 
philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and 
the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to 
those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall 
fmd, that, as FORCE is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to 
support them but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and 
this maxim extends to the most despotic and military governments, as well as to the most 
free and most popular (Hume, 1987: 32). 
The State in general, including the FMS, is founded on opinion. The intellectuals play a 
considerable role in this regard. This function spells out the relationship of the State to the 
intelligentsia. If the sociology of the intellectuals debates whether this group are a new class, or a 
class-in-themselves or primarily class-bounded (Charles Kurzman and Lynn Owens, 2002: 63), 
in the FMS the debate is focused around the State. Thus intellectuals are strictly divided into two 
categories, those who servie the State and those who oppose and criticise it. 
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In this regard the FMS is similar to a communist system in the manner it deals with 
intellectuals. For both Marx and Engels philosophy was something to be left aside. For them 
one ha~ to leap out_ of it and devote oneself like an ordinary man to the study of actuality, 
for which there exists also an enormous amount of literary material, unknown, of course, 
to the philosophers. Philosophy and the study of the actual world have the same relation 
to one another as onanism and sexual love (1970: 103). 
Enhancing that in 1922, Lenin stated that "the intellectuals, the lackeys of capital, who think 
they're the brains of the nation. In fact, they're not its brains, they're its shit" ( quoted in Slavoj 
Zizek, 2003). There is a striking similarity between the two comments. By employing the 
language of sex and dirt both Marx and Lenin show their abhorrence of free thinking. What is 
being abhorred here is the freedom. To think freely is to not belong religiously to any form of 
institution. This State of not belonging, not devoting, not serving is unacceptable to them. In a 
similar fashion the FMS does not allow any form of free thinking. In the FMS the intellectuals 
are mostly manufactured by the State. They are apologetic to the State, their main duty is 
praising, exaggerating the character of the leader, hiding the reality, and inventing Orwellian 
forms of 'new speaks'. This was the theme of Kanan Makiya's Cruelty and Silence: War, 
Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (1996). For him, cruelty in Iraq, and elsewhere in the 
Arab world, thrives on a flawed culture and is perpetuated by the collective silence of Arab and 
'pro-Arab' intellectuals. 
Arab intellectuals in the FMS are a State apparatus for domination. This apparatus is 
embodied in bodies such as the ministries of culture, education, heritage, and media. The forms 
that are used to justify these acts are Arab nationalism, Islamism, and turath, tradition. By using 
the notion of pan-Arab nationalism, Arab intellectuals engaged directly and indirectly in 
covering up and justifying the acts of the FMSs' leaders. Kanan Makya gives the example of 
Hisham Djaiet. In answer to a question about how he could justify the annexation of Kuwait, 
Djaiet replied: 
I need not remind you, Europeans that your nations were born out of wars. In annexing 
Kuwait, Saddam Hussein has entered into the dynamics of histo?'. . . ·. :Ie w~s 
undertaking the beginning of the unification of the Arab world. Sometunes leg1tunacy 1s 
more important than legality .... War has the merit of clarifying things. With respect to 
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you~ co~tradictions and with respect to ours. We have everything to gain from this 
clarification. We have nothing to lose from this war, even if it ended in defeat. Because 
thanks to Saddam Hussein, it is taking place on the level of realities--oil, military force, 
etc.--and no longer on the level of symbols (Makiya, 1995: 90). 
Only such language, such flimsy arguments, is permitted in the FMS. For the State the 
intellectual has to manufacture opinions, justify crime, and give language to the most silent form 
of the State. Therefore, the Arab State intellectual is a talking machine talks according to the 
need and the mood of the sovereign. They are a human form of robot. "The Camp is an 
unthinkable realm shrouded in silence" (Robert-Jan van Pelt, 1994; 80), there is no argument, no 
free space, no exchange, therefore no intellectuals. It is not necessarily that the intellectual has to 
be independent. There is no doubt about his or her critical faculties . The Camp has no space for 
critics. The Camp is a silent, eventless place. What is happening is the ritual, regular and 
repetitive events that function, in a religious manner, as a permanent remembrance. One is not 
allowed to forget, to depart, to have free time and space from the State. The real event is hidden. 
If the event is a moment of becoming, of a rupture with continuity, then it has the hazard of 
provoking thinking. Therefore, nothing is an event apart from a State event. This silence 
provides the road to the extemality of the state. 
The link or the relationship between the State and the society is axiomatic. Thus labelling 
a State as external is rather anomalous. Almost all the definitions of the State stress this link 
between the government and the people. The modem State has more complex and 
comprehensive relationships with the people. As a result of modernity, "a large group of 
individuals within a defined territory: [became] subject to one supreme authority: this group 
became the people (Sorensen: 2004:11). When the State became the supreme authority, and 
obtained the "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" in the 
W eberian sense then the State overcome all the other layers of power over individuals and 
' 
became the only centralised power within a territory, managing the society's affair. 
The relationship between the State and its people is established in more than one way: 
economic, rational, symbolic, or out of necessity. But what organises the relationship more than 
yth. 1 · ·t· h ' The concept of citizenship frames the link on legal, political, and an mg e se 1s c1 1zens 1p. 
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identity levels. The legal aspect of citizenship requires a working constitution as a prerequisite. 
The political aspect requires freedom as a basis, without which there won't be any room for 
becoming a political agent. The people's identification with the institution is crucial for the 
legitimacy of the State. 
The constitution as a document provides the frame for the relationship between the State 
and the citizens. Thus if the State is not constitutionally based citizenship is non-existent. But 
citizenship can be otherwise. In his study of Soviet citizenship Golfo Alexopoulos explains: 
In the first decades of Bolshevik power .... fears of anti-Soviet elements and other 
dangerous enemies produced various waves of political repression in which all citizens 
became vulnerable to severe restrictions on their citizenship rights and even exclusion 
from the Soviet polity. At different times and for different reasons, certain groups were 
targeted more than others, but all Soviet citizens could be subject to accusations of 
political disloyalty or deviance. The sanctions corresponding to such charges would bear 
directly on their citizenship status. . . . . Soviet citizenship policy was not principally 
guided by economic considerations or concerns about population size, labor shortages, or 
immigration. Rather, political factors proved central. Citizens were to be molded into 
active and enthusiastic supporters of State goals while deviant individuals and groups 
became targets of denaturalization or were stripped of their citizenship rights on various 
charges, real and imagined (2006: 489). 
In a similar fashion in the FMS, citizenship, as an aspect of modernity, instead of becoming a 
formula to organise the polity becomes a tool in the hands of the government. Thus, the State has 
two strict categories of citizenship; first for those who are "active and enthusiastic supporters of 
State"; second are those "deviant individuals and groups". The former is considered as a citizen 
while the latter in most cases are stripped of rights and become targets of denaturalisation. 
The question is: how does the State become the external through the process of 
denaturalisation? In order to answer the question one has to dwell on questions like; why is the 
extemality one of the distinctive characters of the FMS? In this regard what is meant by the 
concept of the external is crucial. The external is not abandoning the sphere of the society by the 
State and residing beyond. The extemality means the lack of any channel of communication 
between citizens and the State. This indicates that the State is unapproachable. There is an 
b 1 1 k f · t' b tween people and the State In other words, the State is rather a a so ute ac o commumca 10n e 
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regime. As Burhan Ghalioun (2004: 127) puts it "they [the Arab elites] communicate in no way 
whatsoever with their citizenries". This means the State has a presence O th h" h , r ra er a 1g presence, 
within the public sphere but, despite this presence; these apparatuses are the external to the 
population. They are the external because they do not engage in communication. They do not 
build relationships. Walls, arms, wire, and security apparatus separate the State from society. The 
metaphor of the black hole that is used to describe the State in the Arab world can be interpreted 
as the State having the capacity to 'disappear' the individual forever. The externality of the State 
is one of the characteristic of the exceptional State. An exceptional State is a State that is in a 
State of emergency. 
This condition grants the government the power to suspend the operation of some 
constitutional and legal provisions pertaining to human rights, and this is in conformity 
with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, a number of 
these rights-such as the freedom of belief, the prohibition of torture, and non-
retrospective application of the law must continue to be respected. A State of emergency 
is also assumed to be temporary and imposed only in the face of a danger that threatens 
the independence of the State, its territorial integrity, or the regular functioning of 
constitutional institutions. Nevertheless, a number of Arab governments have resorted to 
declaring long States of emergency without clear reasons (AHDR, 2009: 61 ). 
This separation and isolation of the State from the people offers the State a position of 
superiority: to hold back and be servile, to distinguish between friend and enemy. According to a 
Human Rights Watch report (2007: 9) Egypt "uses a policy of preventive investigation and 
detention whereby they aggressively carry out surveillance of independent mosques, maintain 
extensive lists of persons who regularly attend them, and record their activities and associations 
with each other". When the State is external to the population it means that the State has a 
freehand in penetrating society, without acknowledging any restrictions. This intervention, 
penetration, and harassments happens to a degree, for instance in a country like Syria, as 
described by Human Rights Watch (2007) leaving "no room to breathe". The State within its 
fortress, coldly and crudely, observes society. When the population has no access to the State, 
when there is no transparency, then society tends to distrust, to distance, and to live in a State of 
fear. For them the State is an unknown entity. It is covered with fog. This absolute lack of 
knowledge by society about the State translates itself into absolute lack of power and influence 
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over the State. Only through knowledge can one understand an entity. The lack of knowledge 
means the lack of understanding, thus the lack of influence. 
"When the consequences of an action affect the stability of the homeland", says the Syrian 
president Bashar al Asad (2001) 
.. . there are two possibilities: either the perpetrator is a foreign agent acting on behalf of 
an outside power, or else he is a simple person acting unintentionally. But in both cases a 
service is being done to the country's enemies, and consequently both are dealt with in a 
similar fashion, irrespective of their intentions or motives. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 360) "the State is sovereignty". In the FMS, 
the sovereign is the State and the State is the sovereign. The two are intertwined to the degree of 
hybridity. The State is reflecting the mood, the desire, the dream of the sovereign. It is correct to 
say that the State, the whole State, becomes a part, an organ of the body of the sovereign. In this 
case, as Estienne de La Boetie puts it, "it is hard to believe there is any such thing as politics 
when everything is in the hands of one man" (1988: 37). Since the mode and the structure of the 
State has been imagined and established by the master, there is no room for the emergence of 
polis or society. Therefore the homeland and the sovereign are intimate; the territory becomes 
part of the sovereign body. This could be called the politics of the body. Therefore, in FMS 
talking about the health of the president is a matter of national security and it is a punishable act. 
Nothing can function without the permission of the sovereign. Thus it becomes apparent that any 
action that affects the stability of the homeland directly affects the stability of the sovereign and 
vice versa. Therefore, anyone who is engaged in such act is ''the perpetrator", he must be either a 
mercenary for an outside force, in another word engaging in act of treason, or a fool; carrying out 
an "unintentional act". In both cases the perpetrator is not regarded as a person with a genuine 
political agenda but his attempt has been depoliticised, which immediately translates to politics 
of anti-politics. Al Asad reassures the multitudes of his country that they should not engage in 
any act that upsets the State. They should not show any dissatisfaction toward the State. They 
should not attempt in any fashion, whatsoever, to collect knowledge about the State, to engage in 
any act of criticism. According to him, those who dare to do so are crossing the red line. They 
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are either being pushed by outside forces or a fool. To live, to survive, one has to remain silent, 
distant, and docile. 
The externality of the State is a policy to make the State distant and mysterious. When 
the State is the external then the society has no mean to be informed about it. Knowledge is at the 
heart of the matter. While the State has every means and grants itself, in the name of security, the 
right to collect detailed information about society, on the other hand society has to live in total 
darkness about the State and its apparatuses, apart from the official State propaganda. If the State 
is the sovereignty and the 'sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of internalising' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 360) then, in the FMS, the society is internalised but the State, as 
internaliser, remains the external. This happens through redefining the space, military zone and 
prohibited zone, security belt etc. The reorganisation of space, whether is it urban space, rural 
space or wild place, is a modem act of managing the space for the sake of control. The State as 
the external plans the space and remains external to it. The zoning internalises communities and 
gives the opportunity for the State to remain the external. This is done through headquarters, 
military barracks, secret agents, etc. 
It is not only the space that is managed by the State. Time is also managed in a similar 
fashion. Curfews are common in the FMS. Such an act is boldly and harshly visible in areas 
where people of different ethnic and minority backgrounds are living. Minorities and differences 
are present in every single county in the Middle East. In Iraq: Kurds, Shi'a and Christians, in 
Egypt: Cupts (Christians), and radical Islamic groups, in Syria: Kurds, Allawi, Christians, and 
Druz, in Jordan: Palestinians, in Saudi Arabia: Shi'a, and others, in Bahrain: Shi' a, in Kuwait 
Bdon and Shi'a. The minority in the hierarchy of the Camp are at the bottom. They are stripped 
of all the basic rights. They are naked in front of the authority. 
To question the rationale behind the extemality is to question the power relations. Why 
does the State want to be the external? Is there a power relation between the State and society in 
the FMS? For Foucault, power relationships 
.. . can only be articulated on the basis of two elements which are each indispensable if it is 
really to be a power relationship: that 'the other' be thoroughly recognized and maintained 
to the very end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole 
field ofresponses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up (1982: 220). 
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When there is no communication, there is no power relationship. In this regard, how can a 
relationship be described or understood when the two parts, namely the State and the society 
(people) are related but not communicating with each other? Deducing from Arendt (1969) the 
FMS is the least powerful form of government. Therefore, the FMS for its survival depends 
"solely upon coercion and multiple security services" (Ghalioun (2004: 127). As a result the 
State and society are in a kind of war with each other "the State is against the nation" (Ghalioun 
(2004: 127). 
The externality of the State indicates that the State has a monopoly without being apart. 
Thus it is not permitted for any other groups or organisations in society to be external. In other 
words, neutrality within the space of the FMS is prohibited. Thus bodies like intellectuals, civil 
society and independent media are basically either dysfunctional or banned. In the absence of 
such associations, the State dominates socio-economic and private affairs, intensifying the State's 
authoritarian tendencies. 
The externality is leaving no gap between the State and the society. The State is directly 
linked to the people but this linking does not allow people to relate to the State. It is a one-way 
relationship. According to Simmel (1996: 66) "the human being is the connecting creature who 
must always separate and cannot connect without separating". Thus, when there is no gap, there 
is no connection. Like the panopticon the external State desires to be a passive observer and to 
have power to see every aspect of society without being seen, until the moment of action. 
The external is residing in a space without communicating and not willing to listen to the 
inhabitants of the space, refusing to build any bridge, no relationship of care. This separation 
between the State and the population is a process of drawing borders, dividing the space, and 
consequently distinguishing the State and its apparatuses from non-State. This clear partition 
makes the State visible and appears powerful in the eyes of the population. The externality 
means presence without communication. This privilege grants the State a clear idea on who is a 
friend and who is an enemy. 
How is externality possible for the State? The FMS has barriers with its subjects: actual 
and virtual, such as walls, wire nets and also fear. The FMS re lies on both tradition and 
modernity to make the externality possible. When in Syria the top State leaders are from the 
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Allawite sect it gives the State an identity and purity in a traditional manner. It distinguishes 
between who is entitled to have a natural (divine) right to lead the country and who is not. This 
traditional cleavage makes it clear for the non-Allawaite what their limit are and to not look at 
the top positions in the State. That was the case during the reign of Saddam in Iraq. It is the same 
in the rest of the countries in the region. 
How is modernity contributing to this the extemality? It is clear that a minority cannot 
hold power over the majority without extensive access to modem techniques. Technology, ideas, 
notions, and concepts have been borrowed from modem Europe to enhance the dominance of the 
elites. In Syria, the government, by withdrawing citizenship rights from the Kurds, citizenship 
being a modem concept, automatically remove any entitlements and any right of participation. In 
Kuwait the Bdon (without) people are banned from citizenship rights and have no entitlement to 
work, education, and residence. It is the same for the Shi'a and Ismailis in Najran region in Saudi 
Arabia. Modernity contributes in the form of identity-making, media, technology, surveillance, 
international relation etc. 
4.6 The Camp Economy 
The Camp is structured to limit the activity of its inhabitants. Since it is a "nomos of the modem" 
(Agamben 1998: 171) it borrows many structures from modernity. It is highly hierarchical, 
centralised and controlled. It also runs according to a plan, it is monitored and under constant 
surveillance. It curtails freedom in every way. As part of its nature the Camp has a centre and 
does not allow any other force to emerge within the Camp to compete with the central force. 
Thus, the central power is omnipotent, and totalitarian, but without ideology. It controls every 
sector of the life and utilises it for the survival and continuity of the regime. One sector that plays 
a significant role in this regard is the economy. When a form of economy is described as the 
Camp economy it is neither a state socialist economy nor a market economy. If the main 
.. . features of the State socialist economies are absence of autono~ous econ~mic unit~. 
The government is the major coordinator of the economy, havmg extens1~e . pu~hc 
· d 1 t control over the issue of money and the d1str1button ownership of resources an comp e e 
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of investment and the formation of prices. Government direction largely determined 
levels of employment, wages and the d1' · · b tw · · 
(Lane, 2008). 
v1s1on e een personal and collective spendmg 
Thus there is no doubt that the Camp economy shares many general features with the State 
socialist economy model. In a similar fashion in the FMS which organizes its economy on the 
model of the Camp, 'the government is the major coordinator of the economy'. The State also 
has an extensive or practically full ownership of (natural) resources. But the Arab States do not 
control the small bourgeoisie sector in their economy. As Mehran Kamrava (2002: 43) puts it: 
These States [Middle Eastern States] face diminished capacities in their efforts to regulate 
the economic activities of the petite bourgeoisie and some medium-sized enterprises 
(SME). At best, the State can only partially enforce its regulative agendas on the 
activities of these economic actors, resulting in the emergence of the economic 
phenomenon of "semi-formality": those economic activities that are only partially or 
episodically regulated by the State. 
The exemption of 'the petite bourgeoisie and some medium-sized enterprises' from the control 
of the State is the main diverging point of the Camp economy from the State socialist economy. 
This economic independence is tolerated by the State according to the logic of the Camp. Their 
economic activity is limited and their "relative economic autonomy from the State does not 
necessarily translate into overt political activism". As Kamrava (2002: 43) indicates "semi-
formal economic actors are among the groups least likely to engage in open political activities 
directed against the State". 
While it is crystal clear that the economy in the FMS is not in any form or shape a 
capitalist economy, the State has a monopoly and the market is a sphere for political activity. 
Many governments have allowed speculation to take place as a means of redistributing 
rent accrued to government to their client base of 'loyal' followers. In the Arabian 
Peninsula, various governments have allowed the development of speculation in. real 
estate as a means of buying loyalties. Land would be granted to loyal followers either 
freely or at real low nominal prices and the latter would resell the land at above market 
prices either to governments who would need the land for various infrastructural projects 
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or to other members of the private sector for their own developmental purposes. The 
s~e would ~ppl~ to manipulations in Arab stock markets leading more often than not to 
maJor financial disasters. The laxity of government controls over financial transactions 
and the lack of prudential guidelines have allowed speculators, usually close to centres of 
power, to amass vast fortunes without effort. Rent or 'booty' is pretty much ingrained in 
the local culture (Hafez, 2009: 467). 
The Camp economy is controlled and run by a limited number of people. It is an arena for 
buying loyalty and exemplifying that the only way to accumulate wealth is by being loyal to the 
regime. This is not only in the Gulf Arab States but also in other regions such as the Levant. 
The Syrian economy is controlled by a few powerful families. These clans have access to 
major orders, monopolies, lucrative licenses and are not, therefore, interested in reforms. 
Moreover, State patronage has proved a reliable way of safeguarding power. As long as 
the upper class retains its privileges, it will support the regime (Keller, 2006). 
In the FMS the economy is the strongest tool in the hands of the political elites to ensure 
their lasting in power. This is achievable because economic resources are natural resources or 
handouts from abroad. This premise indicates that the economy is structured according to the 
requirements of political survival. Thus, the formula that emerged in regard to the economy is 
like this: how to use the economy to empower the elites and control the population. Therefore, 
in the FMS "legitimacy has not been based on taxation and representation" (Fundy, 1994: 44). In 
most of the States in the region people are not taxed. The absence of taxation is the absence of a 
relationship between State and people. It signifies the independence of the State from the 
population. This is possible "either because they have oil resources (the Gulf States) or because 
they depend exclusively on a foreign patron (the former Soviet Union and later the United States, 
in the case of Egypt)" (Fundy, 1994: 45). This economic system sidelines the people and reduces 
them to an unproductive population. 
This method of an illiberal-controlled economy is widespread among Muslim countries 
and as a result, they "generate only six per cent of the world's wealth, while accounting for 
nearly 22 per cent of its population" (Allawi, 2009:207). If a process like "democratization is 
inextricably linked to the sources of funds for the State" (Fundy, 1994), then the population has 
not any particular methods to pressure the State into making concessions to the people. 
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When the people are not a source of income for the State, this indicates that the State is 
independent, but for the State to survive it relies on the whole population to be dependent on the 
State. This asymmetrical relationship effects negatively the position of the population in the eyes 
of the State, i.e. the State elites. This dependency has been interpreted by the followers of the 
'Rentier State' hypothesis as the major impediment in democratisation. Accordingly, the 
"governments use their oil revenues to relieve social pressures that might otherwise lead to 
demands for greater accountability (Ross, 2001: 332). 
This is what might be called a 
... taxation effect, when governments derive sufficient revenues from the sale of oil, they 
are likely to tax their populations less heavily or not at all, and the public in turn will be 
less likely to demand accountability from--and representation in--their government (Ross, 
2001: 332). 
This conclusion is based on a rationale, that there is an agreement between the State and the 
society. This agreement called "authoritarian bargain" which is a contract "between ruling elites 
and citizens whereby citizens relinquish political freedom in exchange for economic security" 
(Desai et al, 2006: 2). 
This interpretation is wholly based on the W estem view or logic. It is a rational choice 
theory. It implies that individuals in those communities are rationally calculating and they choose 
what maximises their interest. In this case for individuals to be silent in the face of the regime 
and adhere to the system is more beneficial than resisting to it, whereas, a close examination of 
the situation disputes such an approach totally. The Rentier is not a social contract. There is not 
any form of written or unwritten agreement, between the people and the State. These conclusions 
are based on a different path, different people and different logic. It is the result of work of some 
Middle East scholars who have looked for similar correlations between variations in tax levels 
and variations in the demand for political accountability in European history. As Waterbury 
argues that 
... neither historically nor in the twentieth century is there much evidence [in the Middle 
East] that taxation has evoked demands that governments account for their use of tax 
monies. Predatory taxation has produced revolts, especially in the countryside, but there 
has been no translation of tax burden into pressures for democratization (Waterbury 
1994: 29). 
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The economic situation in the FMS, the economics of the Camp, might have some overlaps with 
the public finance school of economics. 
Pure public finance proceeds in an institutional vacuum. The government is a benevolent 
dictator and will implement best policy. Citizens are depicted as passive and this follows 
naturally from the assumption of a benevolent dictator. The dictator will not be 
influenced by interest groups or the opportunity of personal gain, so citizens presumably 
see no case for becoming politically active. The policy expert is triumphant as they 
inform the benevolent dictator of the best means to provide for efficiency, redistribution 
and macroeconomic stability (McLean et al 2008: 62). 
The Camp economy also overlaps in areas like 'regarding the government' as a 'dictator' 
but differs in the nature of the dictator, which in the case of the public policy school is 
'benevolent' whereas in the case of the FMS is brutal. Another asymmetrical area is the belief 
that the dictator 'will not be influenced by interest groups or the opportunity of personal gain' 
and 'will implement best policy'; the difference in this circumstance is that while the government 
is the 'sole policy implementer', it applies the 'best policy,' not in the interest of the people, but 
rather in the interest of the regime and the ruling elites. 
In the public policy school and the Camp economy, the 'citizens [inmates] are depicted as 
passive' . The public policy school concludes that the 'citizens presumably see no case for 
becoming politically active', but in the Camp economy the citizens see no opportunity for 
becoming politically active. The last parallel and contrast, in the public policy school ' the policy 
expert is triumphant as they inform the benevolent dictator of the best means to provide for 
efficiency, redistribution and macroeconomic stability'. In the case of the Camp economy ' the 
policy experts' are advising the ruling elite not of the 'best means to provide for efficiency, 
redistribution and macroeconomic stability', but rather for the best means for survival. The 
experts in FMSs are concerned, in a pure Machiavellian manner, with the way the prince 
maintains his reign. Because the FMS is an established structure it can manoeuvre in times of 
crisis and pressure and lean toward modem or traditional, depending on the nature of the 
pressure, without risking the whole system. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
The Camp as a modem structure organises people, names them, identifies them, arranges them 
hierarchically, strips them of their rights and above all silences them. Toe Camp is the model of 
an extreme centralist State. This central is the external. The extemality provides access for the 
FMS to utilise both modernity and tradition simultaneously, to use them separately, in 
combination, and sometimes against each other, and above all without being either. The FMS is 
in a failure relationship with both tradition and modernity. This indicates that the FMS is holding 
both tradition and modernity in a static position. It won't allow any progress, any moving 
forward, any changes. 
More importantly it obstructs any attempt by both modernity and tradition to get closer to 
each other, to establish a link, to engage in a dialogue. Through this the FMS makes sure that 
both tradition and modernity remains no more than apparatuses. Therefore, holding both tradition 
and modernity in a state of failure the FMS guarantees its security and its survival. 
The full emergence of tradition, thus establishing a State according to Islamic codes, 
would mean the removal of the current State. Similarly, the emergence of a State in line with 
modernity would mean that the State has to return sovereignty to people, respect human rights, 
and implement democracy. Thus full modernity, as full tradition, translates into a toppling of the 
current State. Therefore, both traditional forces and pro-modem forces are engaged in the same 
enterprise, namely regime change. 
This particular characteristic is crucial for establishing the security of the State and the 
sovereign. The sovereign, the body of the State, is mobile between the two polls without ever 
residing or identifying with either. This flow, between the two opposite polls, depends on the 
events. The events (crisis, internal challenges, and external war) that face the State determine 
which of the two polls is dominant. But the State can never dispose of either of the two polls 
entirely. It is security that swings the pendulum. Security, according to Foucault (2007) is neither 
law nor discipline. Security for the FMS is merely managing the events in order to enhance the 
capturing of the power of the State. 
In both Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari, argue that the State 
functions as an apparatus of capture. Extemality puts the State in the right position to manage 
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events and direct it toward the security of the sovereign. The Camp is the only space that allows 
this happen and is the only method that makes this possible. 
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6.1 The Military and the State: the Military as an example of d ·ty · ki mo erm m ma ng the 
FMS. 
'The good military [man] is the good Baathist', a famous Baathist slogan 
Modernity is a complex phenomenon. It includes many different and contradictory components. 
The FMS is itself a product of modernity. It is a form of the Westphalian state. This form of state 
was manufactured by the European colonial power and was later on given the mission of 
modernising society. The essential point here is that the State borrowed modernity, initiated it 
and attempted to implement it. This point is significant. The State is not a neutral entity in the 
Middle East. The State is possessed by the State elite. When modernity is the State modernity, it 
is utilised to enhance and ensure the State elite's position. 
In most cases the FMS is not an ethnically neutral state. Usually it belongs to a particular 
ethnic, sect or religious group generally the State elite cleavage, are minorities in number. In 
order to rule the State has to actively to peruse the policy of silencing and marginalising the 
differences. This puts the state in a permanent state of virtual civil war. Therefore, it is rather 
obvious that the borrowed modernity would not end up being a general social change. 
Consequently the borrowed modernity ends up being a tool in the hands of the FMS. To fulfil 
this endeavour the FMS borrows the technical modernity and resists the intellectual part of it. 
As the FMS diagram shows modernity is one of the two legs of the FMS. The FMS fails 
to be modem but nevertheless is a state. This state is on the edge of failing. In order to prevent 
this it has to rely on violence and force. The military is the most organised form of violence in 
the hands of the State. 
This chapter argues that, in the Middle East, the nature of the State shapes the nature of 
modernity. The military, its structure, its relationship with the State, and its aim are all elements 
of modernity. the Military is an important aspect of modernity and the FMS utilises this aspect of 
modernity, makes the military in the FMS, resembles a modem military in many ways, but 
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different in functions and relationships with the State In the FMS th ·1· · · · • e m1 1tary 1s utilised as a 
mercenary force. 
6.2 The State-Military Relationship 
The Arab state-military relationship remains to be an un-thought area, "despite the wealth of 
studies on Arab regimes and the many assessments of their military capabilities, there is a dearth 
of analysis of political-military relations in the Middle East' (Brooks, 1998: 10). The civil-
military relationship in the FMS is not conventional. It evades many existing frameworks of 
state-military relationships and conceptual understanding. This relationship is difficult to put in 
any of the conventional typologies. For Mehran Kamrava (2000: 68) in general, State control 
over the armed forces in the Middle East can be divided into: 
those found in inclusionary states, in which the regular military's political aspirations are 
kept in check and are neutralized by a highly ideological, largely volunteer militia (Iran, 
Iraq, and Libya); those in exclusionary states, in which once-ideological officers are still 
in power but have now civilianized themselves and much of the machinery of the State, 
having in the process become largely nonideological, civilian autocrats (Algeria, Egypt, 
Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen); and finally, those in monarchies, either whose small 
geographic and demographic size compels them to rely on foreign mercenaries (Bahrain, 
Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]), or which rely on one or more loyal 
tribal contingents to counterbalance the influence and potential autonomy of the regular 
military (Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia). 
This categorisation might partially inform us about the nature of the military with regard to the 
idea of professionalization but ultimately it fails to decode the complex state-military 
relationships. A founding problem of the FMS is that neither the State nor the military has fully 
matured. Therefore, it is hard, if not impossible, to talk about state-military relationships in a 
conventional way. In the FMS the full formation of both the military and the State is impossible. 
The military in the Arab Middle East resides in a rather unusual location. It is both alienated 
from society and mistrusted by the State. 
The military is ideally seen as an organised force to protect the territory of the country 
from foreign aggressors. The Arab militaries were, at best, ineffective, in this regard, in almost 
all the wars they engaged in, for instance; the 1967 Arab Israeli war and in both Gulf Wars 
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showed quite dismal performances. For Reiter and Stam (2002) this is primarily due to the lack 
of democracy fo r Kenneth M. Pollack, (2002) it is a mixture of tactical and state-military 
relationships. 
Noticeably, what is missing in the literature is the question of the purpose and the 
rationale of the Arab military in the eyes of the State. Moreover, the question touches the State 
society relationship, and how the military is deployed in this regard. There is no doubt that the 
State-military relationship in the Arab Middle East is complex. The nature of this complexity 
mirrors the nature of the State or the sovereign. 
The military epitomizes modernity. Based on the formula of the FMS, modernity in the region is 
in a state of failure. In other words, the State is actively interfering in halting the progress of the 
military from becoming a fully-fledged modem institution. Through this process the State 
succeeds in making the military a tool to be utilised for the regime's survival. This was the 
situation from the early days of the formation the State in the region. When the new military was 
established in Iraq on January 6, 1921 it had only three tasks: 
• Protect the new monarchy and provide it with a force more powerful than the well-
armed tribes: 
• Deal with the ever-present threat of rebellion from discontented tribes or ethnic 
groups; 
• Contribute to nation-building via the implementation of conscription which would 
bring young men from disparate regions together and inculcate in the~ a sens~ of 
nationalism. Faysal regarded the new military as a 'spinal column for nahon-formmg' 
(Hashim, 2003: 12). 
6.3 The State and Violence 
The military is a large body of people organised and trained by the State. Since "every state is 
founded on force," (Weber, 1946: 1) the State and violence are closely combined. Weber, 
elaborating on that statement, concluded that "if no social institutions existed which knew the 
· , ld b 1· · ated" (1946· 1) If violence is not use of violence then the concept of 'state wou e e imm · · 
· h d th " ondition would emerge that could 
managed or organised and concentrated m one an , en a c 
be designated as anarchy''. This view which has a clear parallel with Hobbes's notion and 
• • • • & th 1 tionship between violence and the 
Justification of sovereignty provides the premise 1or e re a 
196 f Sardar Aziz dissertation 
state in its modem form. Weber continues his analysis until he arrives at one of the most famous 
definition of the State namely "state is a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 1946: 1). This 
emphasises the centrality of coercive power in understanding the State, including military power. 
This leaves no doubt that the State is the State when it has the monopoly on force or violence. 
This monopoly of violence's only achievable, among other things, when the State has a well 
organised military, to combat any other, non-state, sources of violence. So the State needs the 
military to be worthy of the state and the State is the only party that has the legal right to use 
violence. This makes the military the essence of the State. 
However, there is a clear sign of an interdependent relationship between the military and 
the State, thus, the relationship is delicate. In fact, balancing this relationship has been the focus 
of the analysts for a long time. For Huntington (1985: 70), "the military man has the right to 
expect political guidance from the Statesman. Civilian control exists when there is the proper 
subordination of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy". The Statesman has to 
acknowledge the integrity of [the military] profession", the military has to remain "neutral 
politically". It is clear that for Huntington the civil-military relationship is a dichotomy. This 
inherently conflictual relationship can only be solved when one side, preferably the civilian, is in 
control. "In countries with fully institutionalized and consolidated democratic control, such as 
the United States, military officers not only obey civilian authority but also internalize 
democratic norms and accept civilian control as legitimate" (Fitch, 1998: 41). The more 
legitimate the State the more obedient the military. If the legitimate state is a civilian state and 
legitimacy is essential for establishment of professional relationship, then a non-civilian state 
such as PMS state has difficulty in having a professional army. 
In an essay published in the 1920s, Walter Benjamin questions this relationship. 
Accordingly, the State has the right to use violence when it is justified. "Violence is justified 
insofar as it is a means for the control of those violent acts that are not themselves means for the 
control of immediate threats of violence" (Fenves, 1998: 43). Taking this perspective further, 
· 1 · · · · · d · 1 So this use of violence is permitted only v10 ence that 1s Justified 1s violence towar s v10 ence. , 
when there is an act of violence. Therefore, it is "clear .... that violence can first be sought only 
in the realm of means, not of ends" (Benjamin, 1999: 277). This means for Benjamin the 
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preservation of law, a universal law, which regulates all the interest of · ty Th .: · · soc1e . ere1ore, 1t 1s 
crucial for any state, in order to have the right to use violence, to be a legitimate state. 
This premise provides ground for the question of monopoly. If "monopoly is a sufficient 
control over a particular product or service to determine significantly the terms on which other 
individuals shall have access to it" (Friedman, 2002: 208), then such an act requires justification 
to establish legitimacy. If the State has a monopoly over the use of violence, this does not grant 
the State a free hand to make use of this right. The significant point in this regard is the 
'sufficient control', of violence, 'to determine the terms on which other shall have access to it'. 
Therefore, the monopoly is more for the sake of diminishing, or desirably a total ban, on the use 
of violence, as Carr and Wilson put it "the service which soldiers are trained to render is one 
which it is hoped they will never be called up on to perform" (Huntington, 1985: 469). So the 
total monopoly of violence by the State is to end all other forms of violence, as a result violence 
shifts to potential violence. But for the State to justify its monopoly over violence it has to be 
legitimate. This legitimacy is obtainable through the process of democracy, thus in countries 
with fully institutionalised and consolidated democratic control military officers have no choice 
but to obey to the civilian authority. 
The key concept here is legitimacy versus force: legitimacy belongs to the State, while 
force belongs to the military. Even in the fragile democratic states, for instance Pakistan and 
Turkey, when the military organised a coup, they immediately came under pressure, internally 
and the externally, to restore democracy and organise elections. But in the absence of legitimacy, 
as in every single Arab Middle Eastern states, the relationship between the State and the military 
is a relationship of power. When one is strong and powerful, the other will, or is forced, to obey. 
Therefore, in the States where the military is not fully institutionalised and is not controlled by 
democratic means, it might develop an appetite for intervention, commonly through organising a 
coup. This makes the relationship between the military and the State a relationship of mistrust. 
Thus when it comes to the military, in the Arab Middle East, there is the ever present spectre of a 
coup. 
For Johri Locke, in the Second Treatise of Government, the legitimacy of government is 
often justified on the grounds that it is based on the consent of the governed. Accordingly, the 
th 
1 B sed on the Lockein assumption, Said 
government derives their just power from e peop e. a 
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Aburish (1997: 1) argues "there are no legitimate regimes · th Ar b M' rn e a 1ddle East". Therefore 
for Michael Hudson (1977: 2) ''the central problem of gove t t d · . rnmen o ay rn the Arab world 1s 
political legitimacy". The sovereign in every single country dl f th , , regar ess o e structure of the 
government, is not based on the consent of the governed th s h d · , u opposes t e true esrre of the 
population and fails to represent them. Unlike any democratic system h ·11 · · , w en an I eg1tunate 
government is toppled, especially if it is through an internal coup n I t & • , o one amen s 1or its 
removal. However, in the case of a coup, the coming government is illegitimate, but an 
illegitimate one is replacing another illegitimate one. In a similar case Alex Thomson comments 
on the military coup in African states: 
African military coups were relatively peaceful affairs. Causalities were usually confrned 
to the small participating factions while many were entirely bloodless. This was simply 
because few in society were prepared to defend the outgoing usually illegitimate 
administration (2000: 123). 
6.4 Modernity and the Military 
Analysing the military and its relationship with the State in the FMS is significant in many ways. 
The military was the very frrst sector of the State that had to undergo the process of 
modernisation. Through modernising the military elites in the Middle East hoped that they could 
protect their states from colonialism or defeat at the hands ofFrance and Great Britairl. 
These decades saw a mania in the Middle East for the import of European methods of 
military organization and techniques of warfare. Everywhere, in the Ottoman Empire, 
North Africa, Egypt, and Iran, nizam-i jadid (new order) regiments sprang up, sometimes 
on the ruins of older military formations, sometimes alongside them, unleashing a process 
of military-led modernization that was to characterize state-building projects throughout 
the region until well irlto the twentieth century (Cronin, 2008: 197). 
Thus, the military was the frrst institution to experience change and reform in order to become 
modem. This fact highlights an important character of Middle Eastern modernity. The regional 
elites realised that irI order to protect themselves from the colonisers they had to borrow their 
' ' 
method, their technique and their knowledge. To be able to defend and resist, they realised that 
they had to become like their enemy. Consequently, Modernity was a defensive project. To 
become the very one who you are against, to be, simultaneously with and against modernity. 
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This dualism, this paradox became the main feature of d 'ty · th · · , mo erni m e region. This 
process was hasty, organised under a feeling of shock and the awareness of an imminent defeat. 
However, this historic fact means the military made the most use of and was the most affected by 
modernity. This furthermore illustrates that from the very beginning the process of modernity 
was seen only in fragment. Modernity was not seen as a departure, or as a rupture with tradition, 
all that was frozen and solid melt into air as Marx and Engels (1848) put it in the Communist 
Manifesto. Modernising the military signifies that traditional power had no intention of 
undergoing reform; rather it intended to solidify its position, through using modernity as a tool to 
reform, reorganise, and retrain the military. 
Another feature of the military in its relation to modernity lies in its structure. If 
modernity requires organisation, bureaucracy and hierarchy, the military provided all these 
through training. The military broke down the former local relationships, introduced education, 
and required travel, consequently the ordinary people as a soldier introduced to urban life which 
helped in constructing a new national identity. If modernity demanded a new man, this new man 
was a soldier and it was possible to make him. It was possible in Europe as Foucault explains: 
By the late eighteenth century the soldier has become something that can be made; out of 
a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is 
gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, 
mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning slightly into the automatism of 
habit; in short, one has 'got rid of the peasant' and given him 'the air of the soldier 
(Foucault, 1991: 135). 
Modernity and the military share many other characteristics. Modernity is impersonal in 
term of its relationships; it establishes bureaucracy rather than paternalism as the model of 
authority. The soldier has to have a high awareness of self-control, discipline and willingness to 
accept authority. Thus with the arrival of modernity the military became the ideal vehicle to take 
society to modernity. Therefore, the theorist of pan-Arab-Nationalism al-Husari believed 
"military barracks are like social schools. They free the individual from selfishness and make 
him feel the presence of other-the country and nation. It teaches him true sacrifice in all its 
forms" (quoted in Makya, 1989: 165). The military became the method to introduce and impose 
modernity the method that was acceptable and encouraged. It did not care of values like freedom 
or granting rights. Rather it aimed to make a docile body in a matter of a short time. The military 
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was composed of home-grown, middle-class, personally pious and fiercely ideological officers 
who rose on the rhetoric of nationalism This self-importance gave th ·1·t f · , e m1 1 ary a sense o 
mission as the builder and the protector of the State. Thus the military in the Middle East 
normally considers itself unaccountable to any civilian institution. 
6.5 The FMS and the Military 
No existing civil-military relationship typology can explain fully the nature of state-military 
relationship in the PMS. There might be overlap with other third world types but nevertheless the 
state-military relationships in the PMS remains an anomaly, especially to the many western 
typologies. The civil-military relation in a democratic country is characterised by 
l)a high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the 
limits of their professional competence; 2) the effective subordination of the military to 
the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy; 
3) the recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional 
competence and autonomy for the military; and 4) as a result, the minimization of 
military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military 
(Huntington,1995: 9). 
The part of Huntington's description might be helpful in explaining the state-military 
relationship in the PMS, is his description of the state-military relationships under personal 
dictator and one-party system states. Accordingly: 
In the personal dictatorships, the ruler did everything he could to ensure that the military 
was permeated by and controlled by his cronies and agents, that it was divided against 
itself, and that it served his purpose of keeping a tight grip on power. In the one-party 
states, civil-military relations were not in quite the same disarray, but the military was 
viewed as the instrument of the party, military officers had to be party members, political 
commissars and party cells paralleled the normal military chain of command, and 
ultimate loyalty was to the party rather than the State (Huntington, 1995: 10). 
But this description explains the state-military relationship in the PMS only partially. 
Understanding the typology of the PMS civil-military relationships is best done through knowing 
what it is not. In contrast to other civil or state-military relationships for instance the European, 
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the former Soviet, the Latin Americans, the American and the Turkish, the FMS state-military 
relationships stands as an anomaly. 
According to Born et al (2006) the European paradigm of civil-military relationships is 
based on the complete separation, unquestioned subordination, and almost radical isolation of the 
armed forces from civilian politics. The civil-military relationship in the FMS clearly does not 
adhere to this paradigm. The former Soviet paradigm, in which the military constituted the 
muscles of a single party system, might overlap in some areas. In this system "the military, like 
all political structures, was constitutionally subordinate to the party" (Perlmutter and LeoGrande, 
1982: 781). The party in the FMS, in case of its existence, is not the owner but another tool in the 
hands of the State elite. 
In what is called the Latin American paradigm, there is also some similarity with the 
FMS model. In this Paradigm the crux of the relationship is a mistrust of the armed forces 
themselves. The military is basically viewed as a predatory institution, capable of intervening in 
civilian politics at any time, and once having intervened, is likely to try to remain in power. 
There is therefore an understanding that armies should be kept completely away from politics, 
and that their loyalty to the civilian government has to be kept under guarantee at all costs 
(Sigmund, 1993: 115). In the FMS there is widespread mistrust by both the State and society 
toward the military. But this mistrust did not result in keeping the military at bay. The FMS 
widens this gap between the population and the military. 
The Turkish military and the Turkish pattern of civil-military relations do not neatly fit 
into any of these paradigms (Aydinli, 2009: 583). Turks have more confident in their military 
than in any other of the country's institutions. According to a Gallup poll conducted in May 2007 
81 % of the population have confidence in the military, while only 56% of the population have 
confidence in their national government (Europe's World:2007: 55). This trust in the military 
and regarding them as the guardian of the system and the country, as in Turkey, is non-existent 
in the FMS. The military in the FMS neither trusted by the people nor by the State. This 
significant feature makes it resemble mercenaries. Moreover, the military is just one layer of the 
complex security system in the FMS. Its main function is to protect the State from its people. 
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6.6 The Spectre of the Coup 
A spectre haunts the FMS, the spectre of the coup. The State-military relationship is established 
under the shadow of this ever-present spectre. The spectre, from its nature, is a present-absent. It 
is un-dead. It does not appear visible but its presence is always felt. The metaphor of a spectre 
embodies something that is always there and always waiting to come ( or come back). The 
spectre is thus both past and future; it is from the past, but waiting to come back. This spectre is 
the spectre of coup. There have been coups in the past, there have been coups in the region, and 
there might be coups in the future, at any moment, when the time is ready, the spectre of a coup 
waiting vigilantly for the right moment to appear. This fear of a coup that might happen any 
moment when the situation is right results in the permanency of the spectre of the coup. A coup 
is imminent. A coup is in the situation to-come. Coup is here, if it is not, now, tomorrow, in the 
near future. This spectre shapes the relationship and gives it a particular structure, makes it 
agitated. Therefore, the relationship between the military and the State is a fluid relationship. 
There are several reasons why the spectre of coup in the region is every present. Firstly, from a 
historical perspective "the Middle East has provided fertile ground for coups. Between March 
1949 (the first coup after World War II) and the end of 1980, fifty-five coups were attempted in 
Arab states-half of them successful" (Quinlivan, 1999: 133). This might mentally and 
empirically prepare the ground for others to try, i.e. path dependency. 
Secondly is the lack of legitimacy. An illegitimate state, since the population are not 
linked to it, is easy to grasp. However throughout time this has changed. Illegitimated state 
became less vulnerable to a coup. This happened mainly through "learn[ing] to take preventative 
measures to forestall their recurrence" (Be'eri, 1982: 70). This learning throughout time resulted 
in the development of a particular structure, which could be called a 'coup-proof structure. Such 
a structure is a mix of both modem and traditional elements as Quinlivan (1999) explains: 
(1 )the effective exploitation of family, ethnic, and religious loyalties for coup-critical 
positions balanced with wider participation and Jess restrictive loyalty standar_d~ for the 
regime as a whole; (2) the creation of an armed force parallel to the ~egu_Iar_ m~h~; (3) 
the development of multiple internal security agencies with over!ap~mg Junsd1ctton that 
constantly monitor the loyalty of the military and one another w1~ mdependent of 
communication to critical leaders; (4) the fostering of expertness m the regular military; 
and (5) the financing of such measures (Quinlivan, 1999: 133). 
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As Quinlivan shows measurements were implemented in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Saudi 
Arabia. The measurements show how modernity and tradition are skilfully amalgamated by the 
sovereign to proof any possibility of organising a coup. But the implementation of these 
measures also signifies that the whole system is built on the basis of preventing the spectre from 
becoming reality. These systems might succeed in preventing coup but the fear of a coup has 
never gone away fully. The spectre of a coup results in the emergence of relationships of distrust 
between the State and the military. Thus, the military becomes a necessary evil. This results in 
the emergence of a complex state-military relationship. 
Although some might argue "military coups, have become less frequent and successful or 
there have been almost non-existent military coups in the MENA region since the late 1970's" 
(Brooks 1998: 11) this by no mean eliminates the fear of a coup within the regimes. The FMS is 
fully aware that any signs of weakness in the system immediately raise the appetite for a coup. 
6.7 To Name (conceptualise) the State-Military Relationship in the FMS 
The FMS is a closed state. This indicates that one, as an individual, has no responsibilities only 
obligations. He or she cannot and should not leave the group but simply observe tradition. In the 
FMS the sovereign belongs to a distinctive group of people. Society only has to yield to it. 
Therefore the military's core duty is to sustain this structure and defend it. In this regard the FMS 
is in line with the Western radical far left and far right systems. Similarly, it believes in the 
internal subordination of all other social institution of the state, which translates into submission 
to the sovereign. 
To achieve this purpose the FMS develops a specific system of control which overlaps 
with what Lucham (1961) called an "Apparat Control", in which a ruling party, balances the 
power of the military with the assistance of such tools as ideology, purges, and secret police 
surveillance. The structure of the Iraqi military during the reign of Saddam is an example of this 
In the military, as opposed to the Republican Guard (RG), support for the pr~side~t is far 
less staunch. Thus, the RG is placed between all military units and the capital city, and 
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the Special Rep_ublic~ Guard (SRG) is stationed inside of Baghdad, and thus between 
the RG and the mner nngs guarding the president. As long as the regime looks stable the 
R?, the SRG,
1
_Spec_ial Sec~rity (SS!, and the Palace Guard (or Presidential G~ard, 
Hlillayat al-Ra 1s) will remam essentially loyal to [President] Saddam Husayn. If he is 
removed they have too much to lose: power and prestige, higher salaries than those of 
their military counterparts, and other privileges that increase in relation to a soldier's 
proximity to the president (Baram, 2000: 12). 
The military structure through these multiple coils where one feels higher that another is to 
assure that the military is neither cohesive nor even that there is proper communication between 
its different coils. These boundaries within the military are the classic divide and rule game. 
Obviously this is not enough, if the military is a modem organisation; the FMS has to halt its 
progress toward becoming fully modem. Like any other sectors of the State, it has to remain in a 
state of failure. 
Sustaining failure is accomplished through putting hurdles in front of the progress of the 
military. The most common way to establish that is through injecting or introducing traditional 
structures like the tribe or the sect into the military. For instance recruiting young men from his 
hometown, Tikrit, as his bodyguards became the policy of Saddam Hussein. This was organised 
on the basis of kinship. 
Within the Tikriti population, the innermost circle from which recruits were picked was 
Al Bu Nasir, the tribe to which both Saddam Husayn and President Bakr belonged. The 
next phase was to introduce some of these young men into key positions in most of Iraq's 
internal security bodies. The most important amongst them was Jihaz Hanin (the 
Apparatus of Yearnings), later to become al-Mukhabarat al-'Amma (General 
Intelligence), the Ba'th party's intelligence organ that terrorized all of its opponents, as 
well as most party members (Baram, 2000: 11). 
The process of tribalising the military is clear evidence of the ruling elite's distrust 
toward the military. Moreover, (a) the effective exploitation of tribal loyalties by the state elite 
was a form of coup prevention; (b) an intervention by the State elite to halt the progress of the 
military; ( c) to break up the military into units and spread fear and frustration among its high 
ranks, in the words of an Iraqi artillery battalion major captured in March 1991: 
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We are very afraid of this man. Even now that I am talking to you Am · ·11 . . . , an encan, you wi 
notice that by habit, I will lower my voice when I want to h" H h · say is name. e as spies 
ev~rywhere. If he knows ~at I say bad things about him to you he will kill my wife, my 
children, and my_ parents m Iraq. If my division commander every (sic) ordered me to 
tum my ~s agams~ Sad~am Hussein, I will do it. But who will be the officer to give this 
order? I will never give this order. But I will follow the man who does (V em, 1991: 3 3 ). 
This all happens in order to prevent a coup. If in Iraq the process of causing failure was done 
through introducing the tribe into the military, in Syria a similar process took place, with a minor 
difference, which was the replacement of tribe by a sect. 
[In Syria] a small group of men controls the military and the security forces in Syria. Like 
Asad himself, most of them are 'Alawis, members of a small and long-persecuted 
religious community living in northWest Syria. They serve as the regime's nucleus, the 
guarantor of order in the country, and the sponsor of those coalitions (military, party, 
bureaucratic, rural, and minority) on which the regime relies (Eyal Zisser, 1995). 
6.8 The Making of the Mercenary 
To paraphrase Foucault (1995) the soldier is a figure belonging to modernity, his body made 
docile through training, disciplined and controlled by the State. The soldiers were merely drawn 
from citizens. The emergence of soldier marked the end of the phenomenon of the mercenary. 
"Mercenaries went out of style in the nineteenth century. States altered the conduct of war by 
raising chizen armies and eschewing the use of mercenaries in practice or in law" (Avant, 2000: 
41). 
With the advance of modernity and the expansion of European colonial power, the idea 
of the soldier reached the Middle East also. "From the year 1822, Egyptians had found 
themselves being taken in tens of thousands and turned, for the first time in memory into 
soldiers" (Tahtawi, 1977: 177). The idea and the concept of soldier was novel. It replaced the 
unorganised old military. 
The new military, it was explained in an official The Ottoman pamphlet, 'should not, like 
the rest of our forces, be composed of sellers of pastry, boatmen, fishermen, coffee-house 
k b l d th S Who are engaged in the thirty-two trades, but of well eepers, acca s, an o er . 
disciplined men'. A military was no longer to be thought of as an occasional body, 
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brought together for seasonal the Campaigns It was to be an · d fi d · orgamse orce, create out 
of men compelled to live (Mitchell, 1988: 36). 
The new military introduced many new rules and disciplines; its number increased, the duration 
of service prolonged and it enlisted the natives. These changes might look impressive but they 
were limited only to techniques. The essence of the State or regime military relationship and also 
military society relationship did not change significantly. 
The mercenary had a long tradition in the region. One of the most organised military, in 
pre-modem times, was the Ottoman Janissary. Janissary is deduced from the Turkish Yani-chiry, 
yani which means new and chiry stands for troop. Thus Janissary literary indicts new-troop. 
They were: 
Christian, converts, they became Muslim reaya (flock) of the Sultans. This 
transformation had an immediate positive effect on their economic status-the new 
Muslims stopped paying Cizye tax. They gained other prerogatives in their relationship 
with the administration, avoiding the numerous everyday inconveniences that were the lot 
of Christian subjects. Apart from that, the Muslim person had one more important 
advantage-the opportunity for further social prosperity by entering the so-called "military 
class" (askeri). By this the converts acquired additional fiscal comfort and economic 
advantages. All these were not imaginary; they were real opportunities (Radushev, 2008: 
447). 
The recruitment of janissaries shows how the Ottoman elites planned and desired to have a 
military separate from society. The Janissaries were not directly linked to the society; even 
though they converted they still remained aloof. This was also true from society's point of view. 
The janissaries insulated the ruling elite from the rest of society. Their ultimate allegiance was to 
their master, their sovereign. They prioritised the sovereign in comparison to the rest of the 
native population. The origin of the Janissary was important: 
The sovereign also decreed that youths from the regions of Harputs, Diyarbakir and 
Malatya (territories in South-eastern Anatolia under strong Kurdish and Shiite influence) 
were not to be recruited. Recruitment in the lands from Karaman to Erzerum should be 
attempted with utmost care, because there the Christian population was also mixed with 
Turkmen and Kurds. "Whoever violates this order and brings foreigners among my pure 
blooded slaves," ends Suleyman I, "shall be damned by the Prophet 120 thousand times!" 
(Radushev, 2008: 450). 
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The Ottoman sovereign distrusted the local population. The sovereign was the external. 
Consequently, the power that protects and guards the sovereign should have no link to the 
population. The janissaries were converts, which indicated that they had departed and changed 
their own original belief. This very fact forced the janissary to acquire a very fluid identity. On 
the one hand they had to leave and break with with their own society; on the other hand, they 
were not fully embraced by the new society. The fact that they were called Devsirme (tribute in 
blood) not brother, shows that they were not seen as a full member of their new society. This 
fluid weak identity gave the power to the sultan to easily dismiss or mobilise them. 
In the early eighteenth century there was a large-scale the Campaign to recruit youths for 
urgent reinforcement of the corps' units in Istanbul. After his ascension to the throne in 
1703 Sultan Ahmed III (1703- 1730) removed 800 Janissaries of the Bostanci corps from 
the Capital and the Palace; they had instigated the big riots against the central 
government. Immediately after that, the new Sultan issued an order to recruit fresh 
Janissaries from the European provinces of the Empire (Radushev, 2008: 450). 
The trend of hiring foreign soldiers and dismissing the local continued during the early years of 
Muhammad Ali Pasha in Egypt. He was in no sense an Egyptian nationalist. According to Peter 
Colvin: 
A very high percentage of the students and the new elite that evolved were what could 
only be characterized as The Ottomans. This means that they were ethnically Turks, 
Circassians, Armenians, or from other nationalities considered suitable for military or 
bureaucratic positions. Rather few were Egyptians, although the insatiable demands for 
manpower meant that more and more Egyptians did get recruited. Even the private 
soldiers of the military were originally Sudanese, until it became clear that they could not 
stand the climate and were replaced by Egyptian peasants (Colvin, 1998: 251). 
With the emergence of the territorial states in the region after the end of the Second World War, 
this trend, of hiring and relying on foreign alien mercenaries, more or less continued, moreover, 
a new form of local mercenary was introduced. 
6.9 Reconceptualising the Mercenary 
The FMS recruits mercenaries in two ways. There are those states that employ mercenaries in the 
hi b of the shortage of manpower and the classical sense. The Gulf Arab monarc es, ecause 
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effect on how states and societies themselves are organised There~ th f 
. 1ore, e nature o state's 
relationship with the military is a barometer to read how the state relates to its people. 
In Saudi Arabia the military is divided into two main branches. One is the Saudi Arabian 
National Guard (SANG) with its sub-branches. The other is the regular military. The National 
Guard in Arabic is called Alharas Almalaki, which actually means the royal guard. Historically it 
was forged out of those tribal elements that were loyal to the Saud Family. The SANG's or the 
royal guard's mission is to protect the royal family from internal rebellion and the other Saudi 
Military, should the need arise. Jane's Defence Weekly described the royal guard as "a kind of 
Praetorian Guard for the House of Saud, the royal family's defence of last resort against internal 
opposition" (Hartung, 2003). 
Colonel Abdulla bn Muhammad AL alsheik (2008) is the officer who wrote about the role, duty 
and connection of the Royal Guard. According to him the role of the Royal Guard is to do 
everything to provide protection for the servant of the two holy places, within and outside the 
Kingdom, by using every resort to fulfil that. The Royal Guard is directly connected to the 
servant of the two holy places i.e. the King. 
The Royal Guards' duties are: 
• Providing security and equipment, for the servant of the two holy places, in all his trips; 
inside and outside the country. 
• Providing guard the security for all the servant of the holy tow plac:s guests . . 
• Providing security and safety for all the location that the king and his entourage v1s~t. 
• Providing safety and security for the royal family during all the celebration in 
coordination with other security sectors d 
• Providing safety and security for all dawawen (a place for receiving the locals) an 
palaces. • all th h 
• Putsting surveillance all the places of the visit of the royal family, checkmg . os~;'o8°) 
are working there and providing them with special entrance card. (AL alsheik, 
[quoted from the official website of the Royal Guard]. 
d • S d · Ar bia It is clear that the main duty These are some of the duties of the royal guar 1Il au 1 a · 
· . 1 f: -1 The structure and the duties of the of the royal guard is providing protection to the roya amt Y· 
· b ·er between society and the 
royal guard show clearly that they function as a protection arn 
b t cted from the people. So, this well 
sovereign. The sovereign, who is the State, has to e pro e 
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organised and well trained military in addition to providing safiety and ·ty th secun to e body of the 
sovereign also has a duty to maintain the status quo. 
If most studies in the past regarded the role of the m1·11·tary as · .: f , a progressive 1orce o 
modernisation or even democratisation, that was so because of the domination of the 
modernisation theory as Huntington puts it "most seem to agree that in the Middle East the 
military were typically proponents of change" (1968: 219). Since a branch of the military like a 
royal guard has no connection to society, it fails to be a force for modernisation. It is rather a 
force for halting and resisting change. 
But what does this emphasis on the notion of "providing protection", as the main duty of 
the royal guard, reveal. Why does the monarchy or the King or the president need the best, the 
most equipped special force to protect him. Why is the sole aim of the organised force within the 
territory of the country so devoted to doing this? What does this need signify? In the FMS the 
sovereign requires protection to a level that the whole system is structured around this single 
aim. In answering these questions two lines need to be considered. One is mythology, the other is 
fact. The myth wraps the fact. The myth is the infusion of the physical body of king, president or 
prince with the body of the people. The body of the sovereign is the body of the state and the 
nation. Thus protecting the body of the sovereign indicates protecting the body of the nation. 
Whereas, the invisible fact is that the body of the sovereign: king, prince or president, is not the 
body of the people but lives on them parasitically. This is not specific to Saudi Arabia alone. It is 
endemic in every single state in the region. As Makiya (1989:21) puts it "for six decades the 
Iraqi military acted as an agent for internal repression". The Arab Middle Eastern states regard 
the population within their territory, as their primary enemy. As Chomsky puts it (2002:70) "if 
politics begins to break out inside your own country and the population starts getting active, 
those with power cannot hold on to power, since the latter is very fragile". The fear of 
th
is 
potential moment the moment of realisation and breaking out is the prime reason behind 
' 
building such a mighty military. 
th I 
f h · between the State and its society. 
Accordingly, this fragile power shapes e re a ions 1P 
h. art· Jar relationship There is not any Thus, the military as a tool is deployed to manage t is P icu · . . 
. 
1 
b • .: the sovereign All that 1s there 1s 
sort of social contract no consent and no rationa asis ior · 
' ' . If . th tate of perpetual doubt. "When it is, 
naked power. Therefore, the sovereign finds hlffise m e s 
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after all, hardly a law of nature that a few should command while th lt'tud b e mu I e o ey, that the 
economy should be geared to ensuring luxuries for some instead f ·t· "' 1 o necess1 1es 1or al ", 
(Chomsky, 1992: 192). In the absence of a coherent ideology toJ·ustify thi's th · h , e sovereign as to 
rely on naked power, in most cases, to sustain the situation. 
For the very same reason the demand by the State in Saudi Arabia upon the population 
for wider military service is avoided. "Such demand could bring forth pressure for citizens to 
have a say in state policy" (Gause III, 2003: 358). The State or the sovereign view the population 
with suspicion, and employ different policies to distance or docile them. In such circumstances it 
only makes sense, to have an organised military for achieving such an end. The source of and the 
reason for the misgivings be tween the State and society, in the case of Saudi Arabia, are 
intrinsically based on the nature of society and the formation of the State. Historically, the 
country was never united. Eventually when it was united, it was done by force, while, in reality, 
it had little to bind it together. Like any other FMS the country is still missing an identity to 
cement the different cleavages together. It is instead held forcefully together. The merchants of 
the Red Sea coast saw themselves as sophisticated and cosmopolitan. The nomads and oasis-
dwellers of the centre saw themselves as strong physically and spiritually. Both groups looked 
down on those in the east, many of them Shia's. If the population is held forcefully together to 
serve the sovereign, it results in a permanent fear of the break down this fragile togetherness. In 
the past when that occurred in other places in the region the outcome were less than desirable. 
[in case of Suadi Arabia] the ruling family is well aware of what the future woul~ hold 
were it to be overthrown. If the history of postmonarchical Iran and Iraq are anything to 
go by, the royal family would have to flee or be slaughtered. E_ven the less extre~e cas_es 
of Egypt and y emen suggest that the royal family would lose 1~s weal~ and all its social 
privileges. The Saudi royal family will not give_ up po_wer easily. It will be p_rep~ed _to 
use force to hold on including physical suppress10n of its opponents. Underestimatmg_ its 
· · ' th 'II' gness of any of the Arab rulmg 
willingness to use force--or, for that matter, e WI m 
cliques to do likewise-would be a serious error (Clawson, 2002: 201). 
. . th n · trapped in an either/or scenario. 
This clearly indicates that the sovereign 1s aware a I is 
. . d . This affects the relationship between the 
In this case the choice is either holdmg power or ymg. d with violence On the one hand, the 
state sovereign and the population which could be smeare · 
. th lation will behead them. On the other 
sovereign knows that in the case of any weakness e popu 
217 Sardar Aziz dissertation 
hand the people are aware that the sovereign does not hesitate to use · 1 . v10 ence agamst them. 
However, the State-society relationship, especially in the Gulf States d t thr 
, oes no operate ough 
the deployment of mere violence, as is the case in the republican states in the region. The Gulf 
State also have a Rentier policy. It is separation between economy and politics. "We do not ask 
much of you economically and we do not give much to you politically'' (Zakaria, 2003: 76). It is 
a trade the State authority imposes on its people. But the State authorities are aware that this 
policy does not guarantee the security of their state. In these countries the armies are structured 
in a way to be ineffective. There is no cohesion among the different units. The military units are, 
in case of Saudi Arabia lead by the royal family members. The family members are not in unity. 
It is reported that briefly before his death Ibn Saud said, "Verily, my children and my 
possessions are my enemies" (Hertog, 2007:541). Thus every unit has a loyalty to the leading 
prince before anything else. Information management or the capacity to communicate 
information vertically is at best poor. It is obvious that if the military is divided and has personal 
rather that national loyalty and is as result reluctant to share the information. 
6.11 Conclusion 
If the State is a "container" (Taylor, 1994: 151), the military's ultimate duty is to protect the 
inhabitant of that container from external threats. Thus, the military's main duty is to defend the 
territory of the State from external threats. Therefore, the military is not for internal deployment. 
In the FMS however the military's main task is internal. This internal mission is namely the 
protection of the sovereign. This results in the emergence of a new relationship between the 
military and the State, on the one hand and the military and society, on the other hand. 
Therefore to theorise the status of the military in the FMS is challenging if not 
' 
. . . . . 1 . h. h ards the two spheres of civilian unposs1ble. To take traditional civil-m1htary re at10n, w 1c reg 
d . . . . . . .1 tur the nature of the relationship. To an m1htary as clearly d1stmgmshable 1t fa1 s to cap e 
·1· d the civilians in the FMS. The State 
summarise, there is no such relation between the m1 itary an 
uses the military against the civilian population to implement its coercive rule. 
. . . . 1 . em hasises the formal institutions, The traditional approach to civil m1htary re ations P 
. b tw en the two essentially separate 
functions, and policymaking, and the consequent relat10ns e e 
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sub-systems-the civilian and the military. While in the FMS th h . . . 
' on e one and, the c1v1han does 
not make the State (thus the notion of 'civilian' in the 'civil- ·1·t 1 . , mi 1 ary re atJon does not 
necessarily refer to the state), since the State, is separate from society th th h . 
, on e o er and, there 1s 
no separation between the military and the State in traditional fashion. 
The major challenges in front of other theories would be the exceptional and unique 
nature of the PMS. In other theories the State is taken as a civilian. The FMS is not a civilian 
state. However the critical and new critical approaches are closer to the reality of the situation by 
regarding the boundary between the two spheres as not fixed, but shifting according to the 
interaction between the military and civil sub-systems (Barak & Sheffer 2007: 4). The FMS is 
not a fully formed state, either ideologically or institutionally. 
Through following the trajectory of the State or the regime and the military relationship, 
it becomes apparent that the military was always regarded as a tool: a tool for modernisation, for 
preserving the status quo, a tool to realise the dream of pan-Arab unity, consequently a tool to 
protect the regime. The State, in general, is "an apparatus of capture" (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2004: 468). This capture policy operates through seeking perpetual expansion, for Robert Gilpin 
(1981: 106) this "phenomena is universal". However the FMS has a desire to capture both 
internally and the externally, its core mission is survival. Survival indicates continuation without 
interruption, of the reign of the closed circle of rulers and of the elite. For the FMS to survive, it 
has to establish a highly complex of layers, walls, and be an internal the external. This is in itself 
a paradox. The military plays a designed role in defining this state. Since the State is engaged in 
the endless game of survival it needs force, brutality, fear, and will. The military and other 
security sectors provide these qualities. The military has only to provide. Any step beyond that is 
seen by the state as suspicious. In countries that might differ in certain ways still the outcome is 
the same. For instance in Egypt, when the Free Officers organised the coup, they shared the 
th. 'tu f was changed Anwar Sadat government positions among themselves. But later on 1s si a 10n · 
d · · · .. · h Ttary as he aggressively consolidated unng his presidency struck out at all oppos1t10n m t e m1 1 
his leadership. From the early days of his presidency, he employed divide-and-rule tactics among 
the military elite in order to domesticate it. His use of such tactics created an elite loyal to his 
th • ftuf nal power bases that particular person or the office of the presidency, rather than to e ms 1 10 . . 
. . . M b ak, s reign the role of the military 
m1htary leaders had accumulated under Nasser. Durmg u ar 
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has vanished and been replaced by police, security officers and spies who are above the law and 
killing civilians regularly with impunity. The FMS either captured sovereignty through a coup or 
through appointment by outside forces. Both shape their policy to prevent an imminent coup. 
Thus the FMS lives in continuous fear of a potential coup. Therefore the head of the military has 
to be in the hand of the family, the clan or the loyal elite. 
Plato gave the task of realisation of his republic to the philosophers, Bacon to scientists, 
Marx to the proletarians, and Arab nationalist thinkers regarded the soldiers as playing such a 
role. Husri and others dreamt of the military as the social mobiliser, an agency of social change. 
In the FMS the military is separate from population. The military is separate in their governing 
system, their loyalty, their duty, the location of their barracks, and through joining the army one 
does not become a modem civil orientated man with loyalty to the nation. By joining the army 
one will end up being killed or being a killer vis-a-vis the population. With the emergence of the 
FMS, citizenship was never materialised and the citizen army never established. The emerged 
army was taken through conscription and ultimately reduced to the status of a mercenary. 
Classically the mercenary is a person who is foreign and paid. In the FMS, in order to show their 
unshakable loyalty to the sovereign the military treats the population as foreign, consequently 
they become foreign, and draining the big part of the national budget. Making a mercenary out of 
the military is the ultimate utilisation of the military. The mercenary's loyalty is to money. Since 
money has a source, at the end, the mercenary's loyalty is to the source of the money. The source 
of the money is the regime, especially when there is no taxation. Then the ultimate loyalty of the 
military is for the regime. 
Some regarded the military in the region as "the vanguard of nationalism and social 
reform" (Halpern, 1963: 75). The genesis of such an approach is in European hiStory. In Europe 
the middle class is the maker of modernity. Because in the Middle EaSt the officers are moS
tl
Y 
drawn from the middle classes, by the same token the officers because of their middle class 
. l"fi th y to be a guardian and a leading 
background are seen as modernisers. This qua 1 1es e arm 
Ms h hows that such view is contrary to group toward modernising society. Alas, the F approac s . . 
d d"fferent time are different m their 
the reality. The middle classes in a different space an 1 
.th t f n "over the last eighty years or 
mission and priorities. The FMS is merely a state WI ou a na 10 
. alised state not a nation" (Al Rasheed, 
so the Saudi royal family created a umfied and centr 
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2007). Not making a nation is an effort to withhold modernity. A nation is a form of 
organisation. Through it people imagine their large community. It is a form of identity and 
solidarity. In pre-national societies organising people around a general collective idea is difficult. 
The existence of a nation is viewed by the FMS as a threat. To resist this threat the State has to 
block the emergence of a nation and it has to be militaristic and distant from the population. It 
has to control the people and spread fear among them; this can only be achieved by a ruthless 
military whose loyalty to the population is nil. 
By making a mercenary army out of the military, the FMS reduced the chance of a coup 
significantly. This by no means indicates that the fear of a coup has disappeared altogether. The 
military has power to a degree as Peter D. Feaver puts it "the very institution created to protect 
the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity" (Feaver 1999: 214). 
Therefore, the classical dilemma is who guards the guardians. But the FMS has managed to 
diminish this dilemma to a certain degree. 
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Conclusions 
The . . .. [~ab] monarchies ... are peculiarly vulnerable to the tensions of 
modem1zat10n. Their legitimizing values are essentially rooted · k" h" r • d rn rns 1p, 
re 1g1on, an ~ustom. But they are by no means wholly traditional; they do not 
conform precisely to the classical Middle Eastern patriarchy. In fact, we observe 
strong attributes of modernity in the legitimacy formulas of even the most 
traditional kingdoms, just as we shall discover persistent strands of traditional 
identifications in the systems that have crossed the revolutionary divide (Hudson, 
1977: 165). 
A man spends his first year learning how to speak and the Arab regimes teach him 
silence for the rest of his life (Ahlam Musteghanemi in the Memory in the Flesh) 
The theoretical terrain and methodology of this thesis provides the conceptual framework 
through which I proceeded to analyse modernity in the Arab Middle East. Modernity in the 
region as a phenomenon has had a tragic fate. This phenomenon failed to materialise, or rather 
more accurately the emerged state and its elite, prevented of realisation in the Arab Middle East. 
This failure was not due to the culture, economy or external factors alone. This failure was and is 
premeditated by the State elite through the state apparatuses. Modernity was and is premeditated 
because its full realisation is not in the interest of the survival of the ruling elite. After the end of 
colonialism, the inherited state [inherited from the former colonial rulers] became a medium 
controlled by the emerged local elite, within this medium; culture, economy and external factors 
functioned according to the state elite's interest. This State or this particular form of State is 
conceptualised as the FMS. 
The background chapter shows how this form of state emerged and was established 
through different events and treaties. How Western powers, namely the United Kingdom and 
France, in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 divided the region between themselves. In the 
tradition of the region there was no counterpart to the Western idea of the sovereignty (state) 
whether in its internal or the external fashions. Therefore, the state as an idea and 
stru
cture is 
wholly new and manufactured. This occurred through imitation and the copying of 
th
e W eS
t
em 
modem model of the nation-state: the Westphalian model. 
222 I Sardar Aziz dissertation 
From the day of its inception the emerged state had to b 1 orrow many e ements of 
modernity in order to survive. The state borrowed from modernity, selected suitable parts of it 
and translated it. Translation indicates that the state manipulated modernity and altered it to 
maintain its own survival. Modernity became an essential element of the new state. This was 
depicted in the technology, bureaucracy, army, arms, infrastructure and the media. Toe state's 
manipulation of modernity had a negative impact on the nature of modernity from the ground up 
to the degree that the state had to limit and counter true modernity. For instance democracy, 
nationalism, human rights, separation of powers, freedoms and legitimacy are all essential parts 
of the modem state structure but implementation of these structures is against the state elite 
interest. They desire to be in power without challenge, without limit, without end and without 
any regard for the population. Therefore, modernity from the day of its arrival has to be kept in a 
state of failure, which indicates that the realisation of full, real or true modernity was never 
accepted by the state elite. The part of modernity that was encouraged, by the state elite, among 
the population was fake or superficial modernity. Modernity of fashion: handbags, shoes, cars, 
and other gadgets or imitations of life style whether it is sexuality or other social aspects. This 
was embraced enthusiastically by the fake middle classes in these states. 
The FMS concept analyses a multifarious event. This event is the failure of the occidental 
modernity in the Arab Middle East. To describe an event as a failure is a statement. This 
statement is made by comparing the definition of modernity with the reality on the ground. 
Modernity is used as a shorthand term for modem state and modem society. A modem society is 
profoundly different, in many ways, from its previous society, namely traditional. These 
differences appear on individual, social and institutional levels. In modem society individuals are 
reasoning and autonomous, people organise themselves in the form of society, i.e. the 
· · · · h. h ompeting in a peaceful tolerant space. 
recogrut1on of different cleavages and interests w 1c are c 
Modernity has a different mode of production, a different set of organisations. A modem society 
. . d bi" h "f zenry relationship between people and 
1s also expected to protect human nghts an esta is a Cl 1 
. b fi und in the work of philosophers of 
state. Reference to these concepts and paradigms can e 0 
d H el However t he experience of modernity from Spinoza to Locke to Kant an even eg · ' 
' 1 th Arab Middle Eastern countries had modernity in the non-West is different; but neverthe ess, e . 
. "f the ruling elite were not challengmg 
opportunity and potentiality to develop a modem society, 1 
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it. A glimpse into the past shows how society was willing to b h em race t e western values and 
overcome their tradition. 
The Iraq of the 1950s of which I was raised, as well as the broader Arab Islamic world of 
that time were a stage when the secular elements of society the 1· 1·t· 1 1 d , ru mg po 1 1ca c ass, an 
cultural and intellectual elites had moved far from an overt identification with Islam. It 
then appeared to be only a matter of time before Islam would lose whatever hold it may 
have still had on the peoples and societies of the Muslim world.. ... Islam was not 
noticeable factor in daily life. Women, not only in my own family but throughout 
the middle classes, wore only western clothes. They had long ceased to wear the hijab 
(Allawi, 2009: VIII). 
This clearly shows that the ground was ready for change, for new, for rupture if there was a 
suitable and committed guide. Today within the States of the Arab Middle East, these features 
are either totally absent or exist in very weak forms. This allows one to state that Middle Eastern 
modernity has failed to establish a truly modern society. The notion of failure also suggests that 
there is the presence of modernity on the ground but in fractured and failed forms because this 
failed modernity on the ground is borrowed from occidental modernity, it is not a modernity that 
emerged from the region's culture by the region's thinkers. This also suggests that tradition is a 
living part of the popular culture. The states in the region are the product of the arrival of 
occidental modernity. These state elites to quote from the Indian thinker Partha Chatterjee (1986: 
21) "thinks with and also thinks against a Western modernity", therefore the emerged states 
through their functioning on one hand utilised modern tools and premeditated the failure of 
modernity. 
The roles of this State, its mode of function, its politics are the subject matter of the 
thesis. If the main question of the thesis is, why modernity failed in the Arab Middle East, the 
answer is offered is that modernity failed because of the emergence of a particular form of a state 
that is conceptualised as a FMS. Failure of modernity does not signify its complete rejection by 
· d · eiected by the population. In fact, 
the state elite. Moreover, it is not a sign that mo emity was r ~ 
· o despite their distorted awareness of 
modernity was not resisted by the populat10n. ne can say, . 
. A oll after poll shows, people desrre 
the concept in general they embraced modernity. s P 
ll hn logy This is equally true for the 
democracy, rule of law, transparency and above a tee O • 
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religious people also. In fact, the early advocates of modernity w 1· · 1 . ere re 1g1ous c erg1es. Therefore, 
it is convincing to argue that modernity has been purposely failed by the state elites. 
Ensuring the failure of both modernity and tradition is a complex d t· k th an con muous tas at 
the state and its apparatuses are closely engaged in. This task involves ba lancing between 
modernity and tradition, responding to internal and the external pressure, through the utilisation 
of both modernity and tradition but never allowing either to become independent forces . 
However, this separation and boundary setting is neither unique nor novel historically, Arab and 
Muslim thinkers regarded the nature of men as different. This inferred that philosophy: thinking, 
individuality, argument and autonomy were for the elite and religion: uniformity, holiness and 
silence for the masses. But in modem times this task became more complex and requires more 
detailed knowledge and techniques. This has been mostly addressed by the presence of 
modernity and some of its techniques. 
If the modem State is commonly regarded as an independent, legitimate and centralised 
socio-political organisation that aims at the regulation of social relationships in a complex and 
stratified society living in a specific territory, then the FMS is of a different calibre. It is neither 
independent nor legitimate, and its essential aim is the survival of its elite. The complexity of this 
state becomes apparent throughout the thesis. 
This thesis suggests that picking a single invariable factor such as culture, religion, oil or 
the external factor, is no longer satisfactory to demystify the crisis of the region characterised by 
impossibility of reform, lack of democracy and survival of the states. To claim that there is a 
single dominant factor responsible for the structure or the failure of these states is not 
satisfactory. These states are equally modem and traditional. Both modernity and tradition are 
nothing but tools in the hands of the State elites, equally utilised with each other, againSt each 
other or separately, depending on the nature of the challenges that the State has to face. 
· · lik ' · L lam compatible 
The FMS conceptualisation shows that the rhetoncal question e is s 
. . E tud is nothing but misleading. Since 
with democracy', that dominates current Middle astern s Y, . . . 
. . . . 1. . • en to endless interpretations, 1t 1s no rehg1on 1s democratic and Islam like any other re igion is op 
the situation that determines which interpretation is dominant. HiStorically when Muslims were 
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confident and lived prosperously they interpreted the Koran in an O d l'b 1 pen an I era way. Whereas 
when they were defeated and frustrated they turned to a radical int tat' h erpre 10n; t e example of 
Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ton Tayrniyya and the fall of Baghdad at the hand of the Mongol is a 
prominent example. Ibn Tayrniyya lived in a time when the Islamic world was suffering from 
external wars and internal strife. The crusaders were in the region and the Mongols had all but 
destroyed the eastern Islamic empire when they captured Baghdad in 1258. In Egypt, the 
Mamluks had just come to power and were consolidating their hold over Syria. It was in this 
setting of turmoil and conflict that he formulated his views on the causes of the weakness of the 
Muslim nations and on the need to return to the Koran and sunna (practices) as the only means 
for revival. (The information is available on the special website devoted to him and his work 
http://www.ibntaimiah.com/ in Arabic) His literal and radical interpretation of Koran, directly 
reflected the political situation around him. 
Based on the relationship between situation and interpretation, the strong presence of the 
political Islam irI the FMS is clear. FMS marginalises the population and when it fights the 
radical Islam it utilises both the language and the technology of modernity, thus the state is seen 
as a modem in the eyes of the population. This false affiliation of the state with modernity makes 
modernity associated with all the states' pathologies such as corruption, despotism, waste of the 
wealth and tyranny. 
The particular structure of the FMS elucidates a number of impossibilities. Among them: 
(a) it is impossible to reform within the system; (b) because of the FMS structure being neither 
modem nor tradition and utilising both the system survives any pressure from both outside and 
inside; ( c) moreover, their longevity shaped the mind of generations of people to not know how 
to be citizens. This hopelessness is due to the established structure of the FMS. Reform indicates 
· · · · b f · t·tut1'on or of a value. But in order to 
an absence w1thm a system; whether 1t 1s an a sence o ms 1 
· · requisite the creation of space is 
mtroduce this absent value or norms mto the system, as a pre , 
. ak' h F rthermore it is essential that the 
needed, which cannot be realised without m mg c ange. u ' 
th b f values and norms. Therefore to state the only true power holder, acknowledges e a sence 0 
. . . . th stem where it can be located and 
reform, it is necessary to pinpoint what 1s m1ssmg m e sy ' . 
·b·l·ty f aking room to accommodate it. 
more essentially whether there is room, or the poSSI 1 1 0 m ' 
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The FMS does not acknowledge any need for reform Th FMS . . . . 
· e views itself as a divme or 
perfect creature. More importantly, the FMS does not to! t ak" (fr . . era e m mg a ee) space beyond its 
control ( omnipotent), especially when there is the harsh reali·s t· th t · a 10n a any crack might lead to 
the collapse of the whole system. This very fact has been one f th · · o e mam reasons behmd 
ineffectiveness of external pressure for democratisation. 
Shortly after 9/11, President George W. Bush declared that the best hope for peace and 
security in the Middle East lay in the expansion of democracy and freedom there. But 
soon enough, democratization began to collide with core U.S. interests after all. U.S. 
pressure for political reform proved distracting (and potentially destabilizing) to regional 
allies whose assistance was crucial in the drive to stabilize Iraq and restart the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process (Bellin, 2008: 112). 
In addition the FMS responds to extra pressures only when they come from major powers. 
However, the response is often nothing more than a cosmetic change. Therefore the result of 
external pressure is 
no evidence of a genuine political paradigm shift occurring in the region. They (the 
people) see no substantive redistribution of power, no creation of effective checks and 
balances at the institutional level to limit executive power, no reforms sufficient to make 
political leadership truly accountable to the popular will. At most, they fmd cosmetic 
reform: some liberalization, some introduction of competitive elections. But such 
initiatives are hobbled in ways that are preventing a tangible shift in the balance of 
power. Reform in the Arab world has largely given rise to "fas;ade democracy" rather 
than true democracy (Bellin, 2008: 115) 
The structure of the FMS allows such manoeuvres and makes them, at best, ineffective. These 
reforms are sold by the government as meaningful but they are nothing more than a placebo. 
This is equally true for democratisation, secularisation, development and rule of law. None of 
these will be realised without a radical change in the structure of the FMS. Such a change might 
destabilise the balance between modernity and tradition. If the balance shifts towards mod~mity, 
th 
· · · rnment under the rule of law. On the other 
en the result 1s more hkely to be a democratic gove 
hand, if the balance shifts towards tradition then the more likely result is a theocratic 
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government; especially at the current moment when the modem (rad· 1) 1·t· 1 1 1 • 1ca po 1 1ca s am 1s the 
most organised traditional force. This by no mean indicates that trad·t· d 1- · 1 10n an re 1g1on are the 
same thing, but religious political groups are the most powerful and organised traditional groups. 
Therefore, any real change threatens the whole system. This makes words such as reform, which 
also means changing the form of the government, as a real threat to the survival of the FMS. 
This equally applies to democracy. If the word democracy indicates the rule of the 
majority or the participation of the population, such an act contradicts with the basic principle of 
elite rule in the FMS. Democracy as a practice opposes the central ethos of the FMS, which is 
exemplified in the belief that the State is the property of a particular group of people. If concepts 
like reform, democracy and the rule of law demand progress towards modernity, there are other 
concepts which equally relate to both tradition and modernity, namely secularism. Secularism is 
the separation of religion from the public domain. The FMS stands on a modem and a traditional 
leg. Therefore, it is clear that tradition, including religion, is an essential part of the FMS -
without it the state can neither operate nor survive. According to this arrangement secularism 
within the realm of the FMS simply is unfeasible. 
If reform or change requires language, movement and organisation then these are not 
possible without the full agreement of the State. Therefore, inside the FMS for any events, 
whether modem or traditional to take place, there must be a full permission from the 
government. For the FMS, the undisputable rule is: any event that does not enhance the survival 
of the state is banned. Managing, monitoring and prohibiting these events, is the priority of the 
state. They are an essential part of state security. The FMS is wary of its security. State and state-
security dates back to the birth of the modem state; the FMS has no difficulty in borrowing and 
implementing this particular aspect of modernity. Whether it is repression, which is fairly very 
d th t the FMS meet the definition of common (imprisonment, torture and threats) to a egree a 
1 amalgamatl·on of both modernity and tradition classical control tota itarianism. Through 
. b "ble Usually through utilising 
technique like divide-and-rule and co-option ecome possi · 
. . ( undesirable events but in cases 
modernity and tradition the State has no difficulty m preven mg ' 
of their occurrence the State guides and secures their consequences in a fashion that only 
enhances the State-authority. 
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The failed modem concept relates to previous concepts · · • ill various ways. In relation to 
those who prioritise culture as the central obstacle to realisation of modernity, the FMS confirms 
g 1s ill epen ent. s that, the state, in the form of the PMS creates a zone within which nothin · · d d Thi 
implies that regarding culture as an independent force misunderstands the reality within the 
territory under the coercion of the state. Within the zone of the FMS culture is nothing but a 
mere tool that the state utilises in a similar way to any other instruments. It is axiomatic that the 
culture of the region, like any other traditional culture, is hostile to modernity. But the state 
maintains this hostility to counterbalance the occidental modernity. Meanwhile, this particular 
situation paralyses the local culture preventing it from modernising itself. 
The Rentier-state theory is one of the dominant theoretical approaches used to analyse 
Arab Middle Eastern states. The FMS and Rentier-state theory diverge and converge in a number 
of ways. Rentier and rentierism is not possible without modernity. For instance; the technology 
to excavate natural resources, the ability to ship them to the international market and the 
international market itself, are all products of modernity. This is form technological and 
economic sides. But Rentierism is primarily a political method practiced by the state elite to 
ensure their survival. For instance instead of 'no taxation without representation' the Rentier 
State turns that famous American Revolution phrase to 'no representation without taxation'. 
Accordingly some argued since the primary role of the Rentier State is allocation then 
"democracy is not a problem for allocation states" (Luciani, 1990: 76). If Rentier policy is 
possible because of modernity that does not necessarily indicate that the Rentier is wholly 
modem. As I have argued in the literature review the Rentier mentality has strong roots in the 
tradition of the region. Therefore the Rentier is a traditional idea realised by modernity. This 
indicates that when people in the Rentier states receive subsidies from the state they do not 
regard it as salary for their obedience. Therefore, despite Rentier policy there is widespread 
d
. · · · t annot buy off opposition. In countries like 
1ssat1sfactlon and more importantly the govemmen c 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and others opposition, has arisen and with it a discrepancy 
b 
· fr ork and empirical reality. Moreover 
etween the expectations derived from the Rent1er amew 
.
1 
Ith · th ir wealth The Rentier state is not a 
people in the region are fully aware that the 01 wea is e · 
. th time the ruler to be subsiding the 
modem state per se. It utilises modernity. At e same ' . 
. . al Ar b ritual However this approach fails to 
population for their cooperation is a tradition a · ' 
. . . 1 1 suffers from a crude generalisation. demystify the state-society relationship Ill the region. 1 a so 
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Unlike the FMS, the Ren tier theory, fails to answer the quesf f d · • . 
. . . ion o issatisfaction and opposition 
to the regimes m the reg10n. Rentierism is convincm· g when 1·ty · b rea 1 1s a sent. 
The structure of the FMS m ight instigate the idea of tr ·t· . fr · · ans1 10n, om traditional to 
modernity but in reality there is no transition The FMS is not in tran ·t· t d d • 
· s1 10n owar mo erruty; 
(this argued in rather more detail in the literature review chapter) this also indicates that it has no 
desire to move away from traditional. This makes the FMS structure a permanent structure. In 
other words, this form of state does not qualify as a state in transition. The lack or absence of 
transition and the impossibility of it in the structure of the FMS also clarifies the relation of the 
concept to modernisation theory. The overall expectation of modernisation theory was that the 
process of economic development and the pace of modernisation would ultimately create and 
consolidate democratic regimes. The FMS approach does not argue that the state does not engage 
in any activities: in fact the state through its apparatuses active but only to enhance the FMS, not 
to transit to a new era. 
Modernisation theory argues that the States in the Middle East are on a road toward modernity. 
However, the reality stands in contrast to this perspective. The non-transitional state of these 
States indicates that the status quo is preserved. The static non-developmental status of the State 
and ultimately of society indicates that modernisation theory is irrelevant. Modernisation theory, 
the belief that industrialisation and economic development leads directly to positive social and 
political change, is at best divorced from the reality on the ground. To paraphrase Seymour 
Martin Lipset's statement in his book Political Man (1960) wealth might be essential for 
sustaining democracy but economic development per se does not sets off a series of social 
changes that together tend to produce democracy. Many of the countries in the region are not 
poor and the current levels of education and urbanisation in the region are high enough to 
support democracy. The FMS theory shows that when there is a critical barrier, namely the State 
and the State elite none of these variables has any effect. The FMS in order to survive requires 
' 
tradition as much as modernity. Therefore, the level of modernity should not exceed to a level 
that would wither tradition. Moreover the FMS hollows modernity from its political influences to 
a level that modernity itself, in many cases, ends up being used is a tool to withhold modernity. 
. . t derstanding the contemporary puzzle 
The FMS approach contributes m vanous ways o un 
1 d the states in the region is their around Arab Middle Eastern States. One of the puzz es aroun 
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centrality. This is a puzzle because no states in the region are uni·~onn h :~ . . 1
' or ave a unuonn identity. 
They are all multi-ethnic, multi-sects, and multi-religion. Regardless of that apart from UAE and 
Iraq, no country in the region is federal or decentralised. FMS cannot share power, negotiate with 
the other. It has to hold power in as an absolute fonn. The other puzzle is why despite the 
presence of so much of tradition and modernity in these states no progress is happening. The 
FMS shows that the State elites require both modernity and tradition to utilise in order to survive. 
Therefore, both modernity and tradition contribute in making this fonn of State. 
The FMS approach contributes in various ways to demystify the puzzling structure of 
Arab Middle Eastern States. The theory confinns that not only internal or external factors hold 
together the states in the region: it is a subtle complex combination of all these forces together. 
The external factor is exemplified primarily by the major Western powers. They can be 
considered generally as advocating for more modernisation and modernity. The FMS concept 
verifies that one factor alone, whether it is external or internal, on its own, cannot ensure the 
survival of these states and function with such stubbornness against all the pressures (internal 
and external). The FMS is structured in a fonn able to bring together all these contradictory 
factors and translate them into enforcement. The FMS shows that all political power is held by 
the State. Thus within the State there is no room for consultation, dialogue or exchange, first and 
foremost because there are no recognisable independent forces and in the case of their existence 
they are nothing but a rubberstamp for the authorities. 
By having both modernity and tradition as tools, the FMS is equipped to confront 
challenges both internally and internationally. For instance, there has been much talk about the 
change in the role of the state and state power in the era of globalisation. No doubt this has 
affected the States in the Arab Middle East but it did not impact on the nature and structure of 
the state into any fundamental way. This equally applies to the democratic waves. According to 
Huntington 
-
. . · the 1820s with the widening of the 
The first "'long" wave of democratization began ~ . th U '·t d States and continued 
suffrage to a large proportion of the i_nal_e populat~:: Ill so:e ~ 9e democr~cies. In 1922, 
for almost a century until 1926, brlllglllg. ~t~ Ita/ marked the beginning of a first 
however, the coming to power of Mussolini Ill b y f d mocratic states in the world to 
"reverse wave" that by 1942 had reduced the n~~- :r; s:cond wave of democratization 
12. The triumph of the Allies in World War II IIlltla e a 
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that reached its zenith in 1962 with 36 countries governed d t' 11 1 
followed by a second reverse wave (1960-1975) that brought themocrabica fy,d on y to _be 
e num er o emocracies 
back down to 30. At what stage are we within the third wave? (1991: 12). 
The Middle Eastern countries did not become part of the third wave and the populations like 
Samuel Beckett's protagonists, in Waitingfor Godot, have to wait forever for the fourth wave. 
The FMS is located between modernity and tradition. It is a medium with a purpose. 
Therefore, it acts as a barrier between tradition a nd modernity. Through this separation it 
attempts to create the atmosphere of the Camp. The Camp atmosphere signifies [as explained in 
detail in chapter four] that nothing should take place. All the occurrences should originate from 
the state. The state has to organise, establish, arrange, and appoint, everything, everyone and 
every event. One of the reasons behind this FMS desire is tradition. One can argue the present of 
tradition makes politics in the FMS a political theology as Carl Schmitt understood it. According 
to him 
All significant concepts of the modem theory of state are secularized theological concepts 
not only because of their historical development-in which they were transformed from 
theology to the theory of state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the 
omnipotent lawgiver-but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of 
which is necessary for a sociological consideration of the concepts. The exception in 
jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology (1985: 36). 
In the FMS the image of ruler and its role and relationship with the population is springs from 
tradition (religion). In traditional Islamic theology, ~I rk,ilm alkalam, Allah is 0rdering (amr) 
· · 1 1 f d in Koran "The Initiator of the 
and creating (khalq) simultaneously. As it is c ear Y men tone 
· · 1 t 't "Be and it is" (2: 117). This 
heavens and the earth: to have anythmg done, He sunp Y says O i , , 
· d The picture of the powerful 
"Be," and it is', which indicates thing operates at maxunum spee · 
d. t th ain principle of ilmi kalam: the good leader has an origin in this arrangement. Accor mg O e m . 
. f Reason but because God decrees it to 
is good not because it conforms to a Law of Nature or O ' 
. . . f true leader when he has these 
be good. The FMS leader only sees himself as m a position ° a 
. . . . of what is good and what is not. To have 
particular qualities. Like god he is the ultunate Judge 
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such qualities indicates that one need not consult anyone else Th h ld b • • 
. ere s ou e no restnction or 
hurdle in front of the leaders. Therefore for instance there 1·s c • • . . , , no room 1or an mstltutlon like 
parliament. The FMS leaders meet delegations of their population only if th · th ey praise em or beg 
for money. 
This state is like a mirage; nothing appears as it is. There is the presence of Islam without 
being Islamic. The same thing applies to modernity. This makes studying and analysing these 
states through focusing on official documents just as constitutions or state publications or the 
media a misleading exercise. While FMSs struggle hard to be omnipresent and visible, 
simultaneously most activities of the state happen in the dark. This high visibility in combination 
with high secrecy is the nature of the system. These two contradictory activities blend with each 
other. The visibility is invisibility. What is visible is visible to cover what is meant to be 
invisible. This particular arrangement ensures the inhabitants of these countries live in 
bewilderment. People see the army, arms, mukhabarat (the secret service), police, but have no 
clue, for the instance, where the budget is going, how it is spent, how decisions are made and in 
whose interest. 
The FMS can be highly visible and extremely secretive through the utilisation of 
modernity and tradition. To take the media as an example: state officials in the FMS are always 
visible in the media. They are shown in every different ways but in most cases silently. The 
purpose is to remind the population of them, their position and their importance. This mute 
appearance is highly symbolic. It verifies the position, the power and charisma of the rulers. This 
is only possible because of modernity. Tradition is in the form of praise. It is part of the history 
of power in the region that the leader has his own private poet or poets. The old poet was 
replaced by modem media people, but the function remained the same. In most cases the only 
difference is in the sheer amount. It can be said that the media machine services the ego of the 
· · · · · t· bout the nature of representation in the 
ruler. This daily repetitive exercise poses a ques ion a 
FMS. State officials desire to be seen, to be shown to the public, to pose their activity and remain 
mute. They do not engage in, dialogue or exchange of information. The sole purpose of fueir 
. . d f f the people This occurs not only in 
Virtual persona is to occupy the mmd, memory an IIDe O · • • 
h in every shape and fashion, the city 
the media. There are pictures of the leader everyw ere, . . 
. ark and comer a never agmg picture 
named after them, universities, streets, sculpture m every P ' 
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in the front page of every state newspaper. Samir a!Khalil (K Mak" ) • . anan 1ya m his book the 
'Monument: Art, Vulgarity and responsibility in Iraq' (1991) d t ·1 th. · 
' e ai s 1s 1Ssue. One can never 
escape the presence and influence of political leaders in the FMS. 
From its beginning in the Middle East modernity became the FMS the leviathan's the 
sovereign concern. This had some clear implications on the nature and f d · purpose o mo ern1ty, 
among them modernity is not a social movement. It is not a revolution. It is not aiming to bring 
about a dynamic society. The notions of citizens and enlightened beings are not to be considered. 
It is rather otherwise. If occidental modernity called for 'man's emergence from his self-imposed 
immaturity' , as Immanuel Kant 1784 stated in his brief article 'What is Enlightenment ', the 
Middle Eastern version of modernity utilised modem techniques to enhance the self-imposed 
immaturity. The FMS created a situation in which the human being should not dare to know and 
above all have no courage to lead his or her life. 
This thesis demonstrates that the state, and the system that the state elite established 
among the population, lies at the heart of all the problems of the region. The state elite shape the 
economy in an unproductive way to utilise it for political gain. To become a bureaucrat one has 
to pacify all his or her political faculties. The FMS pact confronts the emergence of society, the 
particular arrangement where different voices can be recognised and engage in dialogue and 
exchange. This anti-society policy has ramification on those who have different identity from the 
dominant group. Therefore, the FMS is a state that discriminates against minorities and strips 
them of all their legal rights. The minority is a loose concept which can be any one and every 
one. One falls among a minority when one is beyond the boundary of the state favour. 
If the FMS is a failure, the question is how to overcome this failure? The answer to the 
question does not lie in the nature of the failure. Therefore, the answer is not concerned about the 
reparation of the failure. The FMS is beyond amendment or redemption. The question here 
· th th ode! This makes modernity a form of 
concerns modernity as a pure concept ra er an as a m · 
becoming. Becoming or "to become", as Deleuze & Parnet (2006:2) put it, "is never to imitate, 
nor to 'do like' nor to conform to a model". Thus, to become modem it is not to become like the 
' 
th d 1 as the West To become modem West. It is not to imitate. It is not to construct e same mo e , · 
. . d 1 ference but not as the model. For this lil that sense one can use the occidental mo e as a re 
' . . . . tat has to be distanced or is forced to 
modernity to succeed, the state, unless 1t 1s a legitunate s e, 
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be distant from it. Modernity as a project has to be social and has t b fi th · th 
o e or e society ra er 
than the state. What is more imperative is the preparation of the gro d fi think" Th 
un or mg. ere can 
never be modernity without thinking, in other words individual thinkers think" t · d 
, mg no m or er to 
serve power or authority, but the human, the community and the society, to paraphrase the 
famous Protagoras statement; making human the measure (Kattsoff, 1953). This is only 
achievable by the revival or the introduction of philosophy into the ambience of social and 
political spheres. Historically, Muslims philosophised but there has never been an Islamic 
philosophy. Philosophy requires, firstly, creating an environment for a human to think about his 
or her own condition. Secondly, it is crucial to respect that thinking and make it the source of 
politics. This is only attainable when there is education, freedom, a space for discussion, 
democracy, and a change or exchange in the system of ruling. Philosophy here is also an act, an 
act of permanent critique. This prepares the ground for a historical rupture with a history where 
man (h uman) a s an independent hum an being has never existed. This form of nonexistent 
existence is the central reason for the survival of the FMS and it is the mother of all tragedies. To 
end the failed modem state has to be reconstructed to allow the emergence of modernity by 
people for people. 
Becoming modern, the emergence of modernity, is both potential and possible in the 
Arab Middle East. For people to become free, live in a free society, to obtain a home in order to 
be active in the world is not beyond possibility because of their culture. There is a desire for 
being able to speak; speaking is only possible when you have a listener. There is a clear demand 
among the population to relate to each other not as the big Other i.e. the state wishes but more in 
a civil manner. When the state is a door to connect to the outside, to infmity as Levinas likes to 
· · · 1 · d d" 1 · poss1"ble This indicates the possibility put it, a space will emerge where dia ectic an ia ogue 1s · 
· · · · · d birth f thes1·s i e new People desire democracy, of revision, rmprovement, negotiation an o syn · · · 
· · B t · ·1y because of the structure of Failed they express it in every possible opportumty. u , pnmari 
Modern Sate, this remains only as a desire. 
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